The Dissertation Committee for Randy Sunwin Uang certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:

Careful Crackdowns:
Human Rights and Campaigning on Public Security in Latin America

Committee:

Wendy Hunter, Supervisor

Kurt Weyland

Henry Dietz

Raul Madrid

Kenneth Greene

Careful Crackdowns:
Human Rights and Campaigning on Public Security in Latin America

by

Randy Sunwin Uang, B.A.

Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2012

Acknowledgements

Support for this study came from numerous places. Wendy Hunter, Kurt Weyland, Henry Dietz, Raul Madrid, and Kenneth Greene provided valuable direction throughout this project. Strong backing also came from other established researchers, including Robert Moser, Catherine Boone, Peter Trubowitz, and Tse-min Lin.

Important support came from many additional researchers. Kristin Wylie provided professional commentary and opinions on many versions of the work that went into this project. Riitta-Ilona Koivumaeki, Danilo Contreras-Martínez, and Hector Ibarra-Rueda provided a wealth of excellent recommendations. Taofang Huang and Adam Myers provided particularly useful advice for distilling and refining ideas, especially in the initial formulations of the plans for this project.

Daniel Nogueira Budny and Matthew Johnson provided excellent perspectives on in-country research. Useful observations also came from people working on projects at the same time, particularly Luis Camacho, Mary Slosar, and Austin Hart. Many people who helped to provide specific insights about points underlying this study include Eduardo Dargent, Paula Muñoz, Laura Gamboa, Ayca Arkilic, Mine Tafolar, Jacqueline Hunsicker, and Carlos Timo Brito. The project process was facilitated by the efforts of departmental administrators, especially Annette Carlile and Amy Chi. María Antonia Garcés provided excellent contacts during interview work in Colombia.

Financing from two units of the University of Texas at Austin also made this study possible: the Department of Government, which provided Macdonald and Patterson research fellowships, and the Institute of Latin American Studies, which provided a Tinker Research Grant and a Lozano Long Research Grant.

Careful Crackdowns:
Human Rights and Campaigning on Public Security in Latin America

Randy Sunwin Uang, Ph.D.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2012

Supervisor: Wendy Hunter

Crime and violence are regularly seen as being ripe for politicians to turn into campaign issues and win votes. This study argues, in contrast, that success on public security is not so automatic: human rights values constrain the use of security and the winning of votes on it. Even in Latin American countries, where voters' concerns about rampant crime and violence are among the highest in the world, considerations of human rights combine with low trust in security forces to restrict the viability of the issue in key ways. Examination of presidential campaigns in Colombia in 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010 supports this claim. Success on security is a two-step process: invoking the issue and then gaining voter support on the topic. Usability depends on the absence of recent repression and the degree of organization of security threats. Then, winning votes on it depends on having a civilian background, a campaign that balances security with other issues, and messages of careful enforcement. These messages of careful enforcement promise targeted, deliberate use of security forces' enforcement activities in a way that

pays attention to human rights, rather than promising unbridled enforcement, increased punishment, or programs of long-term prevention. This study therefore shows how candidates are forced to walk a fine line between promising to establish order and promising to protect basic rights and liberties. These findings are powerful, providing an understanding of public security in electoral campaigns that maintains a much closer fit with empirical reality than existing research. The results also provide a critique of the sociological school of vote choice and points to ways in which ownership of the issue of security may be leased away. Furthermore, because the results are driven by the spread of human rights values, the results demonstrate the importance of quick shifts in political culture as a factor that explains changes in political patterns.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

CHAPTER 1: CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND THE UNEVEN SUCCESS OF PUBLIC SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

Why might there be relatively little successful campaigning on problems of crime and violence, even when it is a matter of intense concern for voters? Certain topics galvanize the voters who care strongly about them, whether they involve crime and violence plaguing neighborhoods and rural areas, an economy under the rails that causes millions of people to go jobless, or controversial social issues that divide society along entrenched lines of principle. In the case of crime and violence, the current situation of Latin American countries presents a strange and seemingly unexpected phenomenon. Concerns about public security are intense and widespread among the voters of the region, yet effective use of this dire issue is not as widespread as these concerns seem to suggest. This represents a key puzzle: why might this be?

Public security, after all, ought to be a major campaign issue in Latin American presidential elections. Crime and violence have made Latin America into a hotbed of danger for the average person. Whether they are highly organized like the guerrilla and paramilitary groups of Colombia and the drug networks of Brazilian slums and Mexico, or diffuse like the perpetrators of property crimes in Chile and Argentina, they make daily life in Latin America more dangerous to person and property than in all other regions of the world (Heinemann and Verner 2006; Cruz 2008).

Some notable examples make clear the extent of this dire problem. The murder rate in Medellín, Colombia, is three times that of Washington, D.C. (Medina and Tamayo

2009); the total number of homicides in Venezuela in 2011 was higher than that of the entire United States (Casas-Zamora 2012). Murder has become young people's leading cause of death in Brazil, due largely to drug gang battles in urban slums (Glüsing 2007). Street robbery more than tripled in Argentina between 1990 and 2001 (Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky 2010: 182). In five Latin American countries in the late 1990s, Guatemala, El Salvador, Venezuela, Mexico, and Ecuador, over 40% of urban households experienced a major theft or robbery in the last year (Gaviria and Pagés 2002: 184). As if these problems were not enough, drug traffickers and guerrilla groups carry out bombings, arson, and kidnapping sprees, and not just against police and military forces, but also against ordinary people. Such examples can be especially grisly. In 2003 in Colombia, guerrillas carried out a car bombing of a club in the capital Bogotá, killing 36 people and wounding over 200 in a wealthy area in the middle of the evening; in 2011 in Monterrey, the commercial hub of northern Mexico, a drug cartel set a casino ablaze in broad daylight on a weekday afternoon, killing 52 people, many of them children and their parents.

"Public security" is used in this project to mean the safety of individuals, property, and government institutions from nonpolitical crime and political violence (González, López, and Yáñez 1994; Kincaid and Gamarra 1996; Bailey and Dammert 2006). Crime and violence in Latin America have made public security immensely valued. It is striking that despite Latin American countries' widely diverse contexts, so many now have the common unenviable challenge of dealing with such dire problems. For those interested in curing these problems, this study's examination of success on

security is vitally useful. Candidates who campaign on the issue and win on it frequently use their victories to claim a mandate to tackle these problems. In environments plagued by violence and crime, candidates often claim to be the best equipped to protect people from harm. Such assertions by candidates are made frequently, but there is little indication of what convinces voters of their claims. So what influences whether using this issue can be successful?

"Success" on security is defined in this study as the effective use of security. To the casual observer, success is readily evident: candidates rail on security and then become popular because of it. More precisely, success requires two steps: first, using the issue centrally, and second, having a high vote share as a result. Candidates' success can be observed directly, seen as security-concerned voters favoring such candidates more than other candidates, and doing so more strongly than voters overall.

Existing research on advanced industrial countries has found that success on public security comes readily. Voters' widespread concerns supposedly result in an easy electoral advantage for candidates who campaign on security (Chevigny 2003; Estrada 2004; Mayer and Tiberj 2004; Hamai and Ellis 2006). The preponderance of research on issues of public security has concluded that voters' concerns readily lead candidates to campaign on tackling crime and violence, and finds that voters consistently reward these candidates strongly at the polls.

This study, however, argues that the findings of existing research are limited in geographic and temporal scope. Instead, this research argues that in contemporary Latin America, such findings do not hold. Given the rampant crime and violence plaguing

Latin American countries, the seeming advantages facilitating success on security would predict its easy use and easy winning on the issue. Yet in Latin America, presidential candidates have not consistently seized the opportunity to campaign on the issue. Campaigning on security often does not even occur, not even among rightist candidates, who are seen as natural users of issues of public security (Petrocik 1996; Gibson 1996) and who, within Latin America as a region, are in need of issues to stem the recent victories of leftist politicians. Some candidates seize upon these problems in their campaigns, but not all politicians who might be expected to focus on the topic actually turn it into a major campaign theme. Moreover, those who do are not always successful.

This study argues that human rights values powerfully constrain the viability of security as a campaign issue in contemporary Latin America. These values have spread in Latin America such that demands to quell a rising tide of rampant lawlessness no longer consistently result in automatic success. Instead, the spread of human rights now makes this transmission subject to specific favorable conditions. This project specifies the particular conditions that affect success on security, and demonstrates the precise ways in which they affect success; it unifies these conditions in a theory that makes clear predictions of likely success based on these conditions, each of which bears hallmarks of the spread of human rights within the region.

Results of this project include conclusions that directly impact major currents of research in the comparative study of politics. Beyond the pressing topic of public security itself, this study is about elections and campaigns in general, and about the politicization of issues more specifically. Its implications bear directly on research about

issue emergence in campaigns, representing a critique of the sociological school of voting. In the view of this school, issues become politicized when social divisions arise related to those issues; then, voters choose candidates on the basis of their opinions on the issues (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994). The view that success on security comes easily is a claim derived from this school. Instead, because this study shows that public security is only a viable issue under specific conditions, it points to the limitations of such a view.

In addition, this project advances research on issue ownership by suggesting limits to rightist ownership of security issues. Rightist ownership of public security is frequently seen as a natural aspect of electoral politics (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003). Instead, this study shows that ownership may be more difficult to maintain. This work shows several factors that weaken rightists' perceived advantage on security, helping to lease away rightists' ownership of the issue.

Furthermore, the research demonstrates a key impact of political culture on political dynamics. In the comparative study of politics, culture has frequently been characterized as slow-moving, with impacts on politics that are of relatively minor consequence (Elkins and Simeon 1979) or that become apparent only over long stretches of time (Pierson 2004). In stark contrast, this project invokes a dynamic view of some aspects of political culture, which explains relatively quick differences in political patterns within a single region over time.

Finally, for research on Latin American politics, the project helps to explain recent patterns in leftist and rightist success in the region in a way that corrects some

existing observations about the 2000s rise of leftist presidents. The findings are able to explain why in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many Latin American presidential campaigns did not feature security as a major topic, even though crime and violence were already rampant. It also explains why, after the early 2000s, the trend of rightists being elected in Latin America on public security has seemed to accelerate somewhat. In doing so, the findings of this project cast doubt on the belief that socioeconomic issues naturally dominate all other issues in the region (see Cleary 2006).

In accomplishing these tasks, this study stands out in three ways. First, it combines in-depth examination of multiple cases in the same country. This within-country approach is a clear break from most studies of public security, which examine single elections or examine cases cross-nationally, despite several clear analytical advantages of examining cases within the same country. Second, this project takes advantage of multiple first-hand interviews from intriguing, politically relevant sources. These sources, close to the real-life dynamics of running and supporting campaigns, allow the study to incorporate first-hand accounts and reflections of many surprising aspects of campaigning on the issue. Third, it involves content analysis of reporting of major substantively important campaigns that have used public security: these efforts yield details of campaigning on security that draw on systematic analysis of campaign dynamics. Such content analyses are present in research on campaigns and elections for many issues other than security, but are of great need for the issue of security itself.

WIDESPREAD SECURITY CONCERNS BUT UNEVEN SUCCESS ON THE ISSUE

Crime and violence currently plague Latin American countries so much that public security has become one of the most important concerns of voters throughout the region. In contrast with the U.S., where voters' major national concerns involve economic and social issues (Miller and Schofield 2003), and in contrast with European countries, where voters' main concerns center on economic issues and topics of social participation and cultural expression (Kitschelt 1994), voters' non-economic concerns regularly center on public security. Table 1.1 shows the importance of these concerns.

Table 1.1 – Public Security as a Principal Concern

Country	*Security*	*Economics*	*Next Largest Problem*
Venezuela	59%	15%	corruption (8%)
Guatemala	51	32	corruption (4)
Colombia	46	36	war on terrorism (4)
El Salvador	45	46	politicians (2)
Chile	41	32	education (5)
Honduras	35	43	corruption (10)
Argentina	30	34	education (6)
Brazil	30	25	corruption (14)
Mexico	29	44	corruption (7)
Panama	21	47	corruption (9)
Costa Rica	21	49	corruption (7)
Uruguay	15	62	bad government (3)
Paraguay	14	55	corruption (10)
Peru	10	71	corruption (7)
Nicaragua	5	67	corruption (9)
Bolivia	4	57	corruption (8)
Ecuador	4	60	corruption (13)

Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006-2007, 2008.
Note: "Security" combines several free-response categories as recorded by LAPOP: crime, gangs, security, conflict, kidnap, and violence. "Economics" combines the economy, inflation, unemployment, and poverty.

Yet electoral success on public security has not been consistent, not even in countries with extensive concerns about it. Actual success has been much more varied than what existing findings would predict. Some candidates, such as Antonio Saca in El Salvador in 2004, used security as their central issue and won dramatic voter support for their proposals. Others, such as Porfirio Lobo in Honduras in 2005 and Otto Pérez Molina in Guatemala in 2007, tried to leverage it but had limited success. Still other candidates, such as winners Felipe Calderón in Mexico in 2006 and Ricardo Martinelli in Panama in 2009, unsuccessful candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle in Uruguay in 2009, and winners Sebastián Piñera in Chile in 2009-2010 and Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica in 2010, used security as one of many issues. In Brazil and Venezuela, on the other hand, security has largely not been a major campaign issue even though voter concerns are high. These patterns differ dramatically from the expectation that security is a ready-made issue.

Uneven success on public security can be seen in Latin America as a whole. Existing research portrays security as politicized either in a straightforward manner, with campaigning keeping pace in proportion with voters' concerns (Weis and Milakovich 1974; Garland 2001; Godoy 2006). Or, it is portrayed as being used in a very easy manner, which often results in issue use above and beyond what might be expected of voters' concerns (Cullen, Clark, and Wozniak 1985; Beckett 1997; Davey 1999; Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2006).

In contrast, this study focuses on the many recent Latin American presidential elections where concerns are high yet there is not much campaigning on security, much

less effective use of this issue. In many elections, concern for security is high but there is little campaigning. Furthermore, for the campaigns that do use security centrally, some have won many votes on it while others have not. This pattern, of so many elections featuring many voters concerned about security but with candidates having more varied success, is out of step with the predictions of existing research. These aberrations from the existing predictions are so frequent that they cannot be attributed merely to candidates' individual failures to pick up on the issue. To account for these patterns that are so starkly different from the empirical expectations of current research, a new understanding is needed of how public security works as a campaign issue.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

This study argues that human rights values make public security into an issue whose political viability is not assured, but is rather contingent on the correct conditions. Considerations of human rights, including a growing intolerance of repression and the arbitrary use of authority, affect the viability of security throughout the campaign process. Variation in success on security can be explained by specific conditions, each of which is linked to considerations about human rights. Public security and human rights need not always be in conflict, but tensions between the two considerations make it so that not just any politician at any time can succeed on security.

More than demonstrating that human rights considerations constrain security, this study develops an argument about the conditions that facilitate use of security issues and

which encourage voters to choose candidates on the basis of security. The study shows how these conditions combine to produce varying levels of success. As this study reveals, attention to human rights makes the use of security dependent on the correct background conditions surrounding the election season; a growing dislike of repression also leads voters to favor certain candidates, mixes of issues including security, and specific messages on security. Instead of public security problems constraining attention to human rights, human rights values now have the potential to limit successful political use of public security.

First, human rights values cause candidates' sustained use of security to depend on two conditions: the degree of organization of security threats and the existence of recent repression. When crime and violence are caused by diffuse, less potently organized threats, candidates have fewer opportunities to rail against crime and violence, and other political actors such as competing candidates and journalists have more opportunities to push back against these candidates. Where there has been recent repression, other political actors have yet further opportunities to push back against security-minded candidates.

Second, human rights make winning votes on the issue depend on specific candidate backgrounds, campaign approaches, and security messages. Career military backgrounds can still be useful for candidates to convince voters of their ability to crack down on security threats, but these same backgrounds are also bad for candidates because they raise concerns about such candidates' interest in respecting human rights. In contrast with existing research that focuses only how military backgrounds help

candidates, through perceived competence on security, this project shows how these backgrounds create difficulties for candidates by considerations of human rights, and that these difficulties often overcome the benefits of a military background. Candidates are often hurt by perceptions that they will govern in arbitrary ways that threaten basic rights; candidates who focus almost exclusively on security are also seen assumed to be willing to trample on basic liberties. Candidates who discuss security by using messages of punishment also heighten voters' worries about basic rights. Most voters who are concerned with crime and violence want security forces to work toward making their lives safer, yet human rights values turn security into a sensitive issue.

Third, the security messages of punishment that have worked well in advanced industrial democracies are not as effective in Latin America, compared with messages of careful enforcement: that is, sending the police or military directly into areas that are plagued by crime and violence to confront these problems directly, but with attention to human rights. These messages of careful enforcement are not only more effective than punitive messages, but they are also more effective than messages of long-term prevention. Candidates' success depends on being the one to use enforcement messages the most; voters' concerns about a respect for basic rights simply requires that such candidates propose a deliberate enforcement that is unlikely to result in widespread human rights abuses.

Differences in these conditions therefore generate the wide variation in success on security. Using security as an issue in the first place is helped by the presence of organized security threats and the absence of recent repression. Then, civilian

backgrounds, balancing security with a broad mix of issues, and messages of enforcement help candidates get the most votes through their use of the topic. Human rights values therefore lead success to require promises of a "careful crackdown": force against criminals and violent actors, but also restraint and attention to basic liberties.

Current research would characterize the path to campaigning on public security as a pipeline that transmits concerns about the issue into effective use by candidates. As Figure 1.1 illustrates, the vital change in perspective that this study brings is to say that where conditions are unfavorable, they narrow the chances for success on security, akin to a funnel that gets narrower at the bottom. Where they exist, overwhelming concerns are funneled into only medium success on the issue, and widespread concerns may result in low success. Success is not automatic: these conditions notably undermine the effective use of security. Only where these obstacles do not exist will the dynamics resemble the pipeline that exists for the advanced industrial democracies on which most existing research has been based.



PUBLIC SECURITY:
FAVORABLE CONDITIONS

PUBLIC SECURITY:
UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS

Figure 1.1 – Unfavorable Conditions Narrow Chances for Success

RESEARCH DESIGN: IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF COLOMBIA

This project undertakes a multi-case comparison of presidential election campaigns in Colombia. Colombia provides an excellent context for analyzing the use of security, especially through a multiple-case comparison. Concerns about security in the country throughout the period of study, the early 1990s through 2010, were dramatically high. Colombia has had ample experience with both rampant crime and acute political violence, with consequential repercussions for daily life. In the early 2000s, for example, a person was eleven times as likely to be a victim of homicide in Colombia as in the United States, about 60 times more likely than in Spain, and over 100 times more likely than in Japan (United Nations 2007). Low-range estimates for Colombia's homicide rate, recorded in terms of the number of incidents per 100,000 inhabitants per year, were consistently in the 50s and 60s from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s; even after subsequent improvements, the homicide rate stayed above 35 until 2009 (Ungar 2011: 331-334). As a sign of how severe these problems are in Colombia, the U.S. homicide rate for the last hundred years, including spikes during the 1960s, late 1970s, and late 1980s, has never exceeded 11 (Justice Research Statistics Association 2000: 38-39).

These decades-long problems of acute political violence and broad nonpolitical crime lead the preponderance of existing research to predict consistent success on security. Colombia differs from many Latin American countries in its mix of security threats, but this in fact makes Colombia a vitally useful and appropriate country for analysis. Since Colombia has both high crime and widespread violence, with each problem contributing to widespread concerns about security, Colombia serves as a "most

likely" context for success on security, and thus a "hard" test for the argument that human rights can constrain security.

The case selection for this study involves five recent campaigns in Colombia. Their selection satisfies two criteria. First, they each took place amidst the backdrop of high security concerns in Colombia. Second, taken together, they include full variation in the conditions for success. These campaigns are those of Ernesto Samper in 1994, Andrés Pastrana in 1994, Harold Bedoya in 1998, Álvaro Uribe in 2002, and Juan Manuel Santos in 2010.

Case selection consists of candidate campaigns, not election cycles, because campaign use of security and ability to win votes on the issue are both candidate-specific phenomena, not country-specific phenomena. Even when examining the effects of the conditions for issue use, which are country-specific and which change with each election cycle, analytical attention must be given not only to election cycles but also to individual campaigns because showing low issue use for the election cycle as a whole requires demonstrating that the candidates in that election year all paid minimal attention to the topic.

For 1994, both Pastrana and Samper are examined because 1994 is the election year with unfavorable conditions for sustaining issue use. Both must be included to demonstrate that conditions discouraging the use of security were responsible for this low use. In particular, this is done to show that the observed low use of the issue is not simply an artifact of choosing the candidate for that year who failed to invoke the issue, but rather common to all candidates. This is, of course, more easily done for 1994 than

for 1998, 2002, 2010, because two-party dominance of the presidential campaign arena held firm and interactive dynamics may be different in a two-party campaign than in a campaign environment with more candidates.

The Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos campaigns were chosen because they represent the most vociferous campaigns on security in their election year. The inclusion of the single heaviest user in each election is necessary to show that the candidate clamoring to use security the most would not always be received well by voters, as existing research presumes. For these elections in which security was used as an issue, 1998, 2002, and 2010, selection of only this single heaviest user of the issue for each campaign, rather than an examination of all security-oriented campaigns or indeed all campaigns regardless of whether they used security, was done because this study has stronger analytical rigor when specifically selecting the heaviest user of the issue. The purpose of the study is not to explain the levels of success of all candidates in a campaign season, not even in elections where all candidates are attending to security. Rather, its focus is to show that considerations of human rights can drastically limit success. This task is done most strongly by using the "best case" for success for each election: that is, the case that existing research would predict to win votes on security the most readily. Use of additional campaigns in the same election years could provide a larger number of cases for examination, which would seem to be a good reason for their inclusion, but their inclusion fails on one critical matter. By not being the most notable case of campaigning on security, these cases are not predicted by existing research to be as successful on security. They therefore provide drastically limited analytical leverage: variation in their

success could be explained by many factors, even ones that are not the focus of this study. Their level of success could therefore not be isolated to the conditions hypothesized to operate in this study. Inclusion of these "weaker" cases as main cases would therefore be of limited use in establishing that the specific conditions at work were those that truly accounted for variation in success.

Just as importantly, these cases vary on the conditions needed for winning votes on security. In doing so, they fill the spectrum of levels of success: the 1994 Pastrana and Samper campaigns represent the lowest levels of success on security, the 2002 Uribe campaign represents the highest success, and the 1998 Bedoya and 2010 Santos campaigns represent intermediate levels of success on the issue. Attention to this full range of cases is more appropriate than a focus, which occurs in much of the existing research, on only cases of high success. Attention to this full variation is also more analytically rigorous than focusing only on cases of low success, because it demonstrates that low issue viability comes from systematic factors.

Selection of campaign cases from the same country, differing on the explanatory factors while the country's history and many other conditions remain similar, gives the project a "most similar" case study design. It is stronger than a single case study approach, such as that commonly used in examinations of the political use of public security (see Arcé 2003; Holian 2004). Using different cases within the same country to reach conclusions through a comparative investigation is also stronger than an approach that examines campaigns cross-nationally (see Chevigny 2003; Estrada 2004; Smith 2010). A single-country, Colombia-based study examines a cluster of campaigns where

many factors associated with the country's history and many other background conditions remain the same; it also keeps institutional rules and other background factors roughly similar.

The campaigns examined in this study represent a stronger selection of cases than others that might also be considered fruitful because they most effectively leverage the strength of the "most similar" single-country design. All the campaigns being examined took place after the adoption of the 1991 Colombian constitution, causing institutional changes to be less consequential. In the elections examined in depth in this study, no candidate is the incumbent. Side references to Uribe's 2006 re-election are also included, since the election is a substantively important election in terms of continued promises of security, but the fact that the main cases do not have incumbents allows incumbency to be seen as less consequential in affecting success. Since the cases examined are similar on these background factors, variation can be seen more clearly as resulting from the favorable or unfavorable conditions identified in this study.

Table 1.2 shows how these conditions work to provide wide variation in success. As this study shows, diffuse threats and recent repression combined to render 1994 an unfavorable context for invoking security as an issue, even though crime and violence remained high and security concerns were intense. To show that the low use of security was due to unfavorable context and not merely due to any single candidate's decisions, both major campaigns of that election year are analyzed: Samper's winning campaign as well as Pastrana's losing campaign.

In contrast, the conditions for issue use were more favorable in 1998, 2002, and 2010. In the run-up to Bedoya's 1998 campaign, security threats were increasingly organized; leading up to Uribe's 2002 campaign and Santos' 2010 campaign, security threats were even more potently organized. Yet Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos varied in their candidate backgrounds and mix of issues. Bedoya faced largely unfavorable conditions for success: he had a military background and focused almost exclusively on security. Bedoya stands out from Santos and especially Uribe in having a military background and a heavy weight of attention to security; the inclusion of Bedoya as a case is integral to the study, showing that the wide variation in success among these cases is driven by the explanatory factors with which his candidacy is associated. In contrast, for Uribe these conditions were favorable and for Santos they were also largely favorable. Finally, Uribe and Santos varied on the favorability of security message content: Uribe's use of careful enforcement messages stood out clearly, even more so than for Santos.

Table 1.2 – Conditions at Work in Colombian Elections

Year	*Campaign*	*Background Conditions*	*Career Background*	*Campaign Approach*	*Content of Messages*
1994	Samper	Unfavorable	*	*	*
1994	Pastrana	Unfavorable	*	*	*
1998	Bedoya	Favorable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable	Unfavorable
2002	Uribe	Favorable	Favorable	Favorable	Favorable
2010	Santos	Favorable	Favorable	Mixed	Mixed

Note (*): Unfavorable background conditions lead to little use of security, and non-use of the subsequent conditions.

The argument of this study centers on how human rights values affect the interactions between candidates, and how such values affect voters' receptions of candidates, so the methods follow from this focus. The study involves interviews with these actors and content analysis of reporting on candidates' campaigns, combined with the close investigation of cases and the analysis of public opinion surveys.

This project makes use of politically intriguing interview sources, including campaign aides, journalists, and political party officials related to major presidential candidates' campaigns. These interviews took place during 2009 and 2010 in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, and in Medellín, the second largest city in Colombia and the base of support for some high-profile political figures. Interviewees include 1998 presidential candidate Harold Bedoya himself; the campaign chief for Álvaro Uribe's campaigns in 2002 and 2006; campaign members for Horacio Serpa in 2002 and Carlos Gaviria in 2006; and a campaign representative for Juan Manuel Santos in 2010. Additional interviewees include the representatives for other campaigns, political party officials, and journalists with a close knowledge of security issues.

As public figures or representatives of such figures, these interview sources were selected to enable an examination of the major security-focused campaigns in 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010. This selection requirement allows first-hand insight into all of the campaigns of interest to this project. In addition to including each of these major campaigns, interviews with representatives of campaigns for 2010 were also carried out, giving attention to campaigns regardless of their size.

Interview sources were asked about their campaign strategies and their decisions about the use of security. Specifically, they were asked about any obstacles that they felt impeded their success on the issue. If they did perceive obstacles, they were asked how they sought to overcome these barriers. Journalists and political party officials were able to attest to the pressures facing various campaigns. In some instances, these figures themselves even pressured candidates to act one way or another on the issue of security. Interview sources were also asked about the treatment of candidates by news media and other politicians, as well as how these campaigns' use of security compared with other candidates.

Interviews in Colombia were supplemented with content analyses of news reporting of many of the campaigns examined in this project. These analyses show trends across campaigns in how much candidates emphasized security, and what types of messages they used. The sources for these analyses include newspaper coverage of Colombian presidential campaigns, as well as separate newsweekly coverage of these campaigns.

Table 1.3 shows several examples of public security in presidential campaigns, grouped by levels of success. Each of the five main campaign cases from Colombia fits one of the levels of success. Also shown are several elections in other Latin American countries, from which a campaign in each election had similar levels of success to one of the Colombia cases.

Table 1.3 – Examples of Public Security in Presidential Campaigns			
Success	*Description of Use and Winning Votes*	*Colombia Cases in This Study*	*Additional Examples*
Highest	Sustained Use, Extremely Effective	Uribe 2002	Chile 2009-2010 El Salvador 2004
High	Sustained Use, Highly Effective	Santos 2010 (late)	Costa Rica 2010 Panama 2009
Medium	Sustained Use, Moderately Effective	Santos 2010 (early)	Guatemala 2007 Honduras 2005
Low	Sustained Use, Generally Ineffective	Bedoya 1998	Uruguay 2009
Lowest	Little Use of Security	Pastrana/Samper 1994	Chile 2005-2006 Brazil 2002, 2006 Argentina 2003, 2007
Note: Characterizations of extreme, high, and moderate effectiveness are broad characterizations. Voters' security concerns remain relatively low in some contexts, for example in Bolivia and Peru.			

SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION

Conducting a study about topics as sensitive as crime and violence makes it particularly important to identify the scope of this project. To that end, this section clarifies the key terms used in the study, explicitly states the geographical domain of the argument, and describes the organization of the chapters in the study.

The term "public security" is used because it includes physical protection from both crime as well as political violence. This is in keeping with others' conceptions of public security (Bailey and Dammert 2006: 11). Crime and political violence against individual safety are treated together under a single term because their political effects

are similar in the ways that are relevant to this study. Crime and violence may differ in their aims, and people may recognize these differences in the motivations for these two classes of activity (Nellis 2009), yet both lead individuals to fear for the safety of their person and property. Moreover, patterns of crime in the 1990s and 2000s in Latin America suggest that the distinction between politically motivated violence and nonpolitical crime has become increasingly tenuous (Godoy 2005). Therefore, crime and political violence are increasingly intertwined phenomena, and even to the degree that these phenomena can be completely separated, their similar political effects allow them to be handled as issues of "public security" when it comes to campaigning on the issue.

Public security includes protection from crime and violence, but it also excludes certain phenomena. "Public security" is narrower than the concept of "public safety" because public safety includes protection not only from crime and political violence, but also from natural and human-made disasters: that is, not just threats such as robbery and terrorist bombings, but also hurricanes and fires. Public security also excludes certain crimes that do not constitute a direct physical threat to individuals, such as financial fraud. Despite people also clearly being victimized by such crimes, the lack of physical threat involved in these crimes generates different kinds of concerns with different political consequences.

Success, for this study, is intended to mean sustaining use of the issue and then winning votes through its use. More precisely, success is achieved through a two-step process: first, invoking the issue centrally during the course of the campaign, and second, earning a high vote share because of it. Candidates' success can be observed

directly, seen as security-concerned voters favoring such candidates more than other candidates, and doing so more strongly than voters overall. Winning elections is a similar concept, and many studies of campaigns and elections often treat winning elections in conjunction with winning votes. In this study, the candidates examined who earned many votes through their use of security also happened to win their respective elections. Nevertheless, winning elections is a different concept that is analytically distinct from winning votes: candidates can be elected even as they do not win many votes because of a specific issue. Candidates can also win many votes on a particular issue and still lose the election. Therefore "success" continues to be best conceptualized as the winning of votes by using the issue.

"Human rights values," as referred to in this study, is intended to mean support for basic guarantees of physical integrity from agents of the state; it is intended to be distinct from the activism of spreading "universal human rights" worldwide because it is difficult to argue that the average voter sees it that way. Namely, the set of human rights values invoked in this study includes an intolerance of repression and support for protection from the arbitrary exercise of authority by agents of the state such as security forces. The term "human rights values" is intended simply to connote a rejection of human rights abuses within a particular country, without implying a position on whether such protections should exist in all countries. Furthermore, support for other rights such as political liberties certainly may be part of human rights values, but it is the support for the protection of physical integrity that is more directly relevant.

This study's particular focus on presidential elections has implications for the theoretical framework of the project: in presidential elections, the particular incentives to campaigning on security should be more regular. Unlike subnational elections, which can involve localized factors that influence what issues might seem important, in national elections aggregate opinion is less diluted by the particularities of political dynamics occurring in specific cities, departments, or states. Furthermore, in presidential elections, unlike parliamentary elections or other selections of national executives, candidates have more control over what they campaign about (Plasser and Plasser 2002), independent of organizational dynamics within parties that may mute candidates' ability to control the topics that they use.

The geographical scope of this study is Latin America, and Colombia in particular. In comparison with other regions of the world, Latin America is currently the most appropriate region to show that human rights values restrain the viability of security even given contexts of soaring concerns about the matter: Latin America presently leads the world in voters' concerns about public security (United Nations 2007; Gallup International 2000). The remarkable pairing in many Latin American countries of high crime and violence alongside spreading human rights values makes the region a propitious setting to examine the tension between support for basic rights and demands for public order.

Yet the findings are intended to be broader in scope. In terms of crime or violence nowadays, many southern and eastern African countries, central Asian countries, and Russia are not far behind (UNODC 2011). The United States had

relatively high concerns about security in the 1960s and 1980s, even though objective crime rates were lower than in Latin America nowadays; these concerns were also high in some European countries in the 2000s. A study situated in the context of Latin America and based on Colombia therefore produces findings that can contribute more broadly to the understanding of public security, regardless of where in the world these problems occur. For this project, the important features of Latin America are not those that shape crime and violence, but are rather those that shape the political reaction to these problems.

This project further contributes richly to the comparative study of politics by deepening the study of Colombian politics. Colombia is undeniably important: it is currently the second most populous country in South America, with its 45 million people stretching from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean to the Amazon River. Its capital, Bogotá, is an Andean metropolis with 8 million people at 8,600 feet above sea level, and power in the presidential palace, la Casa de Nariño, has alternated in regular elections every four years since 1958. It is therefore an extremely valuable country for examination in its own right.

In fact, Colombia is in need of much more attention from research in political science. Its current population comprises 9 percent of Latin America's total population, yet Colombia is studied in less than 3 percent of political science research on the region (Altman 2006: 201). As a ratio of current population share to the share of research about the country over the last 40 years, Colombia has received the least attention, by far, among the four most populous countries in the region: one-half that of Brazil, which

itself is understudied relative to its population share; one-fifth that of Mexico; and one-sixth that of Argentina (see Altman 2006). In-depth political science research on Colombia is therefore much needed, and particularly valuable to the body of research on the region.

This work uses the context of Colombia to contribute to the body of political science research on campaigns and elections; notably, it is not a sociological study of crime and violence. Social science research on many countries seems to cluster around particular topics based on what makes those countries distinctive compared with their neighbors or the world as a whole, yet this attention often tends to turn into overattention. Recent political research on Colombia, generated from both outside of Colombia as well as from within, has focused intensely on violence, crime, and drugs, including the economic and political causes, social and political effects, and government policies of dealing with crime and violence. Some works have made it a point to note that the study of politics in Colombia is fascinating specifically because of these themes (Taylor 2009). For Colombia, studies of these problems abound, including those about the dynamics of fighting in the conflict (Duncan 2006; Holmes, Piñeres, and Curtin 2008), studies of how the fighting affects voter turnout (García and Hoskin 2003; Taylor 2009), and studies of problems with human rights amidst the conflict (Tate 2007; Welna and Gallón 2007). Studies of the organized drug trade in Latin America have also included a heavy focus on Colombia (Fukumi 2008; Garzón 2008).

Yet Colombia has many interesting political dynamics beyond its long-running conflict and high crime levels. Not only has Colombia generated abundant research on

the effects of electoral rules in the wake of its 1991 constitution and subsequent electoral reforms (Botero and Wills 2009), but it is also recognized as an innovator in many policy arenas including transportation and health policy (World Bank 2002; Moller 2006; Escobar, Giedion, Giuffrida, and Glassman 2009). Given its long electoral tradition and its rich track record of policy innovations, a serious examination of Colombian electoral politics through multiple elections makes an inherent contribution to the study of Latin American politics. Therefore, rather than explaining patterns of crime and violence, this study takes crime and violence, as well as the concerns about these problems, as given. This study does not analyze Colombia as a special case of violence and crime; rather it analyzes the country as a normal case of a presidential democracy that, along with other countries in the region and world, often has to grapple with problems of crime and violence.

To accomplish these goals, this study examines these questions first at a theoretical level and then focuses on specific, concrete aspects. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework for this study, explaining why the factors being examined in the study ought to be the most influential. It shows the empirical and theoretical deficiencies of the existing body of research on public security. The preponderance of existing research views success on the issue as coming easily: this fits advanced industrial democracies today, and could explain the viability of the issue in Latin America in past decades. Yet contemporary dynamics in Latin America are different. After decades of an "old" Latin America that has frequently tolerated repression for the sake of public order, a "new" Latin America that demands a curbing of the excesses of state authority

and a respect for basic rights and liberties, has now emerged more broadly. The constraints brought by human rights values are activated by persistently low trust in the police. Chapter 2 explains the logic behind the specific conditions required for using security and for winning votes on the issue, and describes how these conditions should combine in a theory of success on security.

The next three chapters provide a concrete examination of cases in Colombia to show the conditions that affect using security and winning votes on the topic. Human rights values constrain the success of security as an issue by creating specific conditions for success. These chapters focus on such conditions one at a time. Chapter 3 focuses on the two conditions that affect use of the issue: the degree of organization of security threats and the existence of recent repression. Drawing on interview sources and in-depth examination of campaigns, the chapter presents details about how the presence of only diffuse security threats increases the opportunities for other political actors to push back against candidates' use of security. It also shows how candidates have been put on the defensive by human rights pressures arising from recent repression. Even Uribe had to manage pressures on human rights in his attempts to sustain his use of public security.

Chapter 4 focuses on career backgrounds and campaign approaches. These conditions influence voters' support on the issue of security. Existing works claim that rightist candidates win dramatic support when they make security their major emphasis. Yet Colombia's recent elections show that success can be much more elusive: military backgrounds hurt candidates, and so can an exclusive focus on security. Combining in-depth examination of campaigns with analysis of public opinion survey data, the chapter

shows how voters see such backgrounds as a portent of repressive security practices and an unchecked use of power. In showing the limits of a narrow approach to the campaign, this chapter refutes suggestions that rightists can win simply by attempting to split the electorate along the lines of some non-economic issue (see Gibson 1996; Shepsle 2003). This chapter uses the case of Uribe to illustrate success in winning votes, with Santos also generally being a case of success, and Bedoya being a case of relative failure.

In chapter 5, the focus is on the content of security messages. So much has been made of the "mano dura" or "hard hand" form of anti-crime policy that combines ruthless enforcement with increases in punishment, and much attention has been given to the successful campaigning on such policies in Latin America (Fuentes 2004; Hume 2007; Kliksberg 2008; Holland 2009; Krause 2009). In contrast to existing research that portrays easy campaigning and winning on public security through the messages of "mano dura," this study shows that rather than being the only model for successful security campaigning in Latin America, spreading human rights values may have begun to put such a policy type at a disadvantage. Candidates do not need to campaign on punitive messages, such as that of "mano dura" or "hard hand" policies, but instead can be driven to victory by focusing on messages of careful enforcement. Although punitive messages have worked well during symbolic crime campaigns in the U.S., in Colombia the candidates who have been successful have not campaigned on "mano dura" but instead have proposed "careful enforcement" that promises restrained and targeted enforcement activities of state forces, and which avoids mentioning increases in punishment. Drawing from content analysis of news reporting on campaigns, the chapter

shows that Bedoya did not focus much on punishment. Even more, although Uribe promised some punishment, his platform of careful enforcement was the core of his appeal and these messages were later echoed by Santos, who did not use messages of punishment. These cases demonstrate the careful enforcement, rather than "mano dura," is emerging as a model for campaigning on security in Latin America.

In the course of developing the evidence illustrating the conditions for success, chapters 3 through 5 take on possible alternative explanations that might compete with the theoretical framework of the study. These alternative explanations include competition from economic issues, institutional issues, political experience, and idiosyncratic events. By refuting these competing explanations, these chapters show that the constraints on security examined in this study are the most influential in affecting the prospects for success, and also truly stem from the influence of concerns about human rights and other basic liberties.

Finally, chapter 6 pulls together the findings of this study. It also shows that the determinants of success on security shown in Colombia apply broadly in Latin America: through a brief comparison of campaigns in Brazil, Guatemala, and Chile, it shows that similar dynamics occur in other countries of the region that are very different from Colombia and from each other in important ways. The chapter reflects on the practical and theoretical contributions of the study's framework, highlighting the ways in which this study affects other research areas in the study of politics. Lastly, it details future directions of research generated by the project.

The contributions of this project are broad: examining the urgently important topic of security, advancing the existing theoretical views on this key topic, providing a detailed and rich account of elections in a country of substantive importance, and suggesting the broad applicability of the findings to other arenas of research. Each of these contributions is important, and they are all offered by this study. All this, and more, will unfold on the pages that follow.

CHAPTER 2: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS ON SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin American countries face crime and violence that are so severe that voters across the region are widely concerned about security. Given these rampant concerns, existing research predicts that the issue should be consistently successful as a presidential election issue. Instead, candidates often have widely varying success on it; current understandings are therefore unable to explain reality. To remedy the existing body of research, this study shows that widespread human rights values forcefully constrain the viability of security as an issue.

Existing research finds that voters' security concerns translate into easily sustained use of the issue and leads candidates to win votes readily on it. Yet such predictions are at odds with actual patterns in Latin American campaigns. As this chapter shows, existing research has theoretical deficiencies that stem in large part from a focus on only cases of successful campaigning. Instead, the spread of human rights, in both discourse and beliefs, combines with low trust in Latin American security forces to make success on security dependent on specific conditions. Existing findings of easy success are simply one possibility of what can happen with campaigning on public security. The argument presented in this chapter culminates in Figure 2.7, which shows how human rights serves as a master variable that makes success on security dependent on specific conditions, as well as Figure 2.8, which shows where unfavorable conditions impede the pathway to success. Along the way, the chapter builds from human rights and low police

trust, step-by-step, showing how each condition is hypothesized to hinder or facilitate success.

PUBLIC SECURITY AS AN ISSUE: WHERE EXISTING RESEARCH FALTERS

Existing research portrays frequent and effective use of public security, with consistent ability to gain votes through this use. These findings portray high security concerns as resulting in easy sustained use of the topic. Then, existing research predicts large voter boosts for candidates who use security, particularly for rightist candidates, and demonstrates the electoral appeal of candidates who promise punitive measures to quell crime and violence. These existing findings seem compelling at first glance, but further examination makes clear that present findings are inadequate to explain patterns of success on security.

First, existing research finds that security is used readily as a campaign theme. The central thrust of these findings is that of direct use of the issue. This has been the case regardless of what research has found to be the precise driver of this use, whether it was believed to be driven by actual crime (Wilson 1975) or by voters' fear of crime happening to them (Scheingold 1984), as believed in past decades, or by concerns about security as a problem regardless of whether it would happen to people (Weis and Milakovich 1974; Garland 2001; Godoy 2006), as is believed by current research. These findings hold that once concerns about security mount, candidates end up campaigning on the issue.

Existing findings also demonstrate that candidates can even seize on the issue when crime rates are stable and relatively low (Cullen, Clark, and Wozniak 1985; Beckett 1997; Davey 1999). Concerns about security can be stoked not only by genuine increases in crime and violence, but also by the attention of news media to episodes of crime and violence (Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2006) and by the scare tactics of politicians (Weis and Milakovich 1974; Beckett 1994). When voters become concerned, they readily demand improvements in security (Marion and Farmer 2003). In the face of political violence, voters' concerns bubble up into demands for their governments to take on these threats (Kavanaugh 2011). Even wealthier voters, who are much less likely to be victims of crime than others in their societies, can be highly concerned about security (Ferraro 1995; Ito 1995; Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2006).

Concerns are seen to translate into campaigning because candidates easily get information about voters' security concerns, and because they have high incentives to use the issue. Voters' demands on security reach candidates in a myriad of ways. Candidates in Latin America frequently use opinion polls to see what voters think (Angell, Kinzo, and Urbaneja 1996; Farrell and Webb 2000). Public demonstrations on security can cry out for politicians to clamp down on rampant lawlessness (Jimeno 2001; Erikson 2005; Guáqueta 2009). News media also help these concerns reach candidates, through commentators who call for politicians to control crime and violence (Kaniss 1991; Vermeer 2002).

Candidates are also portrayed as having a multitude of motivations for latching onto the issue of security. As existing research on candidates' selection of issues in

campaigns shows, candidates can wield the issue as a response to these public demands on the issue (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Or, they can use it to distract from other issues, such as socioeconomic themes or a badly performing economy (Middlebrook 2000; Vavreck 2009). Candidates weak on other areas are more interested in campaigning on security (Shepsle 2003), given that security could serve as a "wedge" issue that attracts voters who would otherwise be strongly attached to other political parties (Hillygus and Shields 2008). For all candidates, use of crime all but ensures media attention, giving candidates a sure shot at receiving wide coverage (see Hinton 2006: 85).

Use of security can also stem from a particular ideological position. Voters frequently believe that they are more capable of improving security than leftists; these beliefs constitute rightist "ownership" of the issue (Budge and Farlie 1983). Able to sense this difference in voters' perceptions, rightists have higher incentives to use security than leftists, and actually use the issue more often than leftists (Petrocik 1996). Rightist candidates also have higher incentives to use the issue because it segments the electorate along non-economic lines (Gibson 1996; Shepsle 2003) and because poor voters look to politicians rather than to private solutions for improvements in security (Chevigny 2003; Estrada 2004).

These motivations are seen as particularly strong for presidential candidates, even more so than for local politicians, because the risks involved are low: being tough on crime and violence is an effective symbolic statement and is a theme that unifies the public (Scheingold 1991; Scheingold 1995: 281). Within Latin America, candidates

often cast themselves as strong against crime and violence, and characterize their opponents as weak (see Krause 2009; Holland 2010).

Second, existing research finds that voters respond positively to the use of security, giving candidates strong vote gains on the issue. Many studies of advanced industrial democracies, such as the U.S., France, and Japan, have demonstrated how candidates have used the issue and gained many votes from it (Marion and Farmer 2003; Mayer and Tiberj 2004; Hamai and Ellis 2006). Security is seen as used particularly effectively by conservatives in the United States and by right-wing politicians in European countries (Flamm 2005; Smith 2010); rightists generally have "ownership" over issues of security, so they especially benefit when they use the issue (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996). In Latin American countries, rightists are seen as particularly benefiting on security because of leftists' association with disorder and protest (O'Donnell 1973) and rightist parties' historical connections with hierarchy and order (Borón 2000; Wiarda 2003). A drumbeat of analyses has seemed to bear this out, with the wealth of scholarship on "law and order" campaigning (Scheingold 1991; Beckett 1997; Mayer and Tiberj 2004; Flamm 2005; Reiner 2007), on "penal populism" (Tyler and Weber 1982; Chevigny 2003; Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, and Hough 2003; Gargarella 2008) and on the success of "mano dura" policies (Fuentes 2005; Hume 2007; Aguilera 2008; Dammert and Salazar 2009).

Success is seen as particularly easy for candidates with military backgrounds; this is an important bloc of candidates, worldwide comprising about one-tenth of the heads of state of democracies (Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011: 558). Candidates who are

military professionals are thought to leverage their backgrounds to enhance their perceived competence at establishing order (Sellers 1998; Damore 2004). Candidates' occupational backgrounds provide voters with informational cues about their skills and qualities (McDermott 2005), so these backgrounds are seen as giving candidates credibility on security. Many Latin American voters suffering from crime look more favorably on authoritarian rule (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2006; Pérez 2009; Maldonado 2010) and favor a heavy hand to control public security threats (Palau 2006). Voters often directly associate former authoritarian rulers with improved security (Seligson 2002).

Research about campaigning on security in Latin America specifically, which has recently grown but which remains in need of continued expansion, has so far also agreed with the existing research. Existing findings show that voters clamor for politicians to deal with security, that politicians then take up the matter, and that such campaigning results in wide support (Arce 2003; Chevigny 2003; Fuentes 2005: 135; Hinton 2006). This body of work has illustrated many examples over multiple decades where politicians have won public support through promises of security from crime and violence. Research on the 1960s through 1980s suggests considerable public support for dictators, although they were not running for office, because of their ability to quash rampant lawlessness and to keep crime and violence under control. This support has been extended to authoritarian rulers both while they were in office (O'Donnell 1973) as well as when they later attempted to run for political office under democracy (Seligson 2002). More recently, after many Latin American countries' return to democracy, research on

the region has continued to show political gains from the use of security. Among presidential candidates, examples include some high-profile presidencies. In Guatemala, Alfonso Portillo was elected in 1999 on a campaign about security (Lehoucq 2002). In Peru, Alberto Fujimori's handling of political violence led to a short boost in presidential approval (Weyland 2000) that many have argued also contributed to his 1995 re-election (Arce 2003; Holmes and Gutiérrez de Piñeres 2003). In 1998 in Paraguay, ex-general Lino Oviedo led polls until his arrest for a past coup attempt (Lambert 2000). For lower offices, research focused on Latin America also shows candidates who promised to combat crime being elected in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Chevigny 2003; Hinton 2006). In Argentina alone, for example, support for ex-authoritarian political figures such as Antonio Bussi, Aldo Rico, and Roberto Ulloa was driven by recognition of lower crime under authoritarian rule and concern about crime in the 1990s (Seligson 2002).

Third, existing research finds that successful security-focused candidates have made use of messages of punishment more than enforcement: that is, increasing sentences and penalties on criminals and violent actors, rather than sending security forces into crime- and violence-plagued areas. Voters are characterized as readily favoring the punitive messages espoused by many rightist candidates (Scheingold 1984: 78; Davey 1999). Punitive messages are deemed effective because voters wish to punish criminals as much as they desire to deter further criminal acts (Tyler and Weber 1982). Such promises of punishment are credited with galvanizing conservative voters against the leftist mobilization of the 1960s in the U.S., and also for increasing voter support for conservatives in the 1980s (Beckett 1997; Flamm 2005). In Latin America in the 1990s

and 2000s, promises of a "mano dura" or "hard hand" approach have also been seen as politically effective. To the extent that something other than punishment may be electorally viable, some success has been seen on using messages of prevention, namely discussing crime and violence as problems that can largely be prevented over the long-term through economic and social programs. Leftists' use of preventive messages can wrest ownership of security away from rightists (Beckett and Sasson 2004), for example, reversing the typical patterns of ownership of crime in the U.S. presidential election of 1992 (Holian 2004). Use of preventive messages is seen by existing research, however, as the only regular way in which rightist ownership may be leased by leftists.

Figure 2.1 summarizes these three sets of findings, on ease of use, ease of winning votes, and persuasiveness of punitive messages. Existing research paints a straightforward pathway from concerns to use of the issue to winning votes, with voters' concerns translating into candidates using the issue, and then winning many votes on it.



Figure 2.1 – Existing Understandings of Success on Security

Yet existing research has several key theoretical and empirical deficiencies. This is the case even though many examples that receive concerted attention seemingly confirm easy success on security. There are three major shortcomings.

First, existing research only focuses on the inducements to campaigning on security, rather than any costs or constraints. Existing research focuses on the numerous motivations for candidates to use security, based on the U.S. experience: candidates need issues for their campaigns (see Gibson 1996; Shepsle 2003), and security seems useful in contexts throughout the Americas (see Chevigny 2003). This body of research presents a one-sided decision-making process. Discussions of these benefits largely imply that inducements alone affect whether candidates pick up on an issue. Candidates want to win, and the topic of security has many benefits, so why not use the topic? Rather, the existing body of research has not incorporated the possibility of constraints, instead of just inducements, to using issues. Even more, it presents the benefits as relatively static, with inducements working continually to incite candidates to discuss security. It does not recognize that these inducements may potentially vary across election seasons and even within election years, depending on the context surrounding the time of presidential campaigns.

Second, the existing research portrays candidates' issue use as depending only on those candidates' campaigns themselves: it implies no role for opposing candidates or other political actors. This literature characterizes candidates, their strategists, and their policy coordinators as people who meet only with each other and their constituents, decide on the issues to use, and then do the same thing on the final day of their campaign as they did on their first day, the day they announced their intention to run for office.

Yet during each election, candidates do not run separate campaigns isolated from other candidates' campaign material. Rather, campaigns are highly interactive (see Just

1996: 57), with the issue agenda coming at the very least from interaction with other candidates and news media (Tedesco 2001). Even more, this interaction is strategic: when one candidate begins to campaign on security, other candidates may surely react, affecting future use of the issue. Discussion of security by a first candidate might induce other candidates to choose alternate topics instead, or may induce other candidates to use the issue as well, but existing research discards these possibilities.

Third, when it comes to the effectiveness of campaigning, little role is attributed to voters themselves. Most current research on security portrays security-concerned voters as reacting to candidates only based on considerations of that issue alone, as if they hear messages on security in isolation from all other elements of the campaign. Such research assumes that security-concerned voters respond positively to whatever discussion of security is presented, regardless of other themes that are important to voters or any additional considerations that other candidates attempt to activate. Yet voters concerned about the issue could also react negatively to these appeals.

Existing research contains these dramatic shortcomings, quite likely, because the preponderance of research has focused on notable instances of success. As with studies of other phenomena in the comparative study of politics, this "selection on the dependent variable" causes erroneous conclusions until the focus moves beyond cases of success (see Geddes 1994: 105-106). These existing works are often based on individual cases or comparisons of small clusters of cases where campaigning has actually occurred; they succeed in their aim to highlight success, as illustrative cases of how campaigning on security does occur. Although examinations of dramatic, attention-grabbing security

campaigns are appropriate in their own right, this focus skews the predictions of the body of research as a whole. A note that "crime is no panacea to politicians" (Scheingold 1984: 59) is one of the few hints in existing research that success may not be uniform, but even then, such a note is contained within, and followed by, voluminous research suggesting just how consistently successful the issue can be. Taken together as a collection of works, these analyses lead to a view that overpredicts the use of the issue and the prospects for candidates to win votes on it.

Rather than uniformly viable across Latin America in the 2000s, security has succeeded in a more limited set of contexts including Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile (see Azpuru 2005; Gargarella 2008; Azpuru 2010; Luna and Mardones 2010). Predictions of crime becoming a major issue in some elections, for example in Brazil in 2002 (see Costa 2002), have not borne fruit. More strikingly, candidates who have campaigned heavily on security have not always gained overwhelming support from it, for example in Uruguay in 2009 (see *Sociedad Uruguaya* 2009; *Teledoce* 2009). Several cases of non-success, such as Guatemala in 2007 and Honduras in 2005, have been portrayed as perplexing cases or aberrations (see Enriquez and Renderos 2005; Sabino 2007), rather than attempting to realize that these events form a class of instances that deserve more deliberate and concerted attention.

THE SPREAD OF HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES IN LATIN AMERICA

What has spurred such uneven success? This study suggests a key role for human rights values in constraining security as an issue. Over the last fifty years, Latin America has changed dramatically on human rights. The spread of human rights in Latin America, as it affects success on security, takes two forms. First, among political actors, there has been broad growth in discourse on human rights, making discussion of human rights more common and accepted on the political stage in Latin American countries. Second, among the public at large, there has been a shift in attitudes involving greater intolerance of repression.

First, among political actors, there has been dramatic growth in the discourse of human rights and of political attention to human rights issues more generally. Discourse of human rights has spread to become widely accepted: this growth has been due in large part to the efforts of international public opinion. Such pressures affect politicians' behavior because they seek external legitimacy, in line with international public opinion. For the last fifty years, international human rights organizations and foreign leaders have pressured Latin American leaders, leading politicians in the region increasingly to conceive of human rights as integral to their societies (Sikkink 1993; Hawkins 2002; Koo and Ramirez 2009), and influencing Latin American governments to adopt human rights norms in a wave during the 1980s and 1990s (Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Sikkink 2004). Before this time, one of the only items of attention to human rights by Latin American governments was cooperation with newly decolonized African and Asian countries to establish international human rights regimes (see Sikkink 2004; Burke 2010).

In contemporary Latin America, a well-financed constellation of organizations operates in the region, in part on behalf of domestic human rights groups that are too weak to succeed in lobbying their own governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Franklin 2008). For example, the Washington Office on Latin America spreads advocacy information in an attempt to pressure governments to change their policies; Amnesty International implements country campaigns that bring the activism of people throughout the world to bear on individual governments in the region, one after another; and Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group document and expose ongoing acts of repression and the shuttering of basic liberties. These activities are not mere window-dressing: such organizations all focus centrally on the protection of human rights and the adoption of human rights norms (Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez 1998).

Domestic human rights groups have also spread human rights: discussion of human rights emerged out of experiences with dictatorship (Panizza 1995; Loveman 1998), especially in the Southern Cone region of South America (Roniger and Sznajder 1999). For example, the Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, as well as the Servicio de Paz y Justicia in Uruguay, condemned past authoritarian rule and pushed for human rights norms (Roniger 1997). This activism has spread human rights values independently: human rights values are not a set of principles merely adopted from abroad, but are values with a strongly Latin American foundation (Estévez 2008).

These efforts have clearly spread human rights in the political discourse of the region. Propelled at first by human rights groups (Peruzzotti 2002; Tate 2007), human

rights discourse is now commonly used by women's, indigenous, and environmental movements (see Blacklock and Macdonald 1998; Ha 2007; Montaño and Sanz 2009). These changes have occurred even outside of activist circles in the region. Politicians have increasingly embraced human rights, whether out of sincere conviction or electoral necessity. Many Latin American politicians now state support for the "rule of law" in their discourse (Yashar 1999). Even the party of backers of the Brazilian military dictatorship, originally called the Aliança Renovadora Nacional and more recently called the Partido da Frente Liberal, changed its name to Democratas, a change that was driven in good part by desires to move away from stigmas associated with the authoritarian past (see Lopes 2008).

Such broad discourse has been an example of more generalized attention among politicians to issues of human rights. Attention to human rights is increasingly institutionalized, at least symbolically in countries' governing structures: permanent commissions for human rights have been set up in the congresses of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru, and executive branch ministries or agencies on human rights have been created in Argentina, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The many police reforms within the region are also a strong sign of attention to human rights. Many of these reforms have occurred despite active resistance from militaries and police forces (see Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998), showing that these reforms are driven by considerations for human rights rather than by security forces' institutional goals. Reforms include those in Brazil in the 1980s by São Paulo state governor André Franco Montoro; reform embodied in the Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos by Brazilian

president Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1995 (Hinton 2006: 128); a 1996 reform of the Policía Federal Argentina that incorporated human rights training in its police academy, pushed by Buenos Aires federal district leader Fernando de la Rúa (Ungar 2002: 83); and a reform of the Rio de Janeiro state police in 1999 to attempt to protect human rights, pushed by governor Anthony Garotinho (Hinton 2006: 136). Community policing, a practice that softens the imprint of security forces, was also introduced in many provinces in Argentina and states in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s (Smulovitz 2006), as well as in Peru in 2001 with the backing of a sympathetic Congress (Basombrío 2006). Whether out of genuine conviction, electorally calculated, or a desire for external legitimacy and a good reputation in response to foreign opinion, attention to human rights and broad discourse of human rights has come powerfully onto the political stage in Latin America.

Second, there has been a shift in voters' attitudes toward intolerance of repression and a rejection of the arbitrary use of authority. In many Latin American countries, the past has been characterized as having an entrenched toleration of repression (Brockett 1991; Frühling 1992; Karl 1995), with little support for human rights. Active support for human rights was limited to fledgling human rights organizations, intellectuals, and the militant left (see Marcos 2005; Tate 2007). Problems of crime were seen to further constrain the already low prospects for the protection of basic liberties (Carvalho and Caldas 2002; ICHRP 2003). In the past, many in Brazil and Argentina, for example, have responded to reported human rights abuses by marching not in support of the victims of brutality, but rather in support of the police (Caldeira 2000; Cavallaro and Mohamedou 2005)!

Such seeming tolerance of repression, however, has increasingly given way to a distaste for repression and a support for some basic standards of protection for individuals from excesses of state authority. Observing the spread of human rights can be seen through opinion polls that either demonstrate a clear shift from times past, or that show opinion comparable to that of other world regions which are known to have high support for human rights. The average voter may not think in terms of an internationalized, universal conception of "human rights"; at the same time, however, the following poll results show that the average voter does hold attitudes in favor of specific protections from interference by state authorities.

To the general public in everyday circumstances, the belief is strong that authorities should respect the law even when guaranteeing public security. For example, about 75% of Chileans believe that authorities should respect the law in the course of duty (Collins 2010: 67). It also means resentment, even anger, at the police's abuses of power and mistreatment of individuals: for example, anger at police forces that commit blatant abuses of authority during the course of action (see Barrionuevo 2010). These opinions are evident throughout the region. In Brazil, Chile, and Mexico in the early 1990s, expressed "support for human rights" was similar to those of European countries (Landman 2004), and strong approval of human rights movements rather than approval, disapproval, or strong disapproval, was held by 65% of people in Mexico, 69% in Argentina, 76% in Chile, and 84% in Brazil. Levels of support for the general concept of "human rights," despite differences in what this concept means across regions, also fall in the same range as the U.S. and many European countries (World Values Survey 1991).

The general public now exhibits stronger support for basic protections of physical integrity from state forces. In a striking example: 72% of Chileans felt by 2009 that violation of human rights during its 1973 coup had not been justified, while only 17% declared that it had been necessary (Collins 2010). This change is notable: the perceived need for such repression has faded as well, but on top of significant support for repression at the time, even in Chile's 1988 plebiscite there was 40% support for the continuation of Augusto Pinochet's rule.

Demographic characteristics of this support for human rights may vary within the region, of course. Leftists are more intolerant of repression than rightists (see Collins 2010: 62) and older, poorer women are more in favor of respect for human rights than other groups in society (see Collins 2010: 64). Another good sense of the demographic variation in bases of support for human rights can be determined by examination of survey responses to how many people believe that there is "too much" protection of human rights rather than "sufficient" or "very little" protection, and identifying which demographic groups have relatively low proportions believing that there is "too much" protection. Such an examination shows that appreciation for human rights is higher among women, people with middle levels of income, and people with at least 8 years of education and especially so for people with at least 12 years of education (LAPOP 2004). These patterns show some variation in acceptance of human rights. Yet the overall picture is of high support for basic rights and liberties. The public may not actively agitate in favor of human rights, but there is at least a widely held intolerance of repressive activity and the misdeeds of security forces.

In sum, in a break from the past, attention to the problems of the arbitrary exercise of power and authority has spread, and an appreciation of human rights has spread from small segments of society to be relatively more common among both political leaders and voters. Figure 2.2 summarizes the spread of human rights in Latin America by underscoring the two ways in which considerations of basic rights are increasingly visible: among political actors, human rights values have exploded to become a commonly accepted part of political discourse; among voters, there has been a shift in values toward intolerance of repression by state forces.



Figure 2.2 – Spread of Human Rights in Latin America Takes Two Forms

LOW TRUST IN SECURITY FORCES ACTIVATES HUMAN RIGHTS

It has been seen so far that the spread of human rights takes the form of broader human rights discourse among political actors, and a widespread intolerance of repression among the public at large. Each dynamic is combined with low trust in security forces, which is something for which Latin America stands out. First, distrust in security forces interacts with a broader human rights discourse to allow political actors to portray

proposed security policies as easily causing human rights violations. Second, low trust in security forces interacts with intolerance of repression to produce skepticism among voters that basic rights will be protected during attempts to improve security.

Wariness of security forces in Latin America is easily documented. In Latin American countries, unlike in many other regions, voters have strikingly low trust in security forces. This persistent distrust, especially of the police but also of military forces, distinguishes Latin American countries from the U.S. and other advanced industrial democracies. In Latin American countries, the forces responsible for guaranteeing order are less professionalized than in many advanced industrial democracies, and the police are especially mistrusted (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Ñopo 2008; Lagos 2008; Ahmad, Hubickey, and McNamara 2011). Trust in security forces varies notably across countries in Latin America (see Miranda 2011: 8), but as a region, Latin America is less trusting of these forces than other regions of the world. As Table 2.1 shows, Latin America as a region has the lowest trust in the police compared with other major world regions.

Table 2.1 – Low Trust in the Police in Latin America					
	"How much confidence do you have in: the police?"				
	Latin America	Africa	Asia	Europe	U.S.
A great deal	10%	23%	18%	13%	17%
Quite a lot	29	35	43	47	53
Not very much	36	29	31	28	26
None at all	25	13	8	12	4

Notes: "Latin America" includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay.

Results combine the responses for the included countries, without weighting for the population of each country. For other regional groupings, "Africa" includes countries both north and south of the Sahara; "Asia" includes political systems in eastern, southeastern, and southern Asia; "Europe" includes countries in western and eastern Europe, including Russia. Only two countries surveyed, Russia and Moldova, have more people declaring "None at all" than in the combined Latin America sample.

Source: World Values Survey 2005.

In advanced industrial democracies such as Spain and the U.S., about two-thirds of people affirm in opinion polls that they trust the police (Garzón 2008: 145); trust in the police may be lower in the U.S. among racial and ethnic groups with frequent negative interactions with the police, but these figures show that trust is high among the population at large. In contrast, Latin America has generalized low trust in the police. This "trust in the police" falls to as low as 16 percent in Venezuela and Guatemala, and is under 25 percent in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and Panama (Garzón 2008: 145; Florez 2009: 4). Trust is particularly lacking among the urban poor (Moser, Wilson, and Moser 2005), which is precisely the group in society that looks to politicians, rather than

private solutions, to improve security (Chevigny 2003; Estrada 2004). In Mexico City, 90 percent of people have "little or no trust" in the police (Anozie, Shinn, Skarlatos, and Urzua 2004). Trust in the police varies among countries in the region, of course: for example, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay are the countries in the region where age is a very strong predictor of police trust, with younger people trusting the police much more (Latinobarómetro 1998), likely due to the legacy of authoritarian repression.

Distrust in security forces is not limited to the police. Even militaries, which are seen more favorably than are the police in Latin American countries (Lagos 1997), are also less trusted than in advanced industrial democracies. Military forces in many countries are much less trusted than those of the United States, for example (LAPOP 2008). Across the region the public at large has had low confidence in security forces, and this low trust has been persistent.

What is the political impact of this low trust? Figure 2.3 shows how distrust in security forces interacts with the spread of human rights to be relevant to the politics of security. Broader human rights discourse among political actors combines with persistent distrust in security forces to make security efforts easily portrayable as leading to human rights violations. On the side of voters, increasing distaste for repression combines with distrust in security forces to produce skepticism among voters that basic rights can be protected in any major effort to improve security.



Figure 2.3 – Spread of Human Rights and Distrust of Security Forces

Where there is broadly accessible human rights discourse in a context of distrust in security forces, security is easily portrayable as violating human rights. Security forces are already widely conceived as capable of committing misdeeds, whether they are human rights violations or not. Such public conceptions of security forces means that competing candidates, journalists, and human rights organizations can easily portray such forces as being susceptible to engaging in repression against innocent individuals.

In contrast, where trust in security forces is high, as in many advanced industrial democracies such as the U.S., European countries, and Japan, political actors cannot so easily portray security forces as violating human rights. In countries with high trust in security forces, political actors are much more able to declare their support for their country's well-respected public security forces; they can even counter assertions of future human rights violations as being insulting to these highly-trusted guardians of public security.

Among voters, distrust in security forces combines with a distaste for repression to create skepticism that basic rights will be protected. In advanced industrial democracies, the public can also dislike repression, but those who have high trust in security forces will not worry that such repression will occur. In Latin American countries, in contrast, distrust in security forces transforms intolerance for repression into skepticism that repression will be avoided. The public generally does want the police and other security forces to be actively involved in maintaining public security (see Asociación Grupo Ceiba 2011: 17), but people do not trust the police to protect them when they do it. Voters are already skeptical about security forces' ability to improve security: battling security threats is a difficult, complex task (see Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2011); many politicians who attempt to deal with problems of security find out how difficult the task can be (Weyland 2003; De la Torre and Álvarez 2011: 41). Where trust in security forces is low, this skepticism can extend to many aspects of security forces' performance: not only skepticism in improving security, but also skepticism that basic rights will be protected.

The domain of the theoretical framework of this study is contemporary Latin America. The region has a unique context: different from Latin America in past decades in that human rights values are increasingly widespread, and different from advanced industrial democracies in that the spread of human rights occurs in the midst of low police trust. These items make the geographic and temporal applicability of existing findings restricted to Latin America's past and to advanced industrial democracies. For Latin America in past decades, findings of security being a readily viable issue were

applicable because distaste of repression was not as widespread and the discourse of human rights was not yet common. In contemporary advanced industrial democracies, findings of security as a viable issue also continue to hold: where there is high trust in security forces, voters largely do not worry about the possibility of repression, nor do political actors attempt to portray security forces as engaging in abuses of basic rights. In contemporary Latin America, however, human rights values and low trust in security forces cause voters to be worried about the possibility of repression, and political actors can portray security forces as potentially endangering individuals' basic rights.

THE ARGUMENT

Human rights values in Latin America constrain success on security by creating the context for many conditions to limit this success. The spread of human rights discourse allows for certain conditions to affect issue use; voters' intolerance of repression allows for still other conditions to affect voters' response to these appeals. Issue use is encouraged by a favorable context that overrides the potential to portray security policies as repressive. Voters' reception of candidates depends on the correct messenger, mix of campaign messages, and content of those campaign messages.

Specifically, the higher voters' security concerns, the higher the chances are for the effective use of security, but this success is dependent on the context of security and human rights, the background and campaign mix of security-focused candidates, and the content of candidates' security messages. Human rights values cause the context of

security and human rights to shape the prospects for using the issue: whether security threats are highly organized or more diffuse, and whether there has been recent repression. Sustained use of the issue becomes a highly interactive endeavor, between candidates invoking issues of security on one side, and their competitors, journalists, and international public opinion pushing against this use. Candidates attempt to campaign on security if they choose, but they do so within structural environments that are limited by these conditions. These factors affect candidates' opportunities to sustain discussion of security, by giving them opportunities to invoke security issues in a way that prevents opponents from countering them, or by leaving them only opportunities to raise security problems that leave them open to criticism about human rights. They also affect the opportunities for other political actors to push back against candidates' use of security by countering with a focus on human rights matters. Where threats are diffuse, and there has been recent repression, sustained discussion of security becomes difficult. Analytically, these factors come before the other factors, since winning votes on the issue first requires being able to invoke the issue.

Then, winning votes depends substantially on candidates' backgrounds, mix of issues, and content of security messages: whether candidates have civilian backgrounds or military backgrounds; whether candidates campaign broadly or make security their almost exclusive focus; and whether candidates' security messages promise a careful enforcement rather than a "mano dura" program. There are therefore five conditions in total. This may seem like many, but each of these conditions independently affects success, and their effects will be described condition by condition.

Table 2.2 summarizes these key conditions that are hypothesized to impact success. Each of the five rows in the table represents a hypothesis for the impact of that condition, whether favorable or unfavorable. Where these conditions are favorable, as shown in the second column in blue, they contribute to success. Where these conditions are unfavorable, as shown in the third column in orange, they act as obstacles. For example, the first row presents the following hypothesis: if security threats are diffuse, then use of security is discouraged. As another example, the third row shows the hypothesis that: if candidates have a career background in the military, then winning votes on security is impeded. Summarizing the table as a whole: if threats are diffuse and there has been recent repression by the state or by state-sponsored forces, then security is unlikely to be used in candidates' campaigns. Then, where security is used as an issue, military backgrounds, exclusive focuses on security, and messages of unbridled enforcement or punishment lead candidates to be less able to win votes on the issue.

Table 2.2 – Hypotheses of the Study: Conditions for Success			
Condition	*Favorable*	*Unfavorable*	*Effect if Unfavorable*
Organization of Security Threats	Organized	Diffuse	Discourages Use of Security
History of Repression	No Recent Repression	Recent Repression	Discourages Use of Security
Candidate Background	Civilian	Military	Impedes Winning Votes on Security
Campaign Approach to Security	Balanced Mix with Other Issues	Almost Exclusive Focus on Security	Impedes Winning Votes on Security
Content of Enforcement Messages	Careful Enforcement	Unrestrained Enforcement or Punishment	Impedes Winning Votes on Security

Organization of Threats and Existence of Repression

Introducing the conditions for success in deeper detail, the first set of conditions affects the use of security. Figure 2.4 shows how recent repression discourages issue use, as well as how diffuse security threats discourage issue use. The inclusion of each of these conditions, in orange, overlapping their respective arrows, means that they interact with the ease of portraying security efforts as endangering human rights; these items are shown in this way, instead of with extra arrows to show an interaction, to keep the figure visually presentable for when all sets of conditions are combined to produce Figure 2.7 toward the end of this chapter.

Both conditions give competing candidates, journalists, and international human rights organizations more opportunities to portray security as violating human rights. The next few pages explain this causal pathway. Recent repression allows opponents of candidates' proposals, such as competing candidates, journalists, and international human rights organizations, to link repression to the security proposals. The presence of merely diffuse security threats allows competitors to assert easily that there will be future violations, and causes security-emphasizing candidates to have few ways to respond to these assertions, thus further discouraging issue use. Each independently discourages issue use, such that if both conditions are unfavorable, use of the issue is powerfully restricted.



Figure 2.4 – Recent Repression and Diffuse Threats Discourage Issue Use

The degree of organization of threats affects candidates' opportunities to bring up security on the campaign trail, and affects other political actors' opportunities to push back against candidates' use of the issue. Candidates can start using whatever issue they want in their campaigns, yet so can their opponents; sustaining an emphasis on security requires candidates to hold firm against a torrent of criticism about matters of human

rights from these opponents, which include their competitors for office, journalists, and international public opinion. Tensions are rife between the need for governments to ensure security and the need to protect individual rights (Fuentes 2004), and where security threats are diffuse, it is easy for opponents to assert that security will harm human rights, while security-focused candidates will have few opportunities to respond. With organized threats, opponents have fewer opportunities to assert that security harms human rights, and security-minded candidates have more ways to respond.

Whether candidates are able to sustain the issue is an integral part of success. Voters may be concerned about security even if the issue is not being discussed, but they are unable to make it the basis for their vote choices unless candidates do talk about it. This task is easier to do when security threats are organized.

When security threats, as severe as they may be, consist of diffuse actors, such as individual street thugs or small groups, competing candidates and journalists have many opportunities to push back by asserting that security efforts will endanger human rights. These opponents can point to the difficulties that security forces will have in determining who belongs to threats that are diffuse. They can therefore portray security-minded candidates' proposals as easily harming the population at large. With organized groups, opponents have fewer opportunities to declare that human rights will be violated. Asserting that security policies will trample on the basic rights of members of organized security threats, although possible, is a much harder task than to make the same assertion for diffuse threats. Organized groups are widely seen as a more legitimate target for the

state. These groups are seen as relatively clearly delimited, and distinct from society at large, so security forces can target their activities better.

Security-minded candidates will attempt to respond to these criticisms, needing to do so not only to affect domestic opinion for the election, but also in the quest for external legitimacy. Acceptance among international circles, among other world leaders, is as important in Latin America as in other world regions. Candidates can attempt to respond to assertions of repression, but the presence of diffuse threats also limits security-minded candidates, compared with highly organized threats. With diffuse threats, candidates' discussion of security is likely to focus on broad patterns of crime and violence. At best, they can bring up vignettes of specific instances of crime and exhort their audiences to recall similar instances.

The presence of organized threats such as gangs, drug traffickers, and insurgent forces, gives candidates ample opportunities to retort against their opponents and buttress their case for the need to deal with security. First, organized gangs and guerrilla groups are easily a clear target for campaign speeches and advertisements about the issue. People more frequently attribute responsibility for behavior to the qualities of specific actors themselves, rather than to context (see Jones 1979): it is much easier to blame specific actors, such as organized threats, for crime and violence than to blame such activities on a context that results in diffuse threats.

Second, organized threats not only carry out attacks against innocent bystanders or unsuspecting individuals, as diffuse threats can do, they can also carry out complex, noticeable crimes that make the activities of diffuse actors pale in comparison (Pion-

Berlin and Trinkunas 2011), and can make threats against people, promising reprisals against those who resist them (see Hagan 2006). These differences stir different reactions in the public: for example, the perceived presence of gangs is more influential than perceptions of ordinary crime in driving support for political coups (Maldonado 2010).

Third, organized threats also result in foreign policy matters that candidates can use to discuss security. For example, U.S. anti-drug programs for Latin America target drug traffickers; candidates can make support for these programs a major point of their platforms, and by discussing these policies, can focus attention on security.

Recent repression by state forces and state-sponsored groups that harms innocent bystanders or neutral civilians in a conflict also strongly discourages the use of security. This does not include human rights violations by irregular forces such as guerrillas and paramilitaries. Recent repression need not be a deliberate state policy: of importance, rather, are the activities themselves on the ground, whether due to policy or because of stray forces acting without official consent. Opponents' opportunities to bring up such repression increase where such repression was very recent, so that it is relatively fresh in people's minds, or where repression was especially severe or widespread, so that it stays in people's memories. It is not largely a matter of long-term repression from decades past under authoritarian governments: rather, as the following chapters show, it is often a matter of repression under democratic governments, including strings of severe police brutalities or errant military forces deliberately harming innocent civilians.

Recent repression allows competing candidates, journalists, and human rights organizations to react against candidates' security proposals immediately. Competing

candidates can bring up these problems of repression as an example of the dangers of security programs, thereby inducing security-focused candidates to spend time responding to these assertions. Journalists can rail about episodes of human rights violations instead of discussing the substance of candidates' proposals.

Human rights organizations, especially international organizations, can also criticize security-focused candidates. These criticisms matter because candidates do not want to look bad on the international stage, since if they get elected they will need to interact with leaders of other countries. This international opinion on human rights therefore exercises powerful influence. Furthermore, competing candidates can sometimes reflect such international criticism back into the campaign, suggesting even more that candidates may need to address such international criticism seriously.

These pressures put candidates on the defensive. To manage these pressures, candidates find themselves performing a careful balancing act: at the same time that they show their willingness to crack down on crime and violence, they must also spend time presenting themselves as friendlier to individual liberties. Candidates can end up spending time explaining their commitment to human rights or undertaking campaign changes that make them talk more carefully on security.

Where the recent past has been free of repression, opponents have fewer opportunities to criticize security-focused candidates on human rights. Without recent examples of repression to which other candidates can point, candidates can easily focus on security without having to defend charges that combating criminals and violent actors

will result in repression. As a result, candidates are less pressured to sidetrack their discussion from security to human rights.

A context of both organized threats and no recent repression strongly encourages campaigning on security. Candidates can target organized threats at length without assertions about potential human rights violations, and opponents cannot bring up any recent repression to link to these security proposals. The presence of only one of these favorable conditions also encourages use of the issue: candidates can bring up problems of security without being put on the defensive about human rights, or can keep bringing up security by pointing to the particular menace of organized threats. In contrast, the diffuseness of threats and recent repression discourage sustained use of the issue: opponents hammer away at the potential for human rights violations against innocent individuals, made more credible by recent instances of repression, and security-focused candidates have few ways to respond in a way that brings the discussion from human rights back to security.

Candidate Background and Weight of Security

Success is also limited as a result of candidates' career backgrounds and campaign approaches: these conditions affect how voters respond to candidates who turn security into an issue. Figure 2.5 shows how candidates' military career backgrounds impede the winning of votes, as well as how too much weight on security issues also impedes winning votes. Again, showing conditions in orange directly over the arrows, rather than using extra arrows to denote an interaction with voter skepticism that

repression will be avoided, represents this interaction in a way that keeps the figure from becoming visually complicated. Both conditions activate voters' skepticism of whether basic rights will be protected under the politician who will be swept into office. Career military backgrounds stoke voters' beliefs that such candidates' governance style will endanger basic rights. An almost exclusive focus on security in the campaign leads voters to suspect that candidates will not work to avoid repression. These resulting dynamics are similar, with the difference that military backgrounds stoke fears of an active trampling of human rights, whereas a narrow focus on security builds concerns that the candidate will not be active enough in seeking to protect rights.



Figure 2.5 – Military Backgrounds and Narrow Focuses Limit Votes

Whether candidates have civilian backgrounds or are military professionals affects their vote gains on security by stoking concerns about human rights. Whether candidates have an almost exclusive focus on security or a more balanced mix of issues also affects candidates' vote gains, by priming additional worries about heavy-handed rule.

Career military backgrounds continue to be useful for candidates to convince voters of the ability to crack down on threats, as existing research shows (Seligson 2002), but these same military backgrounds also limit candidates' support because they raise concerns about such candidates' interest in respecting human rights. In a context of low trust in security forces, military backgrounds now reinforce skepticism that security proposals can protect human rights, while providing few opportunities to dispel this skepticism. Such backgrounds can give candidates the advantage of convincing voters of having the capability to crush threats, but these same backgrounds also have the disadvantage of heightening voters' fears about the arbitrary use of authority under their rule. Career military pasts may prime voters to have misgivings about the possibility of authoritarian-style rule regardless of such candidates' focuses, but this is especially the case if such candidates are using military backgrounds to promise to crack down on disorder. In almost all of the Latin American countries that had authoritarian rule, the public blames the military for the violation of human rights during those periods (Agüero 1998: 386). Military backgrounds thus signal to voters a high likelihood of danger to individual liberties and human rights, as well as circumventing democratic processes that ensure economic and legal fairness. Military professionals, seen by voters as used to settling matters through the strength of force, will be perceived as particularly likely to engage in such behavior. Candidates can attempt to downplay the importance of their military backgrounds, but journalists and opposing candidates can continue to heighten such fears by pointing to such backgrounds. Military professionals will therefore have a difficult time convincing voters that they are not set out to endanger human rights.

Civilian backgrounds, on the other hand, provide candidates with many opportunities to improve their credibility about ensuring even-handed rule that avoids repression. Such candidates can declare a forceful commitment to human rights, whether genuine or electorally calculated. The strong symbolism of statements about human rights is reinforced by civilian backgrounds, allowing such candidates ample opportunities to showcase civilian career achievements that demonstrate their protection of basic rights and liberties. Of course, civilian positions need not necessarily overcome voter skepticism, since civilians have continued to preside over corrupt and brutal police forces; nevertheless, these examples offer voters direct proof that civilian candidates can be trusted to be effective on security and protective of human rights.

Candidates' campaign approaches to using public security also affect gaining votes on the issue. A narrow focus that is too heavily weighted on security would, like any single-issue campaign, fail to convince voters who also care about other topics; in addition, however, it would also increase fears about candidates' attitudes toward basic rights and protections. In contrast, candidates who discuss security within a balanced, comprehensive set of issues not only win over voters who care foremost about security but who also care about these additional topics, they also avoid the image of wanting to handle security at the cost of all other matters.

Giving too much weight to security can stoke voters' fears about the human rights repercussions of candidates' focus on security. A narrow focus on security sends a signal to voters that may be interpreted as being single-mindedly fixated on security. At best, it may simply make voters believe that they have a simplistic, boring campaign. Likely, an

almost exclusive focus on security on the campaign trail signals to voters that the candidate may not be very interested in other matters, such as protecting human rights while security programs unfold. At the worst, however, a narrow focus may stir up concerns that candidates might allow repression for the sake of security, engaging in an unrestrained crackdown on society.

Messages of Careful Enforcement

Finally, success requires messages of careful enforcement. Figure 2.6 shows how security messages that focus on punishment or on unbridled enforcement with permissive rules of engagement further impede winning votes. Like career backgrounds and the mix of issues, this condition also increases voters' skepticism of whether basic rights will be protected, but specifically skepticism about the policies that may arise once in office. Such a focus on punishment or unrestrained enforcement intensifies worries that basic rights will be protected, by giving voters cause to believe that security policies may harm innocent individuals.



Figure 2.6 – Unrestrained or Punitive Security Messages Impede Votes

Public security proposals can be roughly categorized as messages of punishment, enforcement, and prevention (see Ehrlich 1972; Tonry and Farrington 1995). Instead of winning through the use of the punitive messages that have been popular in many advanced industrial democracies and in "mano dura" campaigns in Latin America, candidates' success depends on crafting a message that responds to the combination in Latin American countries of a high-crime context and a widespread skepticism that security forces will respect basic rights. This is done by promising careful enforcement activity by security forces, doing so in a way that suggests that repression will be unlikely.

Punishment, enforcement, and prevention messages are clearly different from each other in substance and potential electoral effect. Punitive measures deepen punishments for those who are caught committing crime and political violence, including increasing sentences and fines or introducing life terms and death sentences; these measures intend to keep convicted criminals from society, to deter others, and to condemn such activities (Kessler and Levitt 1998; UNODC 2007). Enforcement measures extend the efforts and capacity of security forces, including enlarging police and military forces, giving them more active roles and intelligence, and increasing their equipment and funding; such measures intend to keep security forces in the streets or patrolling rural areas to ward off or apprehend those who commit crime and violence. Prevention aims to reduce the preconditions that contribute to crime and violence, including social programs to improve education or reduce inequality, or programs to dissuade prisoners from committing crimes once they return to society at large.

Existing research considers punitive measures to be the most effective electorally, more so than prevention or enforcement. For example, punitive solutions to public security became the theme of the U.S. presidential election in 1968 (Flamm 2005), and punitive desires also led to an escalation of punitive crime policies in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s (Beckett and Sasson 2004). The success of punishment would come from symbolism, as well as its deterrent, condemnatory, and incapacitative functions (see Davey 1999; Marion and Farmer 2003; Spelman 2005). In Latin American countries, rightist candidates may prefer to use punitive messages because rightist parties often have roots in hierarchy and authority (Borón 2000; Wiarda 2003).

Preventive measures are also seen to work well. In the U.S., for example, the public prioritizes solving youth crime through youth prevention programs over increased police and increased prison construction (Cohen, Rust, and Steen 2006), and prioritizes youth prevention programs over punishment and enforcement (see Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate 2000: 56-57); preventive messages counteracted rightist ownership of security in the U.S. presidential election of 1992 (Marion 1997; Holian 2004). Yet the immediate urgency of high-crime contexts should reduce the payoff from preventive messages. Under spiraling crime and violence, many voters may see preventive measures as necessary for the long-term, but also too indirect to reduce violence immediately. Preventive programs may be a widely supported way to reduce crime, but as crime truly surges, support for preventive approaches diminishes. For example, as crime increased between 2005 and 2007 in Brazil, support for "preventive" measures compared with

"strong law and order" measures dropped from 74 to 57 percent (IPSOS Public Affairs 2005, 2007).

Enforcement may also work, since voters' security concerns in high-crime contexts come principally from actual experience (see Ray 2010). People often know others who have suffered recently from crime and violence, or have been recent victims themselves (Gaviria and Pagés 1999; Caldeira 2000; Kliksberg 2008). As an extreme example, in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil in 2010, over 10% of people knew someone who had been murdered in the past year (Ray 2010). In such situations, enforcement may be seen as more direct and immediate, confronting the problem directly. Independent of whether larger police forces actually bring reductions in crime rates, increases in crime do increase the public's demand for more police (Brown 1981).

In high-crime contexts "mano dura" policies have seemed to capitalize on both punishment and enforcement, involving increases in punishment of criminal and violent activity, plus ruthless enforcement by state forces with expansive rules of engagement, with little attention to the human rights repercussions of such expanded rules.

Yet voters' skepticism that security improvements can avoid repression makes enforcement messages the key to promising a careful use of security forces. Voters do not trust security forces to avoid human rights violations, much less to do their job in improving security, so these widespread human values create pressures for candidates to underscore that their proposed use of security forces will avoid repression. Careful enforcement is therefore a measured, deliberate use of the enforcement activity of security forces, which avoids repression against innocent bystanders or neutral civilians

in a conflict. These pressures will not force all candidates to promise to be careful, but they do increase the chances that candidates will promise a careful enforcement, rather than a brute-force use that may result in extrajudicial "punishment" by security forces in the course of action.

Bringing These Conditions Together to Explain Success on Security

Figure 2.7 shows how the spread of human rights and distrust of security forces lead to the possibility for unfavorable conditions to cause less success on security. Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 have shown specific aspects of the causal pathways from human rights to using the issue or winning votes on it, including depicting the interplay between human rights and police trust and depicting how the conditions for success lead to issue use or vote gains. Figure 2.7 unifies these figures. The figure shows the full causal pathways between human rights and limited success: starting with the spread of human rights values amid persistently low trust in security forces, continuing through the interactions of human rights values with each of the five conditions for success, and resulting in less success on security.



Figure 2.7 – Full Pathway from Human Rights to Less Success

Figure 2.8 presents the theoretical framework of the project as a whole: it simplifies the presentation of the pathways shown in Figure 2.7, and focuses on the effects of the conditions for success. The top row in the figure shows the existing understanding of campaigning on security as first illustrated in Figure 2.1, with concerns about crime and violence leading in a straightforward way to issue use and vote gains. The theoretical framework of this study introduces the bottom row. For the conditions for success, the unfavorable conditions are shown on the top half of the bottom row, in orange; the favorable conditions are shown on the lower half of the bottom row, in blue.



Figure 2.8 – Theoretical Framework

This figure, the illustration of the theoretical framework, will be referred to throughout this study. The first two conditions affect the pathway from voters' concerns about security to candidates' use of the issue in their campaigns. Where they are unfavorable, they interrupt this pathway, and complications arise with the use of security

as a campaign topic. Then, the three factors of candidate background, weight of security as a campaign focus, and the content of security messages affect the pathway from use of the issue to gaining electoral support from it. Where these factors are unfavorable, they impede winning votes on the issue. For campaigning on security to be as successful in Latin American countries as described in existing research, all conditions must be favorable.

Given the complex way in which campaigns unfold, including involving the decisions of individual candidates, these conditions do not fully control the prospects for success. Purporting to predict with absolute certainty the outcome of elections, based on background conditions surrounding the election or the attributes of candidates and their campaign messages alone, would be to ignore the facts on the ground of the rich, nuanced way in which campaigns and electoral politics unfold. Rather, these conditions affect campaigning in a probabilistic manner, improving or reducing the chances for the discussion of this issue and for its power in driving voters to the candidates who use it.

Despite being probabilistic, however, these key conditions combine to affect success on public security in Latin America in a logical, regular way. Having either organized threats or little repression or both, is practically required for a candidate to sustain security as a major campaign issue; then, candidate background, the weight of security as an issue, and leading on enforcement messages each contribute independently to winning votes on the issue, with the presence of all of the favorable factors contributing to the highest success, and with combinations of several but not all of these factors leading to intermediate levels of success.

Where there are unorganized threats and recent repression, there will be the least likelihood for success because it is difficult to sustain the issue at all. Even when security is used as an issue, candidates will have low success if they have a military background, focus almost exclusively on security, and do not take the lead on enforcement messages. Candidates will have medium levels of success if they have only one favorable factor: civilian backgrounds, a balanced mix of issues, or a lead on enforcement messages. Candidates will have quite high success if they have two of the three favorable factors for winning votes. Finally, candidates with all three favorable factors will have the highest success in using the issue.

Table 2.3 shows how these factors combine in an integrated theory: having organized security threats, or limited repression, or both, is a precondition for using security as an issue in a sustained way. Then, civilian backgrounds, a balanced mix of issues, and an unmatched use of messages of careful enforcement increase the effectiveness of this issue use at winning votes.

Table 2.3 – Predicted Levels of Success		
Organized Threat + Limited Repression	Civilian Background + Balanced Issue Mix + Careful Enforcement	Success
At Least One	Three Items	Highest
At Least One	Two Items	High
At Least One	One Item	Medium
At Least One	None	Low
None	*	Lowest
Note(*): Diffuse threats combined with recent repression will lead to little use of security and non-use of the other conditions.		

It is worth emphasizing that the theoretical framework reflects the influence of all three types of actors: security-focused candidates, other political actors, and voters. Background conditions structure the interactions between security-focused candidates and other politicians, determining whether other politicians can shut down discussions of security or whether candidates can bring up security again and again. The conditions of candidates' backgrounds and mix of issues are a story of candidates interacting with voters, with differences in their campaigns affecting how voters see them. Finally, whether candidates serve a message of careful enforcement and are believed on it is a story about voters receiving messages from both the main security-focused candidate as well as other candidates.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: A CAREFUL CRACKDOWN

To sum up, where threats to security are diffuse and where there has been recent repression, security is less likely to emerge as a central campaign theme and therefore its use is unsuccessful. Even where candidates use the issue, they are unlikely to have the highest success unless they have civilian backgrounds, have a balanced focus on many issues, and make clear use of messages of careful enforcement rather than punishment. Human rights values have therefore created the requirement of a "careful crackdown": promising to give criminals and violent actors the full force of the law, but promising that the person and policies in office can be trusted to avoid brutalities and excesses.

The theoretical framework of this study takes into account variation among different Latin American countries in human rights values and the level of trust in the police. Because distaste for human rights violations and a low trust in security forces drive these conditions, success is most contingent on the correct conditions when police trust is lowest and human rights are most widespread. For example, where trust in the police is particularly low, recent repression should especially impede issue use.

In short, considerations of human rights have led candidates into a balancing act on security. Candidates must promise to be hard on crime and violence but must not seem to be a repressive figure who will wield power in arbitrary ways. As the following chapters show, campaigning on security can still be successful, but just as often it is a risky enterprise that results in few votes being won while instead bringing up problems of human rights violations, concerns about the destruction of individual rights, worries about the arbitrary use of force, and accusations about authoritarian-style rule.

CHAPTER 3: CANDIDATES ON THE DEFENSIVE: KEY CONDITIONS FOR USING SECURITY

Human rights values constrain the success of security as an issue by requiring conditions that affect the use of the issue and the winning of votes. This chapter shows how the presence of organized security threats, a lack of recent repression, or both, allow candidates to focus easily on the issue, by giving opponents fewer ways to assert that security will lead to human rights violations, and by giving security-emphasizing candidates better ways to address these assertions. These are the first two items in the presentation of the theoretical framework in chapter 2.

Unfavorable conditions, namely the presence of only diffuse security threats and recent episodes of repression, interrupt the pathway from voters' concerns to candidates' use of the issue by allowing competitors ample opportunities to assert that human rights will be violated. These conditions discourage issue use: where both unfavorable conditions are present, candidates are unlikely to sustain the use of security. By showing these dynamics at work, this chapter refutes the existing view that voters' concerns lead naturally to the appearance of security as an issue in presidential campaigns.

To show how these conditions affect the opportunities for human rights discourse to impinge on the use of security, this chapter traces how the conditions operated in the Colombian campaign cases from 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2010, paying close attention to the way in which candidates used security when they did, and how other political actors reacted to this use. It examines the effect of these factors on candidates' ability to use the issue without opening themselves up to human rights criticisms, campaign by campaign.

First, a brief overview of issue use helps to show the different degrees to which candidates invoked security as a campaign theme. Content analysis of news coverage of campaigns provides insights on candidates' use of security, for the campaign cases in this study. This content analysis is about issue use by candidates, regardless of their vote share.

Sources for this content analysis involve the newspaper *El Tiempo* and the newsweekly *Semana*. The first measure is drawn from *El Tiempo* newspaper coverage between May 1 and the day of the election, the last Sunday in May. The second measure focuses on the weekly newsmagazine *Semana* for all issues between January 1 and election day. These two publications represent a balance of perspectives on security matters, and are each the highest-circulation print medium of their kind in Colombia. Including both types of format allows true reliability: *El Tiempo*'s daily format gives a fine-grained presentation of candidates' issue use, while *Semana*'s weekly format is likely to reflect the themes that candidates seek to highlight the most.

Content analysis was done with the following method: following existing research on issue use (Petrocik 1996), each derives from content analysis of news sources, specifically candidate-generated news articles about public policy topics. Analysis consisted of a classification of all candidate-generated stories about issues and public policy. For the content analyses present in this study, from *El Tiempo*, 2287 news articles were analyzed consisting of all articles referring to the candidates, including 237 articles determined to be candidate-generated articles about specific pronouncements on

public policy. From *Semana*, 808 news articles were analyzed, consisting of all articles referring to the candidates, including 56 on specific pronouncements on public policy.

Analysis of articles was done starting with a method that distinguished between candidate-generated articles on public policy, and other articles. For each candidate, news articles involving the candidate were determined first to be one of two types: either procedural, as in discussing electoral rules, running mates, and debate formats; or substantive, about issues and public policy. Articles involving only procedural discussion were not included. Articles involving issues and public policy, even if they also involved discussion about procedure, were retained. Among the articles about issues and public policy, the major issue of the article as a whole was determined. These categories included security, the economy, foreign policy, corruption, and social services, as well as many categories that ended up being much smaller in the total number of articles, including education, institutional reform, agriculture, health, tourism, drugs, taxes, and transportation.

Categorization of different topics followed the following rules: when articles mentioned multiple issues for a single candidate, and these issues were not discussed in equal proportions within the article, the most prominent topic was chosen. In the case of articles that provided reporting on televised debates, where multiple candidates and multiple issues were discussed, the content analysis assigned each candidate the issue about which the most was written in the context of that candidate, rather than attempting to identify one single major issue for the candidates as a whole. Fractional values were

given for issues mentioned equally but only for articles that mentioned topics with little additional elaboration following these references.

Table 3.1 shows candidates' use of security for all these cases, first using heuristic scores of "Low," "Medium," and "High" giving a broad characterization of the use of issues, based on case-specific knowledge of each campaign, and then demonstrating the reliability of this heuristic score through the content analysis-derived daily and weekly measures. As shown in percentages in the table, these scores from the content analysis corroborate the heuristic measures.

Table 3.1 – Use of Security in Colombian Campaigns

Year	Candidate	Heuristic	Daily	Weekly
1994	Samper	Low	17%	0%
1994	Pastrana	Low	14%	5%
1998	Bedoya	High	55%	83%
2002	Uribe	High	31%	61%
2010	Santos	Medium	18%	64%

Sources: content analysis of all candidate-generated articles about public policy issues in *El Tiempo* for May of each election year and *Semana* for January to May of each year. Public security issues include armed conflict, crime, peace, and terrorism.

Note: Santos in 2010 started with high use of security and ended lower. The "Medium" heuristic designation is consistent with the high use shown by the content analysis for January through May, followed by the low use shown by the analysis for May.

This chapter first shows how the degree of organization of security threats affects use of security: candidates could not sustain a focus on security by talking about diffuse security threats. During the 1994 election season, organized security threats such as guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and drug cartels contributed relatively less to crime and violence, even amidst soaring crime and violence by smaller, less organized criminal

groups that kept the rates of major crimes in the country near their peak for that time period. These dynamics of the crime and violence in Colombia ended up hindering both Ernesto Samper and Andrés Pastrana in their discussions of security, leading them to mention crime and violence in generic ways rather than making any specific groups the targets of their campaign discourse. Both candidates for the election are examined because candidates can vary individually in how much they might be predisposed to discuss any issue in the first place. Attention to both campaigns shows that the observed low use of the issue comes from pressures to protect human rights during this period.

In contrast, candidates' ability to target organized threats in their discussions of security in 1998, 2002, and 2010 allowed them to sustain their central focuses on security, despite frequent pressures on human rights. Threats were increasingly organized in 1998 when Harold Bedoya campaigned to use the military against drug-linked guerrilla groups. They were potently organized in 2002, allowing Álvaro Uribe to focus on fighting guerrillas and dealing with paramilitary groups, despite pressures about human rights. Such threats were also potently organized in 2010, allowing Juan Manuel Santos to focus on security despite a human rights scandal. The effect can be seen particularly well by comparing the 1994 Samper and Pastrana campaigns with the 2010 Santos campaign: in 1994, actual murder rates as well as voters' concerns about security were running higher than in 2010.

The chapter then shows how issue use is affected by recent repression: recent human rights violations gave more opportunities to opposing candidates, international human rights organizations, and news media to pressure candidates on matters of human

rights. The subject of human rights appeared quickly alongside candidates' discussions of security. When recent repression occurred, candidates had to respond to criticism about human rights. The pressures stemming from repression can be seen for Samper and Pastrana in 1994, Uribe in 2002, and Santos in 2010, but not for Bedoya in 1998.

The contribution of this chapter is therefore to show that variation in the use of security is explained strongly by these two factors. Organized security threats gave candidates the opportunity to hammer home their discussions of security by targeting these threats, thereby helping them to sustain their use of the issue. Yet even candidates with a zest for campaigning on security still spent effort dealing with any recent repression that was associated with them.

This chapter further shows that alternative potential explanations cannot account for the observed variation. Primarily, variation cannot be explained merely by the strength of economic issues. Economic issues would seem to be a good alternative explanation at first glance, since issues must beat each other out for attention (Carmines and Stimson 1989). After all, the power of the economy as an issue has been well established (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1990; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001), and the economy is an issue for which some presidential candidate will always be favored by emphasizing it (Vavreck 2009). In fact, however, concerns about the economy or actual economic performance cannot explain the variation in the use of security. In addition, this chapter shows that variation in use cannot be explained fully by a reaction against existing security policies or by idiosyncratic events such as security problems outside of Colombia.

DIFFICULTY TARGETING DIFFUSE THREATS

The presence of only diffuse security threats hindered the use of security by enabling attention to human rights as a competing consideration that overlaid the issue in a way that resulted in its neutralization as an issue. It also allowed few opportunities for candidates to continue a strategy of activating the issue, through attempts to discuss the security threats themselves. For Samper and Pastrana in 1994, organized actors were responsible for less crime and violence than in previous years. New diffuse actors kept crime and violence high. These circumstances led the two candidates to discuss security in general terms that were not sustained. In contrast, violent and criminal actors were increasingly organized in 1998. Bedoya targeted these actors specifically. For Uribe in 2002 and Santos in 2010, security threats were even more potently organized: by pointing directly to the menace of these organized threats, they were able to overcome the many complaints about recent human rights violations and the assertions that more might follow.

Samper and Pastrana in 1994: Diffuse Threats Leading to Weak Discussion

Samper and Pastrana in 1994 did not campaign on security because security threats were diffuse and there was recent repression; this section details how the diffuse nature of security threats discouraged issue use. The 1994 elections unfolded in a highly partisan environment, despite the institutional reforms embodied in the 1991 constitution, which aimed to facilitate new party formation. This partisan environment, in which voters continued to have strong psychological attachments to parties and in which stable

partisan reputations allowed partisan patterns of issue ownership to be well established, should have provided clear incentives to use the issue of security, especially for Pastrana.

For the 1994 election, actual crime and violence were rampant. Murder rates from 1991 to 1994 were the highest in decades before or after and were higher than during any part of the 1980s (UNODC 2006). Even though they were ever slightly lower in 1993 and 1994 than in 1991 and 1992, such activity was clearly still near a high point. Consequently, voters continued to be intensely concerned about security. At least 25% of the population was concerned foremost about security issues (*El Tiempo* 1994 2/20 "Samper adelanta a Pastrana"). This was even more than the 18% that was concerned about security in 2010, when Santos campaigned centrally on security (Gallup 2010). In the mid-1990s, security was about equal in importance to Colombians as economic issues (Latinobarómetro 1996).

Highly organized drug cartels' contribution to drug violence had declined drastically, even as drug violence remained rampant. After years of attempting to defeat the major drug cartels that had caused crime and violence to soar out of control, in 1993 the Colombian government dismantled the Medellín drug cartel. The Cali drug cartel, which had been its main competitor, employed more sophisticated, less openly violent methods (Holmes, Gutiérrez, and Curtin 2008). As a prime example of the Cali cartel's tactics that avoided violence out in the open, Cali cartel funds ended up in the Samper campaign; Colombians would not find out about this until after the election. Yet diffuse actors continued to cause crime and violence. Many assassins for the Medellín cartel formed smaller independent groups (Rozema 2008). Miniature drug trafficking groups,

despite not being able to replicate the potently organized, hierarchical forms of the Medellín cartel whose pieces they were picking up, filled the void left by the cartel and were just as violent (Bagley 2001: 89). The green valley surrounding Medellín, the Valle de Aburrá, known for its steadily springtime-like weather, would not see tranquility so soon.

Guerrilla and paramilitary groups continued to grow in size (Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sánchez 2001), but political violence was at a relative low in 1993 and 1994. Negotiations in 1990 and 1991 resulted in several guerrilla groups demobilizing; in 1992 the remaining groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) continued to fight state forces. The military responded by increasing its activities dramatically through 1993, leading to less activity in 1993 by all major remaining guerrilla groups (Echandía 2006: 168-169, 208). Furthermore, paramilitary violence was at a low point between 1993 and 1995 (Echandía 2006: 71). At this point, paramilitary groups had not yet coalesced into the umbrella organizations of the late 1990s (Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sánchez 2001). As a result, the intensity of conflict plunged in 1993 and 1994, and this drop was precipitous (Echandía 2006: 66-67).

The point is that highly organized threats, such as paramilitaries, guerrillas, and cartels contributed less to the crime and violence of those years, which mounted primarily from the unchecked drug violence of smaller groups and bands. Although voter concerns about security stayed high, violence was committed much less by organized groups and

more by diffuse actors. Organized actors' relatively low profile during this time would result in difficulty in drawing attention to the dangers that remained from them.

The diffuse nature of these threats gave Samper and Pastrana fewer opportunities to attempt to invoke the issue of security. Both Samper and Pastrana campaigned squarely on economic themes. This focus occurred even though they had roughly similar positions on economic matters. There were some differences in economic policy, of course (Jaramillo, Steiner, and Salazar 1999: 23): Samper declared himself the candidate of "social capitalism," focusing on jobs, while Pastrana focused on macroeconomic growth, with less attention to redistribution (*El Tiempo* 1994 3/3, "Capitalismo social"). Yet they agreed on continuing Colombia's largely market-oriented economic policy, differing principally only on the speed at which it should be carried out (Appleyard 2001). In this environment of policy convergence on economic issues, compared with the past in Colombia and compared with other countries in the region, and under a backdrop of persistently high concerns about crime and violence, surprisingly little attention was given to security (Jaramillo, Steiner, and Salazar 1999).

Two specific items suggest the pivotal role of organized versus diffuse security threats. First, during the few times that Samper and Pastrana did mention security, they talked mostly about crime as a phenomenon rather than aiming squarely at groups that committed crime and violence. Specifically, they largely shied away from making concrete proposals that would open themselves up to human rights criticisms. Second, even after a high-profile crime incident toward the end of the campaign, use of security remained brief.

Both candidates promised to resolve political violence through peace and dialogue with guerrillas, rather than promising to crush guerrillas. They also spoke in favor of negotiations with guerrilla groups (Knoester 1998). Samper in particular focused on peace negotiations with guerrillas, thereby securing benefits to public security only in the long-term. Instead of casting his platform in terms of improving security, Samper talked about the peace process with guerrillas as something during which violence would continue to occur until there was a settlement (Boudon 1996). Samper's campaign aides did not see crime and violence as driven by organized threats: instead, they portrayed security problems as due to a lack of jobs (*Semana* 1994). Pastrana largely matched Samper's plans for ending political violence, emphasizing breaking links between paramilitaries and the armed forces, and calling for international efforts to help seek peace (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/24 "Llegará").

Neither Samper nor Pastrana could give clear, sustained comments on public security. When they did discuss crime, their rhetoric did not focus on the actors who were committing these crimes, but rather talked generically about the problems of increasing crime or discussed security with attention to basic rights. Samper declared, for example, that crime "has grown in an alarming way and measures that allow fighting crime in the streets haven't been adopted in an effective way"; he was vague on the issue, proposing to double the police force in Bogotá but without details on how the police would be used (*El Tiempo* 1994 2/20 "Samper adelanta"). Pastrana placed slightly more emphasis on reducing nonpolitical crime than did Samper (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/25 "Llegará").

Yet the main way in which Pastrana discussed security was to talk about security not in terms of combating the problem itself, but in terms of police reform, which is largely a matter of attending to the human rights aspects of security efforts. Pastrana noted that police reform "should become the core of a much more active policy that deals with the problem of crime in our cities" (*El Tiempo* 1994 2/20 "Samper adelanta") and called for transforming the police (see *El Tiempo* 1994 5/25 "El miedo").

Even after a major, shocking crime, campaigning on security only increased temporarily. Candidates turned their attention to security only in the last month of the campaign, in the aftermath of a bus hijacking in Bogotá. In this crime, the passengers were robbed and assaulted by a group of hijackers as the bus continued to drive through the city for hours (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/26, "Rehenes"). Samper seized on the issue immediately afterward stating, "We cannot let groups of evildoers seed panic in the city precisely when we are getting over the dramatic times of narcoterrorism" (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/27, "Samper, una mano"). This discourse came closer to pinpointing organized groups of some kind, but except for the reference to the dismantling of the Medellín cartel, did not target a specific group. At the start of the second round, several days later, Samper made a full announcement of a public security plan (*El Tiempo* 1994 6/1, "Samper lanza plan"). In his plan, Samper included an increase in penalties for convicted criminals, as well as programs to keep drug addicts away from their habits.

This plan, however, was just one episode at the end of a long campaign. Serious discussion about security therefore waited until the last week of the second round of campaigning. Notably, this was in an election where a quarter of the population had

security as their number one concern. Samper and Pastrana's 1994 campaigns therefore show how the relative inactivity of organized security threats hampered the use of security. After months of high concern about crime and violence, the issue was not used in a sustained way. Both candidates gave weak discussions of diffuse threats. Only when a major event by an organized group shocked people at the end of the campaign did a candidate take up the issue, and only one candidate did so.

Bedoya: Increasingly Organized Threats, Forceful Use of Security

The 1998, 2002, and 2010 campaigns contrast with the campaigns of 1994 in that these years saw the presence of organized, hierarchical security threats that actively contributed to continued crime and violence. With organized threats, candidates could build up their security discourse by making these specific threats the central targets in their discussion of security. Despite unfolding in an increasingly fluid party system, impelled not only by the 1991 constitution but also, for the 2010 campaign, by electoral reforms in 2003, the presence of these organized threats allowed the selection of issues of public security by these campaigns.

The 1998 Bedoya campaign unfolded in a context of increasing crime and political violence, alongside increasingly apparent weakness in state capacity to retain the monopoly of force throughout the majority of its territory. Drug traffickers had expanded, and guerrillas had strengthened dramatically. Drug traffickers had become more connected with violent groups such as guerrillas and paramilitary groups. In addition, guerrillas had stepped up direct attacks against government forces. Notable

examples include the taking over of a military base in the department of Putumayo in southwestern Colombia in August 1996, capturing or killing over 100 soldiers; and the direct defeat of an antiguerrilla battalion in the department of Caquetá in south-central Colombia in March 1998, killing or capturing over 90 soldiers (Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sánchez 2001; Granada, Restrepo, and Vargas 2009). Consequently, about 35% of the population was concerned foremost about security issues (Latinobarómetro 1998).

Bedoya seized on threat of these organized actors. He launched his presidential campaign on the heels of ending a long military career as a general, culminating as commander of the armed forces, where he had spent much of his efforts on battling drug traffickers as well as guerrillas. He had only been forced to retire as a general in July 1997 because he had disagreed with the Samper administration's conciliatory moves toward guerrilla groups and the administration's policy of open-ended negotiation with them.

Seeking to make security the signature issue of his campaign, Bedoya opposed a demilitarized zone for the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla group. He called publicly for the government to stop engaging in discussions and negotiations with the FARC, but remained open, in theory, to external mediators such as the United States (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/7 "Mediación externa"). Bedoya claims not to have perceived any real obstacles getting in the way of using the issue (Bedoya interview 2009). As Bedoya recalled about his 1998 campaign, "I believe I was the candidate of security." He commented further:

> "All this tragedy that we had been living was something that had to be stopped. Colombians have been the victims of these terrorist groups [...] Colombia has rampant corruption and it was an issue that I also used. But the fundamental issue was security. Plus drug trafficking." (Bedoya interview 2009)

Bedoya made forceful use of the issue of security by pounding on the threat of organized groups, namely guerrillas and drug cartels. He was categorically opposed to negotiation with guerrillas, stating, "I will not dialogue with anyone who has committed a crime" (Caracol 1998). Rather than merely talking about crime as a phenomenon, as Samper and Pastrana had in 1994, his specific wording targeted these groups. Bedoya used terms such as "chaos and insecurity" as his way to describe the problems facing Colombia (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/25 "Recuperación"). He did this in clearer and more forceful terms than Pastrana or Samper did in 1994, pointing specifically to guerrilla groups. He critiqued the FARC as an organization that dealt in crime without any of its past socioeconomic ideals; he made ample use of his past in asserting his capability to deal with security. In fact, during these elections, the focus of debates about security became whether to establish peace talks with the FARC and other guerrilla groups (Hoskin and Murillo 1999).

Bedoya strongly linked the threat from guerrillas with cocaine production. Focusing on aspects of the drug trade where the cartels cooperated with each other, he pounded on the threat of drug traffickers, characterizing the drug threat as one massive cartel (Bedoya interview 2009). Bedoya pointed to the overlap of guerrilla-held territory and coca cultivation and cocaine production as his reason for favoring active use of the military against guerrilla groups. This was his declared reason for opposing the removal

of the army from guerrilla-held areas, as Samper had attempted to do as part of negotiations with guerrilla groups (Dettmer 1998). For example, in a campaign speech about settling the conflict with guerrilla groups, he stated:

> Neither the FARC nor the ELN are interested in peace. Allied with the drug trade, they earn much more from fighting, which is their principal source of income. Peace depends on the capacity of the state to enforce the law. Whoever kills, robs, or kidnaps must pay for their crime, instead of counting on an expected pardon (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/25, "Recuperación").

Moreover, Bedoya painted the Colombian government's struggle against guerrilla groups in stark terms: "Intermediate options do not fit: one is either with terrorism or one is against it" (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/25, "Recuperación"). In contrast with 1994 where there were few potently organized security threats, in 1998 the increasingly active profile of guerrillas and drug traffickers clearly helped Bedoya talk about security.

Uribe: Potently Organized Threats, Strong Use of Security

The 2002 Uribe campaign unfolded in a backdrop of widespread political violence that precipitated an increased sense among political actors and the general public of the weakness of the Colombian state. In large part due to Uribe, this election was accompanied by the weakening of attachments to established parties, as the 1991 constitution had intended.

Uribe made strong use of security due to the presence of potently organized threats to which he could point, and to do so in a way that allowed him largely to overcome pressures about human rights. The presence of these potent threats gave Uribe

opportunities to campaign on the issue again and again. Uribe did so specifically by pointing to these organized security threats, particularly guerrilla groups engaged in political violence, as well as by pointing to the menace of drug traffickers.

As portrayed by his campaign chief, Uribe campaigned on security because it was in line with public opinion:

> "We went to the towns and barrios and had meetings and asked them what they wanted. We had them vote on the five things that they were most concerned about. People voted for several issues, but overwhelmingly voted about security. If this is what people wanted, this was what Uribe would talk about [...] Security was more important than education, employment, and more important than food." (Echeverri interview 2009a)

Echeverri also commented, "I can't imagine another country with so many armed groups, well organized, for such a long time" (Echeverri interview 2009b).

By the time of the 2002 campaign, organized threats to public security had reached emergency levels. Guerrilla groups had grown during the three years of peace talks under Pastrana, which had not led to any settlement. As a condition for the negotiations, Pastrana guaranteed the FARC an area in the departments of Meta and Caquetá in south-central Colombia within which the Colombian military promised not to go. This zone was part of a relatively lightly populated area with humid rainforests and broad rivers. Informally called El Caguán after the river basin in which it was located, this zone had an area of 42,000 square kilometers, or the size of the countries of El Salvador and Belize combined. As the FARC strengthened, it came to control highways between major cities. Starting in 1999, it began a series of massive kidnappings,

stopping buses along these highways and kidnapping those on board in exchange for ransoms, which it would use to fund its activities (Granada, Restrepo, and Vargas 2009). Ordinary people became terrified to travel from city to city; plane travel was considered the only safe way to travel between Colombia's major cities.

Guerrillas also began to perpetrate violence within urban areas, attacking utility infrastructure for major cities, including electricity and communications towers near Bogotá. By 2002 the major guerrilla groups were widely discredited by their violence. There had been a long-standing debate in Colombia on whether to consider the country's situation an internal conflict or to consider it terrorism, with the implications of the debate being either that the government was a party to a conflict with guerrillas being another set of parties in the conflict, or that the government represented a state attempting to establish security for its population.

By the time Uribe ran for office, these guerrilla activities swung the debate clearly to one side. As journalist Alfredo Rangel remarked:

> "The media made a constant denunciation of the peace process. They criticized the government of Pastrana [...] There was a discrediting of the FARC in 2001. The guerrilla was discredited by the violence they were doing. The necessity and opportunity arose to classify them as terrorists." (Rangel interview 2009)

These security threats therefore were increasingly classified as a menace to society, and not a part of society. To top these problems off, drug trafficking had also spread: the growth of traffickers, which Bedoya had decried in 1998, had continued. As a result of

these threats, concerns about security were paramount during the election season: 42% of the population was concerned foremost about security (Latinobarómetro 2002).

Uribe seized on these concerns to discuss security, focusing on fighting guerrilla groups. Amid a growing belief among Colombians by late 2001 that Pastrana's negotiations were unfruitful (Hoskin and Murillo 2001), he clamored to continue fighting guerrillas and only to negotiate with these groups once they had agreed to stop fighting. His promises of using the military against guerrilla groups and his opposition to existing negotiations were central to his campaign (Cepeda 2003; Mason 2003). Uribe targeted guerrillas specifically in his discourse, rather than merely stressing the phenomenon of crime and violence. The first point in his platform on security was "Colombia without guerrillas and without paramilitaries." Notably, Uribe focused on security by targeting these guerrillas, as well as paramilitaries to some extent. Thus, he focused on the menace of the groups themselves, rather than focusing on their crimes of murder, kidnapping, and ransom, or their specific acts of political violence. In his platform, Uribe declared, "the legitimate authority of the state will protect citizens and dissuade violent actors" (Uribe 2002).

Uribe also focused on security by commenting on U.S. policies that were intended to combat drugs and drug trafficking. He spoke in favor of the U.S. anti-drug program Plan Colombia, calling for expanding the program to fight kidnapping and terrorism (*El Tiempo* 2002 4/2 "Uribe pedirá a Europa"). This program, set up between the U.S. and Colombian governments in the late 1990s, provided U.S. financial aid for anti-drug activities. When it had started, its stated intention had been to boost the Colombian

government's ability for the specific, confined purpose of fighting drug production and trafficking. As part of his campaign, Uribe proposed to expand Plan Colombia, calling for aerial fumigation and increased cooperation with farmers (*El Tiempo* 2002 3/20 "Guerra y la paz").

Candidates on the left side of the Colombian political spectrum reacted in a way that helped keep security a central campaign issue. They likely ought to have agreed completely with what Uribe proposed, or just ignored it and kept talking about socioeconomic issues. Rather than attempting to shift discussion in this way, however, they tried to argue for shifting Plan Colombia's money toward their favored emphases. Notably, even these competitors could not pressure Uribe too much on human rights, for attempting to defend the rights of drug trafficking groups would be politically untenable.

As clear examples of this lack of ability or interest in defending the rights of drug traffickers, Horacio Serpa, a center-leftist from the Partido Liberal, agreed that drugs were a major source of income for violent groups, even as he continued his longstanding criticism of Plan Colombia for its heavy focus on the military. He called for re-orienting Plan Colombia to focus more on social and development problems. Luis Eduardo Garzón of the leftist Polo Democrático Independiente argued against the basic premise of Plan Colombia. He declared that it should be used for employment, for helping people displaced by violent conflict, and for crop substitution (*El Tiempo* 2002 4/1 "Gobierno revivió"), but did not largely assail these plans on matters of human rights. By disagreeing with the use of Plan Colombia funds without being able to point to issues of human rights, Uribe's competitors reacted in a way that only solidified Plan Colombia as

a campaign issue, rather than turning attention to the socioeconomic issues that benefit leftist candidates (see Panizza 2005; Cleary 2006).

Santos: Continued and New Organized Threats, Strong Use of Security

Santos' use of security was due to his ability to point to the menace of both continued and new organized threats. The 2010 election unfolded in a very fluid party system environment characterized by the entrance of multiple new parties for the 2010 election cycle, alongside several parties that had only been formed in the last election cycle as well as the long-established Partido Liberal and Partido Conservador. Santos centered his campaign on security without being able to benefit directly from the issue ownership on security that the established parties might have been able to lend to his campaign. Nevertheless, because the pro-Uribe party, Partido de la U, was so closely identified with Uribe and his security policies, Santos' eventual position as the candidate for Partido de la U likely helped to cement his own reputation on security even further.

By 2010, Uribe's security policies had led to significant reductions in the geographic scope of guerrilla and paramilitary conflict. These policies also dramatically reduced kidnapping rates, and resulted in homicide rates that were markedly lower than in 2002. Consequently, fewer Colombians were concerned foremost about security by 2010 than in either 2002 or 2006. Concerns about security as the most important problem declined from 42% in 2002, to 38% in 2006, to a dramatically lower 18% by 2010 (Latinobarómetro 2002, 2006, 2010). This "paradox of success" on security (Weyland

2000) explains the reduced importance that Colombians attached to issues of security by 2010.

Voters' security concerns declined in line with the "paradox of success," but the success itself was incomplete, meaning that the issue did not completely disappear. Not only did many on the right continue to see guerrilla groups as major threats that continued to exist and which needed to be finished off (see *El País* 2009), but many on the left who wished to criticize the effectiveness of Uribe's security policies pointed out additional failures of the policy. Guerrilla groups continued to be active in departments of Colombia bordering Ecuador and Venezuela, such as Arauca, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo (see Granada, Restrepo, and Vargas 2009: 107). Homicide rates, while continuing to be lower than in 2002, also ticked notably upward again by 2009 in several major cities such as Medellín and Cali (*El Espectador* 2010 5/4; RCN 2010). At 18%, the proportion of Colombians that was concerned foremost about security may have been much lower than in past years, but it was still in the middle of the pack for presidential elections in Latin America over the preceding decade (Latinobarómetro 2000-2009).

Santos clearly campaigned on security, making it his trademark issue early on and positioning himself as the continuity candidate for Uribe's security policies. The question of whether Uribe would be constitutionally allowed to run for a third term, a topic that had frequently overshadowed topics of public policy during the previous two years, continued to rage through much of 2009. Arguing that he was the logical choice on security if Uribe was not allowed to run, Santos' campaign banners in late 2009 read, "If not Uribe, it's Juan Manuel Santos" (Benítez interview 2009). When third

consecutive terms were indeed declared unconstitutional, Santos maintained his emphasis on continuing Uribe's security policies. Concerns about security leading to the 2010 election were at 18%, lower than in 1994 (Gallup 2010), yet unlike in 1994 for Samper and Pastrana, the organized nature of security threats enabled Santos to discuss security. Controversies about U.S. anti-drug policies in Colombia allowed him to maintain this focus on security, even though, interestingly, his leftist opponents' campaign goals were clearly to make economics, not security, the main issue.

Leading up to the campaign season for 2010, security had been coming off an eight-year period under Uribe in which security had improved dramatically. Kidnappings and murders had declined rapidly between 2002 and 2006, and had stayed within a stable range through 2010, although ticking upward slightly in 2009 and 2010. Guerrillas had been driven from highways and main urban areas to mostly rural areas in more isolated regions of Colombia. Property crimes, especially robberies, were up, however: in 2009 and 2010 these crimes had begun to climb in the major cities including Cali, Medellín, and Bogotá. Even more, former members of demobilized paramilitary groups or drug cartels were regrouping, forming moderately organized successors of the highly organized paramilitary groups of which they had been a part, and were called "bandas criminales" or criminal gangs (*Semana* 2010 3/11 "Bandas").

The organized nature of security threats helped Santos seize on issues of security. Santos focused on the dangers of all kinds of threats that had now grown: guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and these new criminal gangs. According to a campaign representative, even though guerrillas have been around for a long time, "they weren't

extremely threatening" until they came to have links with drug trafficking and become more active. The representative also stressed the importance of combating gangs, even pointing out the example that on his way home there are about ten different gangs (Benítez interview 2009).

The role of organized threats in helping to elevate the use of security can be seen in the way that controversies related to anti-drug policies kept the issue a main topic of debate. Between February and October 2009, controversy raged over whether Colombia should allow the U.S. to widen its use of Colombian military sites. U.S. interest in an expanded presence became a major topic of political debate in Colombia. The importance of this issue to Colombia can be seen in that during this period, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Andean regional director, Jay Bergman, noted that the U.S.-Colombian anti-drug relationship is "perhaps the best in the world" (Bergman interview 2009). This topic was a prolonged controversy in Colombia. During the bulk of 2009, the U.S. use of bases was often the main subject of political debate among politicians and among segments of the public.

As the candidate who portrayed himself as the choice who would most closely continue Uribe's security policies, Santos spoke in favor of allowing the U.S. expanded use. Although as Uribe's defense minister, Santos initially had doubts about the plan (Vieira 2009), he came to favor it starting at least in February 2009 (*El Espectador* 2009). By the time he stepped down from his post as Uribe's defense minister in May 2009 so that he could prepare his presidential campaign, Santos was forcefully in favor of the proposal. Santos' campaign cast the extension as an important step in dealing with drugs

inside Colombia. The campaign credited U.S. aid for helping the Colombian military to pursue Uribe's strategy against guerrillas, and portrayed the agreement as merely the continuation of a decades-long history of military cooperation with the U.S. (Benítez interview 2009).

Leftists, in contrast, galvanized against the idea of an expanded U.S. military presence. Leftist politicians and groups frequently used the slogan "no to Yankee bases." They called this wider use of military sites an unprecedented use of Colombian territory by the U.S. military, and a symbol of imperialism by the United States. This reaction merely served to keep security as the main campaign issue during the autumn. Instead of highlighting poverty, Polo Democrático Alternativo pre-candidates decried what they saw as infringements on Colombian sovereignty. For example, a representative of the campaign for Carlos Gaviria's 2010 Polo Democrático Alternativo primary run declared that the proposed expansion of the use of bases "is a move by the U.S. to have territorial control [in Colombia] through the fight against drugs and terrorists" (Hernándo Gómez 2009 interview).

Even more importantly, the debate about the bases seems to have crucially harmed the campaign of Partido Liberal candidate Rafael Pardo. Although candidates did not officially register their candidacies until early 2010, in the summer and fall of 2009 Pardo was one of the main leftist competitors to Santos, at a time when many candidates could be counted as among the frontrunners. Pardo portrayed himself as a center-leftist who had extensive government experience, as a former government minister and as a senator. Pardo preferred emphasizing socioeconomic issues and education.

Yet as his policy coordinator notes, as the bases controversy raged during the summer and fall, Pardo could not discuss his own issues. Instead of being able to focus on socioeconomic topics, or even being able to strike a balance between socioeconomic topics and current debates such as the bases controversy, Pardo found himself having to talk about the bases over and over again (Fierro interview 2009). As Pardo's policy coordinator noted, during early August 2009 when the debate over the bases flared, the operational goal of the campaign was:

> "to have [Pardo] traveling around Colombia every day and saying something that that there is something in the news about him in the news every day. Pardo wanted to talk about education [...] but he had to talk about the bases." (Fierro interview 2009)

Through late 2009, therefore, this controversy helped keep attention focused on security. It allowed Santos to talk about the issue, and competitors such as Pardo were drawn into the topic instead of elevating topics for which they had issue ownership.

In sum, diffuse threats allowed human rights concerns to constrain use of the issue, for Samper and Pastrana. Neither Samper nor Pastrana invoked this issue for which there were high voter concerns, except to speak vaguely about the problem or in a way that touched on human rights themes of police reform. Use at the end was in response to a single event, and only after a long campaign. In contrast, Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos were all able to seize on security by focusing on the threats posed by organized actors, for which it would become more difficult to argue that their human rights needed to be protected.

CANDIDATES PUT ON THE DEFENSIVE BY RECENT REPRESSION

Recent repression forced candidates who intended to campaign on the security issue to go on the defensive. In each of these cases, where repression affected the dynamics of campaigns it was due to recent activities by state forces against innocent bystanders or neutral civilians, not major episodes of repression from decades past. Certainly, Colombia has also seen many past periods of repression. To quell La Violencia, a period of partisan civil war in the 1940s and 1950s, the 1953-1958 military government of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla combined an unconditional amnesty for guerrilla movements with selective repression in areas where guerrillas did not demobilize (Sánchez and Meertens 2001); also, the 1978-1982 Julio César Turbay Ayala administration used heavy repression in an attempt to improve security. Yet the episodes of repression relevant to campaigning on security are more recent.

Among the campaigns being examined, widespread human rights violations by the military in the early 1990s led Samper to promise an end to these violations and sidetracked Pastrana in his few attempts to use security. Human rights organizations attempted to link Uribe to repression caused by state-sanctioned groups in the mid-1990s, causing him to spend extra effort to manage these pressures. A major human rights scandal by the military in the late 2000s caused Santos to be pressured directly and frequently on human rights by his main competitor, Antanas Mockus of the newly formed Partido Verde. Only Bedoya was not constrained by pressures on human rights created by any recent episodes of repression.

Samper and Pastrana in 1994: Sidetracked by Recent Repression

The 1994 elections were limited in the use of security not only because of diffuse security threats, but also because recent repression enabled Samper to place consistent pressure on human rights on Pastrana. These pressures resulted in the maintenance of the economy, not security, as the major issue by sidetracking Pastrana's attempts to elevate the issue of security when he attempted to do so.

In the years immediately before 1994, state forces were responsible for serious abuses of human rights. Guerrilla groups and paramilitary groups also contributed to atrocities against the civilian population throughout the 1990s, but repression by state forces, namely the military, was particularly widespread. In 1992, government agents were estimated to be responsible for 40 percent of political assassinations (Bergquist, Peñaranda, and Sánchez 2001: xiv), and in 1993, for over 50 percent of both political murders and non-combatant deaths stemming from the conflict (Human Rights Watch 1993: 4; Avilés 2006: 403). State forces' share of responsibility for atrocities, notably political assassinations and massacres of civilians, would diminish notably after the election, with the share committed by paramilitary groups increasing dramatically (Avilés 2006); this shift is likely due both to the reform efforts of Samper once in office as well as the dramatic growth of paramilitary groups from 1996 onward.

These patterns of repression against neutral civilians were treated by the Samper and Pastrana campaigns in different ways, but in both cases they constrained the use of security. Samper took up the issue of human rights in a genuine way, and also pressured

Pastrana on human rights whenever Pastrana attempted to use security. Both Samper and Pastrana therefore came to talk about human rights whenever the issue arose.

For Samper, the recent repression led him to make human rights a sincere, actual component of his campaign. Early in his campaign, Samper committed himself to stop violations of human rights by the Colombian military (Knoester 1998). He declared, for example, that protection of human rights was not "a concession to those who are up in arms, but the natural development of a personal conviction," and he spoke of human rights in terms of protecting citizens from the guerrilla and paramilitary conflict (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/25 "El miedo"). This frontal defense of human rights led Samper to receive strong support from intellectuals (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/22 "Intelectuales").

Pastrana did not take up the issue of human rights directly, as Samper had; rather, he was forced to talk about it whenever he used public security because Samper would press him about human rights. In the presidential debate between Pastrana, Samper, and additional candidate and former guerrilla Antonio Navarro Wolff, both Samper and Navarro directly called for Pastrana to pay attention to human rights of civilians in the armed conflict. In his own discussion of security during the debate, Pastrana underscored the need to deal with drug trafficking, beyond Samper's approach of combating the drug trafficking that was tied to guerrillas. Yet he also attempted to criticize Samper's approach to human rights, asking whether Samper would allow external organizations to judge Colombian security forces who had committed human rights violations (*El Tiempo* 1994 5/25 "Por fin el debate"). Talking about security and human rights as a reaction to

the charges leveled against him, Pastrana was on the defensive, without sustaining a discussion of security itself.

Bedoya: Limited Repression, Forceful Campaigning

Bedoya was able to campaign forcefully on security because a lack of recent repression resulted in few pressures from other political actors on human rights. Bedoya was not put on the defensive by human rights pressures. In particular, news media and candidates largely did not press him on past repression.

By the late 1990s, Colombian military forces' atrocities, although continuing, were less widespread than during the early 1990s. The proportion of massacre victims, for example, killed by the armed forces rather than paramilitaries, guerrilla groups, gangs, and drug traffickers, was 4% (Livingstone 2003: 35); the share of non-combatant deaths during this period for which the military was responsible stood between 2 and 5 percent (Avilés 2006: 403). The number of total civilian victims of political violence stayed somewhat steady in the middle and late 1990s, but the military's contribution declined while the share of atrocities committed by paramilitary groups climbed to approximately 50 percent of all massacre events and massacre victims (Livingstone 2003: 34-35).

Consequently, the media largely did not mobilize against Bedoya on matters of human rights. According to Mauricio Vargas, a journalist well versed in coverage of security matters, the media gave Bedoya a sort of benign neglect; the media "did not do much" against Bedoya, "and it wasn't conscious" where it was negative (Rangel interview 2009). Perhaps in part this may have been because the media largely did not

expect Bedoya to win (Rangel interview 2009). Nevertheless, news media did not even pressure Bedoya on human rights on matters that might have been readily available material. Although the military's share of massacres was lower, the military still engaged in some repression, and Bedoya had been commander of the armed forces in 1996 and 1997. This relative lack of repression, however, likely resulted in less attention to it, compared with the 1994 election.

As a result, Bedoya's use of security was not constrained much by human rights. When human rights organizations critiqued Bedoya on human rights, Bedoya hit back. Bedoya simply denied these accusations. He blamed foreign human rights organizations for pushing this focus on human rights violations, asserting that these organizations were lying about the occurrence of abuses (Schemo 1997).

Bedoya's tone against human rights organizations was strident. For example, when the 20th Brigade, an intelligence-gathering unit of the army that had been accused of many human rights abuses, was dismantled by the military, Bedoya accused human rights organizations of "only worrying about guerrillas and criminals" (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/21 "Harold Bedoya cuestiona a las ONG"). Ultimately, human rights violations by the military, as well as by paramilitary groups, could not be directly traced to Bedoya. Bedoya therefore continued to decry what he considered to be human rights groups' campaigns against him and against paramilitary members' efforts to protect themselves (*Semana* 1998 3/23 "Bedoya al ataque").

Uribe: Campaigning Carefully to Match Human Rights Pressures

Uribe's opportunities to use security were helped by his ability to target organized threats. His ability to do so was not purely automatic, however. In fact, Uribe faced notable pressure on human rights, stemming from past repression. Uribe was forced to expend extra effort, taking careful steps to manage these pressures.

In contrast with the assumptions of existing research on candidates' motivations to use security, Uribe's campaign took careful consideration of not only the benefits of campaigning on security, but also the drawbacks. The campaign explicitly recognized that there would be opposition to Uribe based on human rights concerns about his security proposals. Rather than having this opposition stop Uribe from campaigning on the issue, however, the campaign forged ahead even though, as Uribe's campaign chief commented, "we took those risks into account" before going forward with using the issue (Echeverri interview 2009a). In fact, through the course of the campaign, Echeverri noted that the main opponents to his focus on security were competing candidates and human rights organizations, but there were not many other barriers (Echeverri interview 2009a).

Human rights pressures specifically linked to recent repression bore down on Uribe and caused significant controversy. Other political actors reacted to Uribe's use of security in two ways. The first was reaction to his hardline approach. In the beginning of Uribe's campaign, many journalists simply believed that Uribe represented more war, according to Alfredo Rangel, a journalist well versed in security matters and staunch supporter of Uribe's security policies (Vargas interview 2009). Yet news media

generally had good relations with the Uribe campaign, with only a few exceptions (Echeverri interview 2009b). The policies themselves therefore may have had some skeptics on the basis of human rights matters, but as Uribe's campaign chief noted, this did not stop Uribe from using the issue.

Second, and more importantly, political actors pushed back by referring to repression that could be associated with Uribe. Although many international organizations and foreign groups went further and published particularly strident critiques of Uribe's potential connections with paramilitary groups and drug traffickers, within Colombia opposition to Uribe on human rights matters stemmed mostly from his connection to past instances of human rights abuses.

Namely, Uribe's opponents focused on Uribe's approval of abusive state-sanctioned forces. Before running for president, Uribe was known for his 1995-1997 term as governor of Antioquia department, when he authorized citizen patrols called Convivir. The creation of these patrols was sanctioned by the national government at the time, yet these patrols committed many human rights violations (Isacson and Rojas 2002). He faced human rights criticisms about these patrols even while he was governor (Cepeda 1996). Domestic human rights organizations largely kept quiet against Uribe, recalls Uribe's campaign manager, but Amnesty International reacted strongly against Uribe's campaign (Echeverri interview 2009b), focusing on Uribe's links to Convivir.

These pressures led Uribe to campaign in a careful manner. Uribe's vice presidential pick of Francisco Santos shows the Uribe campaign's attempts to deal with pressure from human rights organizations. The Uribe campaign's choice of Santos was

due centrally to Santos' ability to help Uribe respond to pressures on human rights, from the worries of international human rights organizations:

> "Yes, NGOs about *human rights* [...] Both external and domestic NGOs presented opposition to Uribe. [Resolving the worries of human rights organizations] was what Francisco Santos was for. Santos was in charge of speaking with the NGOs in foreign countries... [As to what he said:] I don't know, I never went with Santos on these trips." (Echeverri interview 2009a)

In addition to being editor of Colombia's most widely read newspaper, *El Tiempo*, Santos was known inside Colombia for his own work on human rights. In the 1990s, after being kidnapped himself by the Medellín drug cartel, Santos became known for founding the Fundación País Libre, an organization based in Bogotá that worked to improve the lives of past kidnapping victims. Santos certainly had many additional strengths, as keen political observers note, such as geographic balance, since Santos was from Bogotá (Tirado interview 2009); he also had family connections as well as connections to media outlets. Yet Santos quickly became enmeshed in the task of shoring up Uribe's reputation on human rights.

Dealing with criticisms on human rights was important because domestic campaign discourse could draw on foreign criticisms, thereby bringing attention to human rights issues within the domestic campaign. Earlier in the campaign, economic development minister Eduardo Pizano had been widely expected to be Uribe's choice (*El Tiempo* 2002 2/22 "Pizano"), but the attorney general disqualified Pizano because he was serving as Pastrana's development minister, and Colombian law requires candidates to resign ministerial posts one year before running for office (*Semana* 2002 3/18 "De

malas"). Instead, when Uribe chose Santos, an opposition politician suggested that this was Uribe's way of deflecting criticism in Europe and in the U.S. about Uribe's support of Convivir (*El Tiempo* 2002 3/21 "Listos"). This was clearly a problem for Uribe. As journalist Alfredo Rangel remarked, even toward the end of his presidency:

> "Uribe does not have good communication with international governments. It's more the impact, the attitude of certain foreign governments and NGOs [that hurts Uribe]. More in Europe than in the United States. Certain Democrats are opposed to Uribe and this hurts him from abroad..." (Rangel interview 2009)

Francisco Santos played the role of a credible human rights spokesperson for Uribe, both inside Colombia as well as outside. In the week immediately after he was announced as Uribe's running mate, Santos spoke out against Serpa's accusations toward Uribe that Uribe was being helped by paramilitaries (*El Tiempo* 2002 3/23 "No a respaldo de paras"), and spoke in favor of safety of the press (*El Tiempo* 2002 3/23 "Apoyo a los periodistas").

Also, since international criticism could blow back to the campaign inside Colombia, Santos defended Uribe's security proposals outside of Colombia and worked specifically toward improving Uribe's human rights image abroad (*El Tiempo* 2002 5/13 "Vices, en cacería de votos"). This is a case of candidates seeking external legitimacy, and pursuing actions to attempt to be well received among international leaders.

So what did Santos say when he went on trips to speak on human rights? For example, during Uribe's April 2002 campaign visit to Spain, less than two weeks after Santos was made Uribe's running mate, Santos declared that on human rights "we have

nothing to hide" (*El Tiempo* 2002 4/2 "Uribe pedirá A Europa"). In fact, even from the very first day as Uribe's running mate, in March 2002, he already was communicating with press in Spain, where had lived in self-imposed exile for a while after suffering several kidnapping attempts. In his communication with *El País*, the largest newspaper in Spain, he attempted that very first day to counter the accusations of "warmongering" that had been leveled at Uribe (see Velázquez-Gaztelu 2002). Santos' intensive efforts to improve Uribe's human rights image in Spain was clearly noticed by Spanish political actors. Shortly after Uribe and Santos' visit to Spain, Uribe was interviewed by another major Spanish newspaper, *ABC*, which even asked him about Santos, "Are you trying to show the world that 'you are not a monster of the right' in choosing Francisco Santos as your candidate for Vice President?" (Muñoz 2002)

Importantly, these pressures affected Uribe's way of discussing security while a candidate for office who had to respond to other political actors' discussion; these pressures did not constrain Uribe so much when, as president, he had more influence in national political discourse. In contrast with the campaign, once in office Uribe took a dismissive attitude to some problems of human rights; his campaign chief, who remained a close adviser through much of Uribe's two terms, noted that when in office, Uribe would react to many human rights accusations with a policy of, "we simply don't respond" (Echeverri interview 2009a). Uribe also would refuse to weigh in on the situations of other politicians who were involved in scandals, because of a conviction that for these cases, those politicians, and not Uribe, bore the responsibility (Echeverri

interview 2009a). Given this stand toward human rights matters, it is clear that pressure on human rights from other political actors affected the campaign.

Santos: Hampered by a Human Rights Scandal

Juan Manuel Santos' use of security in 2010 was challenged by the recent occurrence of serious repression. For Santos, cousin to Uribe's vice president Francisco Santos, clear repression had occurred in the last two years. Consequently, recent repression constrained his campaign more strongly than it did for Uribe. Reaction about human rights from other politicians as well as organized voices in society made it more difficult for Santos to focus on security.

In 2008, a human rights scandal called the "false positives" scandal burst onto the Colombian political scene. This scandal emerged because soldiers were shown to have killed civilians and dressed their bodies as guerrillas to inflate their combat statistics (Ejército de Colombia 2009; Beitel 2010). In 2008 and 2009, international and domestic human rights organizations jumped on the Uribe administration, demanding answers to this scandal and changes to the incentive system that the government had in place for rewarding military units that kill guerrillas (Estrada 2009; Pachón 2009). Uribe's campaign chief, still an adviser to Uribe during this time, recalled that such human rights scandals did not change policymaking on security very much; he did say, however, that the accusations of human rights violations were a "pain in the ass" that caused Uribe to "waste energy and time" to deal with these things while trying to forge ahead with his security policies (Echeverri interview 2009b).

This scandal was Juan Manuel Santos' principal weakness on the issue of security. Throughout his campaign, he was forced to discuss this scandal and to defend himself on the issue of human rights. Santos had been security minister under Uribe when the killings occurred, and this matter affected Santos in presidential debates. In the March 2010 first presidential debate of all seven candidates, each candidate received a question not asked of the others, and Santos was directly asked about the issue of these killings (*Semana* 2010 3/24 "Así fue"). Then, in later debates, Antanas Mockus of the Partido Verde, who ended up being Santos' main competitor, continued to press the issue. Mockus frequently brought up the scandal and the issue of human rights. He attempted to portray Santos as closely related to the killings, declaring that the killings were the result of the military's system of incentives that was put in place while Santos was security minister (*Semana* 2010 6/3 "Primer cara a cara"). Even in the second round of the campaign, when Santos was well in the lead and should have been able to set the campaign agenda, human rights remained a key theme (*El Tiempo* 2010; *Semana* 2010 6/10 "Duro contrapunteo"). In a debate before the second round, for example, the two main topics did not include security but rather centered on the issue of taxes and the issue of the killings. As before, during the debate it was Mockus who focused heavily on the scandal (Agencia Efe 2010).

This topic of human rights violations put Santos on the defensive, forcing him to defend himself and the Uribe administration. To confront these criticisms, Santos declared that he was also opposed to violations of human rights, and the killings were committed by individual forces and were not a government policy (Espectador 2010

5/28). He argued that this type of killing would never happen again, precisely because the scandal impelled the government to be more vigilant over its military units. Santos therefore had to work hard to prevent himself from being characterized as defending the violation of human rights.

All these cases considered in comparison with one another shows that recent repression powerfully restricted candidates' ability to campaign on security without facing pressures in the campaign from opponents. Pastrana was pressured by Samper, who had taken up human rights as a cause; Uribe was pressured not only by opponents in the domestic sphere, but by heavy criticism in international public opinion that he then attempted to handle through his choice of Francisco Santos as his running mate. Santos also faced pressures from the issue of the killings of civilians. Repression by state forces against innocent civilians therefore gave opponents more opportunities to assail proposed security plans on human rights grounds.

PUTTING THE CONDITIONS TOGETHER

Table 3.2 shows how the campaigns could be described in terms of the conditions for invoking the issue of security. Using security was hardest for the 1994 Samper and Pastrana campaigns, where security threats were diffuse and where human rights pressures stemming from recent repression bore down on the candidates. In contrast, it was easier to use security in the elections where the major threats to security were increasingly organized. Bedoya used security the most, having no recent repression that

could be clearly linked to him, and increasingly organized threats. Uribe followed next; he targeted some potently organized threats, but there was some repression possibly associated with him, and he had to be careful to manage other political actors' pressures on him. Santos pointed to organized threats as well, but there was repression that clearly occurred under his watch and he had to spend time defending himself about it.

Table 3.2 – Conditions for Success in Colombian Presidential Elections

Year	*Campaign*	*Organized Threats*	*Limited Repression*	*Use of Security*
1994	Samper	No	No	Low
1994	Pastrana	No	No	Low
1998	Bedoya	Yes	Yes	High
2002	Uribe	Yes	No	High
2010	Santos	Yes	No	Medium

Table 3.3 shows that use of security in these elections is not merely a straightforward matter of objective security conditions or even subjective security concerns. Homicide rates, one measure of security conditions, cannot explain the use of the issue: in 1994, the homicide rate was the highest among these years examined, yet security was used the least. In 2010, homicide rates and security concerns were the lowest of these election years, yet there was notable use of security by Santos, especially at the beginning of his campaign.

Table 3.3 – High Concerns in Colombia But Varying Use of Security				
Year	*Campaign*	*Homicide Rate*	*Security Concern*	*Use of Security*
1994	Samper	73	25%	Low
1994	Pastrana	73	25%	Low
1998	Bedoya	60	35%	High
2002	Uribe	70	42%	High
2010	Santos	33	18%	Medium

Note: Homicide rates are per 100,000 people per year; they are only one way of measuring objective security conditions.
Sources: Villaveces 2001: 276, UNODC 2011: 18 (homicide); *El Tiempo* 1994, Latinobarómetro 1998, 2002, 2006, and Gallup 2010 (concerns).

Variation in use is also not a matter of the type of victims of crime and violence. For 1994, victims of crime and violence were mostly middle-class and poor people, affected by the drug trade or guerrilla attacks. Similarly, in 1998, victims were middle-class targets of crime or guerrilla attacks, and poor rural voters under attack from paramilitaries and guerrillas. Yet Bedoya campaigned intensely on security, while Samper and Pastrana did not.

In 2002 and 2006, middle-class and rich voters' concerns were stoked by guerrilla attacks in urban areas and between cities, even as poor voters' concerns were stoked by guerrilla, paramilitary, and street crime threats. For Santos in 2010, richer voters were safer, while poor voters were affected by street crime and drug violence. Yet issue use was strong under both Uribe and Santos. Therefore, factors other than the socioeconomic profile of victims are more influential in affecting the use of security. As this chapter has shown, perhaps it is the type of perpetrators of crime and violence that is more important.

ELIMINATING ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Potential competing explanations do not convincingly account for variation in the use of security. Specifically, variation is not principally driven by competition from economic issues, a reaction against previous failed security policies, or the influence of individual events such as terrorist attacks outside of Colombia.

Competition from Economic Issues

Some issues are blocked by competition from other issues (Carmines and Stimson 2000) and the economy is the most regular presidential election issue (Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1990; Vavreck 2009). Voters frequently choose to reward or punish incumbents or their parties' candidates based on economic conditions, in particular in response to inflation (Stokes 2001; Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009), unemployment (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001), or income growth (Hibbs 2000). It is a particularly powerful issue for Latin America, where the large numbers of people who work in informal employment have more to lose when the economy is weak (Singer 2007). The wave of research about the rise of the left in the 1990s and 2000s has largely pointed to socioeconomic issues as the driving force behind the election of leftist presidents (Panizza 2005; Seligson 2007; Ellner 2009), asserting that few topics can challenge the economy as an issue in the region (Cleary 2006; Arnold and Samuels 2008; Petras and Veltmeyer 2009).

Yet this "competing issues" argument does not hold up when contrasting 1994 with 1998 and 2002. Such an argument has several empirical expectations, and these

expectations can be shown to be incorrect. Economic issues, according to this competing argument, should dominate discussion of other issues. The empirical expectations of a "competing issues" argument are that when economic concerns are high, lesser use of security should result. This argument predicts that security should arise as an issue when the economy is good and voters are not worried about it as much.

Empirical evidence refutes this expected outcome, however. Competition from economic issues is not the main driver of variation in using security. As Table 3.4 shows, use of security was highest in 2002 when economic concerns were relatively low, and was lowest in 1994 when economic concerns were relatively high. Yet 1994 and 2002 also vary in that 1994 had conditions that discouraged issue use while 2010 had conditions that encouraged it, making a comparison of these years inconclusive. Instead, a comparison of Samper and Pastrana in 1994 with Santos in 2010 makes the obstacles clear. In both years, levels of economic and security concerns were similar to each other, with economic concerns being even higher than security. Yet in 1994 security was not a major issue, whereas in 2010 it was fairly high. Therefore economic concerns were high, but did not crowd out Santos' use of security, especially not at the beginning of the campaign.

Table 3.4 – Economic Concerns Minimally Affect Use of Security				
Year	*Candidates*	*Security Concerns*	*Economic Concerns*	*Use of Security*
1994	Samper	25%	56%	Low
1994	Pastrana	25	56	Low
1998	Bedoya	35	43	High
1998	Pastrana	35	43	Medium
2002	Uribe	42	36	High
2010	Santos	18	46	Medium
Source: *El Tiempo* 1994 2/20 (unemployment only), Latinobarómetro 1998 and 2002, Gallup 2010. "Security Concerns" includes guerrillas, insecurity, common crime, drug trafficking, and criminal bands. "Economic Concerns" include unemployment, extreme poverty, cost of living, and "getting the economy going."				

Economic performance is not a proper explanation either. Economic conditions in 1994 were clearly good and improving. There had been strong economic growth in the several years before. GDP and GDP per capita had almost doubled between 1990 and 1994; unemployment rates had been notably reduced, and the inflation rate had fallen notably from its 1991 peak (Wolfram Alpha 2011). Growth was strong in the whole period from 1990 to 1994 (Arbeláez, Echavarría, and Gaviria 2002). This strong economic situation under incumbent César Gaviria from the Partido Liberal suggests that to the extent that economic issues would be discussed, it should have been done by Partido Liberal candidate Samper, talking up the good economy. Instead, Samper focused on economic issues by being more critical than Pastrana of the market-oriented reforms that had taken place since 1989.

The limited influence of economic performance in affecting the use of security can be seen further in the 1998 and 2002 elections. Both the economy and security were in bad condition, and yet campaigning on security took center stage. Just as security problems spiraled further out of control, the economy was also losing strength. Between 1997 and 1998, GDP per capita declined for the first time since the mid-1980s since GDP had grown at its lowest rate since 1980, not keeping up with population growth. There was zero growth by 1997 (Arbeláez, Echavarría, and Gaviria 2002). The unemployment rate, which had been steady in the early 1990s, had increased every year from 1994 to 1998, almost doubling over that period (Wolfram Alpha 2011).

In 2002, the economy had also been performing weakly. Between 1998 and 2002, GDP had largely stagnated, with GDP per capita down slightly over this period (Wolfram Alpha 2011). As a result, the economy was not in fantastic shape either, even as political violence also led many Colombians to believe that the Colombian state was overwhelmed by the threat from guerrilla groups. Thus, in 2002 as in 1998, security became the major issue, but likely because of a deterioration of security and a diminishing of obstacles to campaigning on the issue, not because of a change in the usefulness of economic issues.

Such evidence refutes the explicitly stated empirical implications of the "competing issues" argument. Although the state of the economy can affect the use of security in some ways, it cannot be invoked to explain variation in its use in a systematic way. To the contrary, rather than economic issues crowding out security, perhaps it is the case that unfavorable conditions to using security allowed more attention to socioeconomic issues than would be suggested by the electorate's concerns.

Reaction Against Failed Policies

Variation in the use of security also cannot be attributed simply to reaction against existing policies. It is certainly conceivable that the failure of heavy-handed security strategies may lead candidates in subsequent elections to move away from such an approach or abandon the subject of security entirely. This dynamic has played out in at least one Colombian election: after the 1978-1982 Julio César Turbay administration which involved heavy repression, 1982 candidate Belisario Betancur criticized this repression and made peace a priority (Chernick 1988). The empirical expectations of such a "policy failure" argument are that security policy failure should be followed each time immediately by the non-use of security as an issue.

Yet a pattern of reaction against failed policies did not occur. The only unequivocal failure in security policies during the 1990s and 2000s consisted of the peace negotiations under Pastrana's 1998-2002 administration. Centrally, it was this failure that allowed Uribe to discuss security at length, proposing a tough approach to combat the organized threats to society. The failure of policy, therefore, does not lead to a quieting of the issue. This is especially the case because failure in security policy means that security problems continue.

Nor does success limit the use of security in any regular way. The 1994 election shows that partial success can be followed by limited use of the issue: leading up to 1994, even though Colombia had just come off a series of successes, people were still concerned about the crime and violence that continued. Campaigning on security remained nonexistent that year, despite much interest in the issue. On the other hand,

policies that reduced crime often led to more campaigning, by promises to continue the policy. The aggressive approach against guerrillas and drug traffickers under the 1986-1990 Virgilio Barco administration led César Gaviria to campaign on continuing this strategy in his successful 1990 campaign. Furthermore, in the 2010 election, Santos kept the campaign focused on security, making his case for furthering Uribe's approach of keeping a strategy of active military presence throughout Colombia. There is therefore no systematic influence of success on the use of security either. Table 3.5 summarizes the irregular effects of success and failure.

Table 3.5 – Failed Policies Do Not Limit Campaigning

Year	*Incumbent*	*Incumbent's Policy Towards Conflict*	*Change in Conflict Intensity*	*Security Used*
1994	Gaviria (1990-1994)	Negotiation through 1991, then military	Decreased	No
1998	Samper (1994-1998)	Negotiation, rejected by FARC	Increased	Yes
2002	Pastrana (1998-2002)	Negotiation through 2001	Increased	Yes
2010	Uribe (2006-2010)	Continue strategy of military throughout Colombia	Decreased	Yes

Sources: For policy, Martínez 2002; for change in conflict, Echandía 2006: 66-67.

If anything, policies that many would consider to have "failed" can produce one of two outcomes. Policies that "fail" because they have produced human rights violations will lead to less use of security as an issue, even if those policies did suppress security threats. Or, policies to contain security threats will likely lead to even more campaigning, since the threats still exist. To the extent that anything about past security programs might stem the use of the issue, it appears not to be the failure of these

programs to bring security threats under control, but rather the repression that arises from such security activities.

Terrorism in the United States

Variation also cannot be explained by individual, idiosyncratic events such as security problems outside of Colombia. Some political actors in Colombia, frequently leftists, assert that the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. improved Uribe's abilities to raise the issue of security in Colombia's 2002 election. For example, Jorge Bustamante, head of the Partido Liberal's internal think tank and advisor to the Serpa 2002 campaign, claimed that this was really what helped Uribe's campaign against Serpa:

> "a few weeks after [the attacks] the resolution in the United States was a paradigm shift: there was a resolution in the United States about Colombia, and this was the running out of the negotiation because it fundamentally changed the definition of terrorists. Before, the FARC were insurgents; now, they are terrorists." (Bustamante interview 2009)

Just as the heightened activities of the FARC gave impetus inside Colombia to consider the FARC to be a terrorist group (Rangel interview 2009), these terrorist attacks in the U.S. led the U.S. government to classifying the FARC as a terrorist organization. Additionally, the U.S. government did begin to shift its stated purposes for Plan Colombia: the U.S. House of Representatives approved a "symbolic" resolution supporting "anti-terrorist" aid to Colombia (*Latin American Weekly Report* 2002).

Many rightists, however, do not agree that terrorist attacks in the U.S. helped very much. Uribe's campaign chief said that these attacks only "helped to get money for the

anti-terrorism fight" for the Colombian government. Despite this help in aid, Uribe's campaign chief claimed, these attacks did not boost security as an issue in the campaign (Echeverri interview 2009b). Given the potential for international influences to affect domestic politics (Gourevitch 1978), however, it is worth assessing whether such individual events did critically affect the prospects for the use of security.

The empirical implications of an argument based on terrorist attacks in the U.S. are that use of the issue should have been difficult in the 1998 elections and earlier, yet easy from the 2002 elections onward. A further empirical expectation is that within the 2002 election campaign, it should have been difficult before September 2001 and easy afterward. Yet these expectations are dramatically at odds with what occurred. For the 1998 campaign, well before the 2001 attacks in the U.S., Bedoya was able to campaign forcefully on the issue of security. He did so without needing to campaign about international terrorism; all the terrorism that he referred to was the domestic terrorism that he attributed to guerrillas and drug traffickers. Such an argument cannot explain the variation across election years.

More importantly, this expectation is at odds with the dynamics of the 2002 election season. Uribe was already campaigning heavily on security early in 2001, before the September terrorist attacks. In early and middle 2001, it was already Uribe's strongest issue. Analysis of the content of all candidate-generated articles about public policy proposals in *El Tiempo* for August 2001 shows that Uribe's campaign focus was already approximately 73% about security topics, with the other topics split among jobs, political reform, and trade.

From September 2001 onward to May 2002, Uribe continued his attention to security. Even as U.S. government officials were beginning to change their philosophy about the reasons for aid to Colombian security forces under Plan Colombia, Uribe's campaign discussion of terrorism did not change, but rather remained the same, characterizing guerrillas as terrorists (*El Tiempo* 2002 4/2 "Uribe pedirá a Europa"). Therefore, although the terrorist attacks in the U.S. may have changed U.S. officials' attention to security, it did not help Uribe campaign more intensely on it.

If anything, Uribe was already talking about security in a careful manner, both before the terrorist attacks in the U.S. as well as after. Even afterward, Uribe continued to couch his security platform in terms of being respectful of democracy. He also continued to be pressured by human rights organizations, continually responding to international human rights organizations and foreign governments about human rights. In sum, the conditions encouraging Uribe's use of security were in place before the terrorist attacks, and continued to be in place afterwards as well.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: CANDIDATES ON THE DEFENSIVE

In *Fuente Ovejuna* by Lope de Vega, one of the leading dramatists of the Spanish language's Siglo de Oro, townspeople kill a corrupt government official who has been committing crimes, and the investigator who is sent to find out who did it systematically tortures the townspeople. After the monarchs find out about the corrupt official's crimes, they pardon the people of the town. The townspeople are left thankful that peace and

order have been restored, yet are not bothered by how they have all just been tortured: in essence, there is an acceptance of systematic human rights violations in exchange for the re-establishment of public security.

In contemporary Latin America, such events would seem increasingly out of place. A growing distaste for human rights violations has made attention to human rights an integral part of campaigning on public security. The campaigns examined in this chapter reveal how two key conditions affect the use of security as an issue, and show details of how these conditions strongly influence the prospects for its use. The lack of clearly organized security threats and the recent spate of repression by security forces kept Samper and Pastrana from seizing on the issue, discussing human rights more than security even though concerns about security were running higher in 1994 than in 2010. Potently organized threats allowed Uribe and Santos to discuss security forcefully by targeting organized security threats and characterizing these organized threats as a menace to society and peace, and promoting measures to combat these threats.

Recent repression served as a second unfavorable condition that hindered many candidates in their use of security, putting them on the defensive about human rights issues. Samper and Pastrana were critically affected by this constraint: Samper declared his intention to make human rights a priority of his administration and often accused Pastrana of compromising human rights whenever Pastrana touched on security. Between a lack of organized threats limiting their opportunities, and recent repression pushing them to discuss human rights instead, neither Samper nor Pastrana campaigned on security in any sustained way.

Other candidates also found that recent repression made it more difficult to campaign on security: Mockus focused on the 2008 scandal about the killings of civilians, putting Santos on the defensive. Uribe was mildly affected by this constraint: in the wake of abuses by Convivir, Uribe selected his vice president in good measure based on human rights considerations. Bedoya campaigned almost unhindered by human rights pressures related to repression. Human rights violations by the military were not directly linked to him, and therefore even though security threats were not as potently organized as in 2002 or 2010, this lack of repression allowed Bedoya to pound on the problems of increasingly organized threats.

This chapter reveals rich detail about the challenges of using security as an issue. The take-away point of this analysis is that candidates can have a difficult time seizing opportunities to speak about security. Background circumstances often cause candidates to be more likely to face pressures that force them on the defensive about human rights.

Candidates' decisions to bring up security in their campaigns depend on interaction among candidates, with candidates choosing security when they believe that it will resonate with voters, and with this use being sustainable when they are not shut down by other political actors who respond by drawing attention to human rights. Of course, once candidates do repeatedly invoke the issue of security, the question becomes, what conditions allow candidates to ease voters' concerns about potential abuses of authority and win votes on this issue? The next two chapters provide an answer to this question.

CHAPTER 4: THE NEED FOR A MEASURED HAND: CANDIDATE AND CAMPAIGN CONDITIONS FOR WINNING VOTES ON SECURITY

Uribe's dramatic rise in the 2002 campaign is a case of voters responding favorably to his use of security. To explain why other candidates have not received such uniformly high support from their use of security, however, chapters 4 and 5 examine the conditions that activate voters' skepticism of whether efforts to improve security can avoid repression against innocent bystanders and neutral civilians. Chapter 4, this chapter, shows how candidate backgrounds and the weight of security as an issue either heighten or alleviate voters' concerns about the protection of human rights: these are the third and fourth items in the presentation of the theoretical framework.

The contribution of this chapter is to show how voters' concerns about repression strongly affect their responses to candidates' campaigns. First, it shows how candidates who are military professionals are at a disadvantage at proving a commitment to human rights. Military backgrounds certainly help candidates portray themselves as capable of cracking down on security threats, but these backgrounds also pose the difficulty of aggravating voters' worries about potential repression. This chapter therefore shows a clear difference with existing research by pointing to the downsides about human rights, rather than the upsides about security capability, that military backgrounds can bring. Military backgrounds can therefore harm, rather than help, voters' overall response to candidates' security appeals. The chapter then provides examinations of support for Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos in their respective elections, involving statistical analyses of

the effect of worries about repression on support for these candidates; analysis for Bedoya also represents one of the few attempts at statistical analysis of his support in election research on Colombia. Finally, the chapter shows that voters also respond poorly when candidates make security their exclusive focus without balancing it with a mix of other issues. Such a narrow emphasis signals a desire to attend to security even at all costs, including that of human rights.

In doing so, this chapter refutes existing findings that military backgrounds generally help candidates on security (Seligson 2002; see Sellers 1998; Damore 2004). It also refutes existing theories that rightists win simply by dividing the electorate along noneconomic lines (Gibson 1996; Shepsle 2003), noting instead that attention to security alone may not be enough to stir up voter support.

These human rights dynamics are shown at work by comparing the campaigns of Bedoya in 1998, Uribe in 2002, and Santos in 2010. These candidates ended up being able to use security centrally as an issue, but their ability to win votes on the issue varied greatly because of voters' differing skepticism about their ability to govern and handle security threats without allowing repression to occur.

Using the definition of success from the introductory chapter, involving voters favoring such candidates more than other candidates and doing so more strongly than voters overall, Bedoya had decidedly low success. He ended his 1998 campaign with less than two percent of the vote. Uribe and Santos, on the other hand, had much more success. In Uribe's 53% to 32% victory over Serpa, his success on security can be seen clearly, leading in one poll 79% to 15% among voters most concerned with security

(LAPOP 2004). In Santos' victory over Mockus, his relative success on security can be seen in a poll that had him leading 34% to 16% overall: among security-concerned voters, his lead widened to 42% to 13% (LAPOP 2010).

First, this chapter illustrates campaign by campaign how career military backgrounds activate worries about repression, and how explicit attempts by candidates to link themselves to civilian qualities help to calm these worries. This condition affects the winning of votes on security through the reactions of voters who have low trust in the security forces, and especially so for those with a sour evaluation of the state of human rights. For Harold Bedoya, voters' reaction against his military career background crucially limited support for him. In contrast, Uribe pointed repeatedly to his civilian accomplishments to help him assuage concerns about human rights and support for democratic processes.

Again examining campaigns one at a time, this chapter then shows the strengths of a broad campaign approach that uses a balanced mix of issues, and shows the decidedly limited appeal of a narrow approach that makes security its exclusive focus. Bedoya in 1998 and Santos in early 2010 were both narrowly focused on security; Bedoya's single-minded approach to campaigning caused support for him to fall further late in his campaign, and Santos' overwhelming emphasis on it also limited his appeal until he changed course in the middle of his own campaign.

Uribe, in contrast, shows how a successful campaign on security can be done. His broad discussion of multiple issues expanded his support far beyond his initial appeal on security, even among voters with low trust in security forces and bad perceptions of the

state of human rights. The second half of Santos' 2010 campaign also shows how a broader focus helps candidates win votes on security. Santos remained almost exclusively focused on security and lost ground to Antanas Mockus; only when he broadened his message dramatically did he begin to recover ground against Mockus.

Success or failure, of course, is not based solely on the weight of security as a campaign message. Comparative research on election campaigns also points to the role of other factors in winning votes in general, such as political party organization and the use of electoral coalitions. For example, in the first round of elections, the organizational advantage of Santos' Partido de la U helped him to a clear lead (Acosta 2010). This study acknowledges the strong and often vital role that parties and coalitions may play at mobilizing support for candidates. Party organization certainly improves candidates' electoral support, but it does so regardless of whether they use security as an issue. Party organization certainly matters to candidates' performance, but this chapter focuses on conditions that are relevant to winning votes on public security specifically.

MILITARY BACKGROUNDS SCARING VOTERS

Looking across Latin America as a whole, military professionals have recently had a lackluster record at winning elections, regardless of their chosen campaign themes. Even so, when it comes to security, military professionals actually seem to be doing worse than when they tackle other topics such as economic issues. Although the weaknesses of candidates who happen to have military backgrounds must not be

attributed exclusively to voters' reactions against their backgrounds, an examination of recent candidacies is suggestive of this dynamic. In the 17 Spanish-and Portuguese-speaking countries on the continental portion of Latin America, there were 78 presidential elections from 1990 to 2010, involving 168 campaigns whose candidate received at least ten percent of the vote. Of these candidacies, a notable 14 involved candidates with career military, authoritarian, or guerrilla backgrounds: in Guatemala, Efraín Ríos Montt in 2003 and Otto Pérez Molina in 2007; in El Salvador, Facundo Guardado in 1999 and Schafik Handal in 2004; in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez in 1998, 2000, and 2006 as well as Francisco Arias Cárdenas in 2000; in Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002; in Peru, Ollanta Humala in 2006; in Bolivia, Hugo Banzer in 1993 and 1997 as well as Manfred Reyes Villa in 2009; and in Uruguay, José Mujica in 2009. Of these, the only ones who won election were former dictator Hugo Banzer in Bolivia's 1997 election, former coup leader Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador, former coup leader Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and former guerrilla José Mujica in Uruguay. Three of these four politicians ran on economic themes, not security themes (see El Universo 2002), and although Banzer used security as an issue (Seligson 2002), he also campaigned heavily on the economy (see Aznárez 1997).

Military professionals may still campaign on security and they may very well win, but voters' worries about repression stack the odds against them, making this task more difficult and more special when it occurs. Colombia provides a clear example of this sentiment. By the late 1990s, many Colombians came to shun career military candidates under any circumstances: 57% of Colombians simply would not "vote for an ex-member

of the Armed Forces for president" while 30% said they would, and 12% said they would not know (Crítica 1999; *El Tiempo* 1999 4/29 "Opinómetro"). In this poll, people may have had in mind Bedoya specifically, rather than military professionals in general. Yet this result still suggests that about half of the electorate would reject a candidate outright simply on the grounds of being a career military figure.

This contrasts clearly with cases in the U.S. such as Dwight Eisenhower, who benefited from his military background in his 1952 presidential campaign, both in general and to gain credibility for his platform plank of bringing successes to U.S. military operations in Korea (Medhurst 2000). Hoping to link his candidacy with that of a successful analogue, or at the very least attempting to deflect predictions that his background might hurt him, during his campaign Bedoya even compared himself directly to Eisenhower (Dettmer 1998). This aversion to voting for military career candidates is particularly striking because during the time leading up to the 1998 campaign, the most popular public figures in Colombia were in fact career military figures: retired general Rosso José Serrano and fellow retired general Bedoya himself (*El Tiempo* 1997 12/20, "Encuestas sobre presidenciales"). As this chapter shows, however, if being a general translates into popularity as a public figure, it does not always translate into support as a candidate for elected office.

Bedoya was not the first military career candidate to run for president. In 1978, retired general Álvaro Valencia Tovar ran for president. He received 1% of the vote, with Julio César Turbay Ayala instead winning the election and then initiating a period of

repression in the name of security. "People do not consider military people apt to govern the country," commented journalist Alfredo Rangel (Rangel interview 2009).

This section proceeds campaign by campaign, examining the role of military backgrounds and civilian backgrounds. It starts with Bedoya, and continues with Uribe and Santos. Bedoya's military background interfered with his attempts to portray himself as being able to improve security without engaging in repression. In contrast, Uribe and Santos in their own ways made use of their civilian backgrounds and past accomplishments as civilian public figures to make the case that they could be trusted to avoid human rights violations.

Bedoya: Military Background Stoking Fears

Bedoya's low success in winning votes is a result of his military background stoking voters' worries that human rights would not be protected under his potential administration. This aspect of his military background served at cross-purposes with the boost to his perceived competence at handling security that his military background likely also provided him. Concerns about arbitrary authority and damage to the rule of law figure prominently in voters' responses to his candidacy.

Bedoya's initially high personal popularity leading up to the 1998 campaign would at first glance seem to support existing understandings of success: in an era of rampant public security problems, many voters were willing to consider supporting a military-based candidate who campaigned on forceful actions to improve security. Especially at the outset, many voters were initially willing to consider Bedoya. Yet

Bedoya's military career background quickly placed a limit on his vote support. It gave credibility to opponents' claims, and voters' concerns, that he would overrun Colombian democracy and trample on human rights. Bedoya's military background proved to be beneficial for him at the start by allowing him to start the campaign as a popular nonelected public figure; yet it increasingly became a liability for converting his popularity into a position as the elected head of government, by allowing others to cast doubt on his willingness to respect human rights and the rule of law.

When Bedoya began his candidacy, he was a well-known and generally well-liked public figure. His popularity as a public figure stemmed in good part from his military background. From 1996 to 1997, Bedoya was commander of the entire armed forces. Yet in July 1997, Samper forced Bedoya to resign due to Bedoya's opposition to negotiate with the FARC; these disagreements between Samper and Bedoya were publicly visible. Bedoya's retirement set the stage for his plans to run for president, and in January 1998, at an expensive hotel in downtown Bogotá frequently used for events by politicians of all political stripes, Bedoya declared his official entry into the race.

In good part because of his personal popularity, Bedoya rose early in the campaign when he launched his candidacy. As a sign of this popularity, before Bedoya announced his candidacy, an August 1997 poll found strong potential support for him. According to this poll, if Bedoya were to run, 40% of Colombians said that they would support him while 56% said they would not (*El Tiempo* 1997 8/10, "Del arte de la guerra"). He was credited with having many good ideas (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/5 "Por qué suben y por qué bajan"). Even the head of the Partido Liberal think tank, reflecting on

how Bedoya's campaign had been, commented that "at first, Bedoya was talking about some interesting proposals" (Bustamante interview 2009). Bedoya peaked in polls at second place; one poll, in January 1998, even gave Bedoya a statistical tie for first place with Horacio Serpa (Dettmer 1998).

Table 4.1 shows that support for Bedoya can be seen in three stages. First, Bedoya was riding high with second-place or tied-for-first support through January 1998. A decline occurred between January and February of that year, causing him to have much weakened support, in third-place with support about 10 percent through March. A further decline occurred in April and May, such that by the end he was truly low-performing: in fourth place, with single-digit support on which he coasted until winning under two percent of the vote in the late May first round.

Table 4.1 – Decline in Support for Bedoya

Poll Ending	*Pastrana*	*Serpa*	*Sanín*	*Bedoya*
9/30/1997	13%	21%	7%	15%
10/6/1997	7	23	16	19
10/11/1997	23	29	7	8
10/30/1997	11	27	7	14
12/9/1997	12	21	11	19
12/17/1997	20	26	10	10
2/3/1998	13	25	9	12
2/25/1998	28	34	7	10
3/8/1998	34	33	17	
3/11/1998	24	22	12	16
3/19/1998	35	29	19	8
3/27/1998	32	29	10	9
4/17/1998	40	33	13	7
4/20/1998	35	26	13	11
4/29/1998	34	32	15	
5/23/1998	42	24	18	6

Source: Polls as reported in *El Tiempo* 1997 and 1998 coverage of polling results.

Figure 4.1 further illustrates Bedoya's decline, by showing how Bedoya compared with other candidates over the course of the campaign. Bedoya started almost tied with Serpa; he then continued through his stages of decline while Serpa held more or less steady, Pastrana surged, and other candidates such as Noemí Sanín and Alfonso Valdivieso moved up and down quite a bit, with Sanín gaining some traction toward the end, and Valdivieso eventually dropping out. Only Bedoya experienced strong early support, followed by a gradual, slow decline.



Figure 4.1 – Vote Intention for 1998

Source: Napoleón Franco, Centro Nacional de Consultoría, and Gallup polls, 1997-1998.

Several alternative explanations for Bedoya's decline must be addressed here, to show that such explanations do not powerfully explain this decline. Could Bedoya's inability to surpass 20 percent of vote intention be due to factors other than his military background? Certainly, Bedoya's decline stemmed from a broad mix of factors, including what the other candidates did successfully. After the election, many analysts offered explanations: the desertion of strategic voters who had initially supported him for being a viable alternative to Serpa; a lack of financial campaign resources; voters' rejection of his hardline security platform; and a lack of strong proposals. Furthermore, Bedoya's campaign aides attributed his weak performance to the fact that his campaign had run out of money (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/30, "Bedoya, con la mira en eventual fraude"). Bedoya also did not have an established party backing him up. Finally, as one retired general on his campaign team complained, there was a strong antimilitaristic sentiment among the population that was echoed by the news media (*El Tiempo* 1998 6/2, "El fenómeno Bedoya cayó").

Still other explanations must be discarded as well: some people have asserted that Bedoya merely lacked political inexperience. Uribe's campaign chief, for example, discredits Bedoya's skill as a political actor (Echeverri interview 2009b). Nevertheless, as the last section of this chapter shows, even a skilled politician such as Santos had some problems that Bedoya also faced. Alternatively, perhaps Bedoya plunged because Pastrana had convinced the electorate that his proposals were the way to achieve peace. After all, Pastrana gained support after the FARC announced its willingness to negotiate

with a future Pastrana administration, and Pastrana and the leader of the FARC even met in a surprise meeting just before the second round, further boosting Pastrana (Richani 2005). Yet in addition to Pastrana, independent candidate Noemí Sanín was also competing with Bedoya for the "anyone but Serpa" vote. Although both Sanín and Bedoya fell behind Pastrana, Sanín ended with 27% of the vote, a very strong third place and far ahead of Bedoya. Pastrana's own proposals may explain why Pastrana continued to increase his support to win the election, but it does not explain Bedoya's failure.

Of the potential explanations for Bedoya's decline, voters' reaction against Bedoya's military background is one of the few that holds muster in the face of the available evidence. It is likely true that Bedoya benefited in the first stage simply from anti-Serpa votes; Serpa's support stayed relatively constant through the campaign, and Pastrana later ate up support from Sanín and Bedoya. Yet this does not explain what caused Bedoya to drop in the first place. Bedoya's campaign may have been short on cash, yet it is difficult to explain why a very popular individual would be short for campaign money. A voter rejection of a hardline approach to guerrillas is not a full explanation either: Bedoya's hard approach was initially credited with making him very popular. Yet another potential explanation for Bedoya's quick rise and fall, a lack of backing by an institutionalized party, may seem to be at least a partial explanation, but even as Bedoya ran as an independent, albeit with the support of several high-profile elements of the Partido Conservador (Bedoya interview 2009), the same can be said for success under Uribe, who ran with the support of high-profile members of the Partido Liberal in his breakaway campaign.

Bedoya's military background hurt him by causing fears of arbitrary rule, raising fears about the state of human rights. First, Bedoya's candidacy created a fear of militarization and authoritarianism (*El Tiempo* 1997 12/12 "A Serrano le suena"). This was no misrepresentation on the part of voters, for Bedoya was perceived as clearly affiliated with the military. For example, at military events after his stepping down as armed forces commander and before his candidacy, high- and middle-ranking military officials declared to him that he would never stop being a military person (*El Tiempo* 1997 7/26 "Yo seguiré siendo el general"). Most of the people who helped him on his campaign were retired generals, along with some members of the Partido Conservador (Bedoya interview 2009), and throughout the campaign, Bedoya was seen as a military figure (Hoskin 1998: 373). According to the head of a think tank affiliated with the Partido Conservador, with which Bedoya was linked, many people did fear the military coming to power (Araujo interview 2009). Bedoya's early success in his campaign stoked these alarms by making such situations seem plausible. In part, this may have been fueled by Bedoya's continued use, even at the close of the campaign, of terminology that may have alarmed voters further: he declared that at the polls he would have a "golpe de Estado democrático" or "democratic coup" (Caracol 1998; *El Tiempo* 1998 5/27 "Bedoya, optimista"). What unfortunate terminology for Bedoya to have used!

Also, fears about human rights were also stoked by Bedoya's military background. Bedoya was seen as associated with the School of the Americas, a U.S.-based training facility for security forces from Latin American countries. The School of the Americas in the past had taught torture techniques to the military officers that it

trained, and its graduates frequently committed human rights violations after returning to their countries; Bedoya both took a course and was an instructor there (Calvo 2008: 137). Although no one could definitively tie Bedoya to human rights violations, his military background allowed worries stemming from his relationship with the School of the Americas to remain.

Bedoya attempted to compensate for the downsides to his military background. In addition to portraying himself as strong-fisted, with his campaign symbol being a hand wrapped around another fist and overlaid with the Colombian colors of blue, yellow, and red, Bedoya claimed that he was capable of being "de mano blanda" or "soft-handed" (Interlatin 1998). Rather than carrying any overt military symbols, Bedoya presented himself as a more conventional politician, dressing up in a business suit and large glasses, or, more casually, with collared business shirts. Bedoya also tried to take advantage of his newcomer political status, a status from which he found it quite easy to benefit (Bedoya interview 2009).

Despite Bedoya's best efforts, voters continued to have fears about authoritarian rule and the future protection of human rights. This continued rejection of Bedoya's military background can be seen reflected in political commentary, such as that written in February 1998 in defense of Bedoya, by ex-general and failed 1978 presidential candidate Álvaro Valencia Tovar. Valencia's ardent defense of military figures reinforces how by this point in the campaign voters saw Bedoya's military background as a stand-in for authoritarian-style rule. Reacting against the way in which Bedoya had been portrayed in recent weeks, Valencia noted that politicians and journalists "attribute

Caesarean tendencies and dictatorial impulses [to Bedoya], as if over the length of his life he had not served in the defense of republican democracy" (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/21 "Por qué no un general?"). Valencia attempted to show that most repressive and dictatorial periods in Colombia were not headed by military figures. He concluded his defense of Bedoya, "A general with vast experience in the handling of situations of violence [...] with proven leadership capacity and team management, could embody the solution in this crucial moment of our republican life. Why not, then, choose the name of Harold Bedoya Pizarro?" The need for Valencia to defend Bedoya, not by underscoring Bedoya's qualifications but rather by attempting to refute the negative associations with Bedoya's candidacy, illustrates a key point. It shows how voters at this point in the campaign saw Bedoya as capable of improving security but also saw his military background as a stand-in for authoritarianism.

Bedoya's military career only highlighted his deficiencies. By April 1998, 23% of voters whose opinion of Bedoya had worsened during the campaign said that it was because "he was better as a military man" (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/14 "Bedoya debe concretarse"). Although this is not the same as rejecting Bedoya for his military background in itself, it does show that voters drew a clear distinction between their personal opinion of him and their recognition of his effectiveness in improving security as a general, on one hand, and their decision to support him for elected office, on the other hand.

From this point on, Bedoya continued his slow downward trajectory. How did Bedoya's campaign end? After he sank into third place, Bedoya's continued downward

support likely occurred because of the desertion of anti-Serpa voters in favor of Pastrana. Pastrana was polling less than 15 percent up until four months before the election, when he suddenly skyrocketed up to lead Serpa by March. Presidential candidate Alfonso Valdivieso, a public prosecutor who was polling less than Bedoya, then dropped out and endorsed Pastrana. By April and May, Pastrana had developed a strong lead. Pastrana was a civilian; he came from the Partido Conservador and had a long line of experience in civilian government positions. Most candidates, including Pastrana, Serpa, and Sanín, were willing to continue a negotiated solution to the country's conflict (Ramírez, Stanton, and Walsh 2004). Bedoya received less than two percent of the vote in 1998. He would try again in 2002, but by this time, many had written off Bedoya as politically incapable. By this time, there was another entrant who campaigned forcefully on security, taking, in Bedoya's words, "much of my campaign" (Bedoya interview 2009): this candidate was Álvaro Uribe.

Uribe: Making Heavy Use of a Civilian Background

Uribe received a positive response to his security message in part because he made extensive use of his civilian background to signal to voters that he would be a predictable guarantor of human rights and a reliable follower of established, legally prescribed procedures. His sustained references to his civilian background and his casting of career accomplishments specifically in the light of civilian characteristics allowed Uribe to portray himself in a manner that ameliorated voters' skepticism of his ability to protect basic rights.

As Figure 4.2 shows, support for Uribe in late 2001 grew dramatically. This lead held throughout 2002. Uribe's support stemmed from incumbent Andrés Pastrana's failure to reach a settlement with guerrilla groups (International Crisis Group 2002). This case of success is particularly instructive, given that Uribe's 2006 re-election is explained by positive reaction to his security program, which had resulted in many dramatic reductions in crime and political violence (Posada-Carbó 2006).



Figure 4.2 – Vote Intention for 2002

Source: Centro Nacional de Consultoría, Napoleón Franco, Invamer Gallup, Yankelovich, and Opinómetro polls, 2001-2002.

One of the pressures on Uribe's campaign was his perception of being connected with individuals and groups that engaged in political violence. As Uribe's campaign chief noted, "Uribe's opposition accused him of being *mano fuerte*, and connected with paramilitaries" (Echeverri interview 2009a).

To combat such accusations and show his commitment to human rights, Uribe drew on his long experience in civilian government to make his case. After all, he was a politician who began with clear progressive tendencies (Duzán 2004). Starting out his political career as appointed mayor of Medellín in 1982, he pursued social legislation. Uribe lasted only a few months in the position. Yet according to someone who knew Uribe from their time when both were active in the Partido Liberal in Medellín in the 1980s, this start of his career marked him as a progressive candidate within the Partido Liberal who did not pay much attention to issues of security (Tirado interview 2009). As a senator, he became known as one of the main drivers of major health insurance legislation in 1993 (Serafino 2002), which mandated that all Colombians get health insurance, gave subsidized insurance to the poorest Colombians, and financed this subsidy through a heavy payroll tax on all but the poorest workers (Escobar, Giedion, Giuffrida, and Glassman 2009).

While running for governor of Antioquia in 1994, Uribe came to concentrate more on security, but kept his progressive roots. He campaigned not just on security but also on infrastructure projects (Tirado interview 2010). As governor, starting in 1995, Uribe focused on education. Uribe was unique among non-national-level politicians in Colombia in that many people already knew who the governor of Antioquia was. People

already took note of Uribe's activities on security in Antioquia; he became known nationally through his strong support of the Convivir program (Cepeda 1996).

For the 2002 election campaign, when Uribe ran for president on a security platform, his opponents accused him of being heavy-handed (Echeverri interview 2009a). Yet Uribe's civilian experience was what gave him a way of backing up his claims of being able to protect human rights. Uribe tried to steer himself away as clearly as possible from any perceptions of association with violence, even as Serpa made such accusations. In March 2002, for example, Serpa declared, "It cannot be possible that on this occasion the paramilitaries will impose [who will be] the President." Later, Serpa asserted, "Uribe has refuted the insinuation that he is 'the candidate of the paramilitaries'. In response, Uribe called himself a "fervid believer in democracy" and declared, "I accept no support from the paramilitaries or veto from the guerrillas" (*Latin American Weekly Report* 2002 3/26).

At the very least, Uribe's campaign chief, thinking about the campaign years later, seemed to be satisfied with the campaign's ability to refute these accusations. As he noted about the campaign:

> "NGOs weren't convinced of Uribe's clean past. But the people were convinced, because Uribe gave them what they wanted. People who are hungry will accept bread. Even if they don't like bread, and even if they have dirty hands." (Echeverri interview 2009a)

This reflection suggests, at the very least, that the Uribe campaign felt that these efforts were useful at convincing voters that Uribe had a clean history.

Uribe used a campaign slogan of "Mano firme, corazón grande" or "Firm hand, large heart." This slogan contained a subtle but notable change from "mano dura" or "strong hand" stands of candidates in other Latin American countries. Uribe's campaign literature featured this slogan accompanied with a picture of Uribe with his hand on his heart, looking slightly upward, with Colombian colors behind him; this patriotic portrayal, associated with the term "mano firme," implied more of a fervor for Colombia rather than an intent to crack down on Colombian society.

Furthermore, Uribe portrayed himself as fully democratic. His "100 Points" campaign materials featured the word "democratic" frequently, and pointed to the "democratic workshops" that he used to formulate his platform. These references were accompanied by a portrayal of his program of "democratic security" in terms of the "legitimate authority" of the state. Uribe began the section of his platform dedicated to crime and violence by stating, "security will be democratic" (Uribe 2002).

Uribe directly pointed to his civilian background to cast his plans for using the military as still bound by law and respect for government, rather than arbitrary, militaristic rule. For example, he declared in his program, "In the government of Antioquia I was the first policeman of the department. In the presidency I will be the first soldier of the nation" (Uribe 2002). These words reflected promises of both coercion and the following of rules. In this way he was able to link his nation-wide program of public security directly to his civilian experience as governor.

Santos: Rebuffing Attacks Using His Civilian Background

Santos also made extensive use of his civilian backgrounds to address concerns about human rights. There was a need for Santos to burnish his democratic credentials. Santos was seen as less democratic than his main competitor, Antanas Mockus. In one poll that had Santos leading Mockus 34% to 16%, late in the campaign, voters perceived Mockus rather than Santos as being more democratic. Of these voters, 42% considered Mockus the best candidate at "following established procedures, rules, and laws" while only 25% felt that Santos was the candidate best able to follow established procedures (LAPOP 2010).

Santos' special efforts to underscore his fully democratic background can be seen in his platform and in his actions surrounding his vice presidential choice of Angelino Garzón. These efforts largely resemble those of Uribe, including using his vice-presidential pick to present a modern image on human rights, and pointing to his civilian experience to dispel fears and concerns. Santos drew heavily from his civilian experience to dispel fears about human rights. Santos' career background involved numerous government positions, including serving as Gaviria's minister of commerce and Pastrana's minister of finance. Just before the 2010 campaign, he was Uribe's minister of defense from 2006 to 2009.

The Santos campaign's handling of the "false positives" scandal shows his deep use of his civilian background to attempt to dispel voters' worries about human rights. Santos was minister of defense when the killings occurred, as well as when the scandal

broke. Mockus had used the scandal to focus attention away from security, casting doubt on Santos' willingness to protect human rights.

To defend his image on human rights, Santos pointed to his accomplishments as minister of defense. In particular, he benefited from a successful operation that managed to avoid human rights controversy almost entirely: Operación Jaque, a summer 2008 military operation in the south-central department of Guaviare, which tricked the FARC into giving up several of its most high-profile hostages. The rescued hostages included 2002 presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, whose kidnap during the campaign had gained heavy international and Colombian media attention. There was a misuse of a Red Cross patch on one of the soldiers' uniforms, but generally the operation was seen as clean on human rights. The effect of this successful military mission against the largest declared foe of the state was immense: this rescue was huge news in Colombia, and continued to be referred to as a great success in the next few years; Uribe and Santos took high credit for this operation.

Santos drew on this background to counter Mockus' attacks about the "false positives" scandal. He deflected the accusations by focusing on the fact that he was defense minister not only during the killings, but also in handling the aftermath of the scandal breaking. On the issue of the killings, he declared, "We did not invent the false positives, we ended them" (*El Espectador* 2010 5/28). Santos drew directly on his civilian position to attempt to turn this weakness into a source of strength, declaring, "I was the one who made the forceful decisions that have made complaints [about human rights] drop drastically since November 2008, to the point that the UN High Commission

on Human Rights said that what we had done was exemplary." (*El Tiempo* 2010 5/27 "Mockus y Santos") Santos couched his remarks on the subject in respectful, responsible terms: he asserted that his administration would certainly be committed to human rights, and now that the government knew that these killings had happened, he would make sure that this would never happen again.

Many voters were incensed by these killings, while others remained less interested in this scandal. Santos' answers may not have satisfied human rights activists, but they did appear to satisfy much of the population, who may have been only passive supporters of the idea of protecting human rights and who believed that human rights were generally protected. This answer was enough that most people still voted for him as the continuity candidate for Uribe's security policies.

VOTERS' REACTIONS BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLICE CONSIDERATIONS

Uribe and Santos pointed to their civilian backgrounds to argue that they could respect human rights, but what evidence is there that burnishing one's human rights image helps gain votes? Santos used his background to convince voters that human rights had been and could be respected, but voters' varied reactions to the "false positives" killings shows the wide differences in the active attention to human rights.

This section undertakes systematic examination of public opinion data to determine voters' responses to security appeals, based on their valuation of human rights and trust in the police. It shows that skepticism about protection from repression, to the

extent that it is driven by human rights values and low trust in security forces, lead voters to limit their support of key security-focused candidates.

The data and method for this examination consist of statistical analysis, employing responses from three surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project and one by the now-defunct United States Information Agency. The Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys, which will be presented here before the United States Information Agency poll, were a spring 2004 survey of 1,479 adults; a July-August 2006 survey of 1,491 adults; and an April-May 2010 survey of 1,506 adults, all in face-to-face interviews, using national probability samples. These surveys were not held in the same month for each year, raising the possibility that differences across surveys may arise as a result of time of the year relative to the presidential campaign. Other surveys were considered to be used for this analysis; the Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys, however, had the distinct advantage of asking about vote choice or intention for presidential candidates, rather than vote choice or intention for parties. Given that these presidential elections took place in a context where major candidates came from newly created parties, and established parties often failed to field viable candidates, party support could not count as a reliable measure of presidential preference.

The unit of analysis for each of the analyses conducted with these surveys was the individual Colombian adult citizen. The dependent variables were, depending on the survey, vote choice for Uribe in the 2002 election, vote intention for Uribe in the 2006 election, or vote intention for Santos in the 2010 election.

The proposed explanatory factor was concern for human rights, measured as an assessment of the protection of human rights under the current government, recorded on a seven-point scale from "not at all" to "completely," which for this analysis was rescaled from 0 to 1. For example, for the 2010 survey, approximately 8% of respondents could be placed at 0 on this scale; 8% at 1/6; 12% at 2/6; and 17% at 3/6. A proposed moderating factor, trust in the police, was measured as the response to a question about trust in the police, recorded on a seven-point scale from "none" to "a lot," which was for this analysis was also scaled from 0 to 1. For trust in the police in the 2010 survey, approximately 9% could be placed at 0; 9% at 1/6; 13% at 2/6; and 19% at 3/6.

Analyses were done by a logistic regression that included concerns about security, and other factors most commonly used in standard models of vote choice such as age, gender, education, race, socioeconomic status, sociotropic economic assessment, and ideology. Party identification was included for the 2006 and 2010 surveys but not for the 2004 survey. It was included in the models for the 2006 model, with indicator variables for each major political party. For 2010, including party identification for these models was considered; upon inclusion, however, the only significant predictors were attachment to Partido de la U and Partido Verde, each only formed within the last election cycle, suggesting that these partisan sympathies are a reflection of candidate sympathies: inclusion of party identification for 2010 removed the significance of human rights evaluations, while keeping out party identification for this year led human rights assessments to be significant at the 99.9% confidence level. Other items, such as religion, region, and assessments of government corruption, were also considered;

inclusion of such factors did not notably affect the results of the analysis, so the results presented in this study include only the first set of factors that are most commonly used.

Concern about security was measured as a free-response answer to a question about the "most important problem" facing Colombia. Public security includes the recorded categories of conflict, violence, crime, kidnap, and related categories such as forced displacement, gangs, and drug trafficking. Education was measured in years of school, ranging from 0 to 18. Race included four major categories, recorded as: "white," denoting predominantly European ancestry; "mestizo," denoting ancestry involving combination of some of the other ancestry categories; "indigenous," denoting ancestry from the first major population groups in the Americas; and "black," denoting predominantly African ancestry. Indigenous ancestry, representing 4% of respondents, was the only notable racial ancestry predictor of vote choice; consequently, the other groups were combined for the presentation of the results.

Socioeconomic status was measured as monthly family income. Smaller income categories were combined to produce categories roughly representing sixths of the population: up to 90,000 Colombian pesos or about 450 U.S. dollars; then up to 180,000 pesos; then up to 360,000; then up to 720,000; then up to 1 million; and over 1 million pesos, allowing socioeconomic status to be a continuous variable by way of relative income. Sociotropic economic assessments were about change from a year ago: worse, the same, or better, and was rescaled from 0 to 1. Ideology, measured on a ten-point scale, was rescaled with 0 representing "left" and 1 representing "right." For the 2006 analysis, party identification included five categories: Partido Conservador, Polo

Democrático, Partido Liberal, and the categories "other parties" and "no party," which were combined.

Human rights assessments and trust in the police are correlated moderately in each of the Latin American Public Opinion Project surveys (0.43 in the 2010 survey, for example), meaning that in the analysis there may be multicollinearity involved, even before considering including any interaction terms in the statistical models. Therefore, for each campaign under examination, two additional analyses were included, using the same set of variables as the original model but restricting the analyses to a high police trust sample and another to a low police trust sample. The coefficients for the high police trust sample and low police trust sample were notably different from each other in both the 2002 and 2010 surveys, and each was statistically significant; the results of these analyses are the basis for the graphs of predicted probability for vote choice from 2002 and vote intention in 2010.

Before presenting the results of the logistic regressions, an overview of trends in support for candidates helps to demonstrate how human rights assessments and trust in the police were associated with support for these candidates. The first to be presented here is Santos, for 2010. As Table 4.2 shows, among voters who felt that the Uribe administration had not protected human rights at all, Mockus led Santos by a margin of 5 to 1. Among those who believed that human rights had been protected under Uribe's administration, Santos led Mockus, 10 to 1. The difference in proportions is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 124$, df = 6, sample size $N = 602$, significance $p < 0.001$).

Table 4.2 – Human Rights Assessments and Support for Santos							
	"How well has the current government [Uribe] protected human rights?"						
Vote Choice	Not at all 0	0.17	0.33	0.5	0.67	0.83	Completely 1
Santos 2010	6%	17%	20%	28%	42%	51%	47%
Mockus 2010	30	23	26	20	13	9	4
Note: Survey responses have been scaled from 0 to 1. *Source*: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2010.							

In addition, low confidence in the police also is correlated with support for Santos. As Table 4.3 shows, among voters with no trust at all in the police, Santos and Mockus split voter support evenly. Yet among voters who trusted the police completely, Santos led Mockus by a margin of approximately 4 to 1. The difference in proportions is also statistically significant (χ^2 = 17.5, df = 6, sample size N = 612, significance p = 0.008).

Table 4.3 – Trust in the Police and Support for Santos							
	"How much confidence do you have in the police?"						
Vote Choice	Not at all 0	0.17	0.33	0.5	0.67	0.83	A lot 1
Santos 2010	23%	29%	28%	31%	38%	40%	43%
Mockus 2010	21	17	18	16	17	13	10
Note: Survey responses have been scaled from 0 to 1. *Source*: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2010.							

Similarly, support for Uribe was weak among voters who were most concerned about the state of human rights. Voters who saw the government as not protecting human rights were much less likely to have voted for Uribe in 2006 than for Gaviria. As Table 4.4 shows, voters who believed that the government under Uribe's first term had

completely protected human rights supported Uribe over Gaviria by a 10 to 1 margin. Support was substantially weaker among those who felt that human rights had not been protected well at all, with Uribe still leading Gaviria, but only 2 to 1 among these voters. The difference in proportions is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 73.3$, df = 12, sample size $N = 673$, significance $p < 0.001$).

Table 4.4 – Human Rights Assessments and Support for Uribe in 2002

	"How well has the current government protected human rights?"						
	Not at all						Completely
Vote Intention	0	0.17	0.33	0.5	0.67	0.83	1
Uribe 2002	56%	64%	64%	81%	78%	87%	90%
Gaviria 2002	25	28	26	15	20	11	9
Garzón 2002	19	8	10	4	3	2	1

Note: Survey responses have been scaled from 0 to 1.
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2004.

Trust in the police alone was not significantly correlated with support for Uribe over Serpa, using the 2004 survey asking about 2002. Yet these results attempt to pair 2002 vote choice with 2004 trust in the police; the time gap between actual vote and vote recall perhaps obscures the effects that trust in the police may have had.

A better way to tackle this question may be to examine the difference in support between vote choice for Uribe in 2002 and vote intention in 2006, as measured in a 2006 survey. Since this was Uribe's re-election and the issues in that election were similar to those of 2002, this survey helps to show how human rights evaluations and trust in the police affected vote intention for Uribe, in a similar fashion to the 2002 election. Of course, respondents may not report their 2002 vote choice accurately, instead likely

overreporting Uribe in their responses; nevertheless, this difference is expected to be in the same direction regardless of differences in trust in the police and human rights assessments, meaning that the effect of these two factors on vote intention for Uribe may still be discerned.

In fact, among those who felt that human rights were completely protected under Uribe's first term, support for Uribe held steady, moving from 88% to 92%. In contrast, among those who felt that human rights were not protected at all under Uribe's first term, one-quarter of Uribe's 2002 supporters decided to abandon him during his 2006 re-election campaign, with support plunging from 64% to 48%. These findings are of course only suggestive, because high marks for the state of human rights between 2002 and 2006 may be a reflection of vote choice for Uribe in 2002.

Moving away from the 2002-2006 comparison, and focusing on comparing support for Uribe in his re-election and support for his competitor Carlos Gaviria, those with the poorest human rights assessments were split roughly evenly. As Table 4.5 shows, among those with the highest human rights assessments under Uribe, Uribe led Gaviria 18 to 1. Here, as with the other surveys, the difference in proportions is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 76.2$, df = 6, sample size $N = 721$, significance $p < 0.001$). Human rights evaluations therefore cut powerfully against the appeal that Uribe had for having improved security.

Table 4.5 – Human Rights Assessments and Support for Uribe in 2006							
	"How well has the current government protected human rights?"						
	Not at all						Completely
Vote Intention	0	0.17	0.33	0.5	0.67	0.83	1
Uribe 2002	64%	69%	78%	78%	78%	84%	88%
Uribe 2006	48	68	64	68	81	87	92
Gaviria 2006	42	23	27	22	9	5	5
Note: "Uribe 2002" was asked in 2006 as well, requiring voters to declare their vote choice for the 2002 election. Survey responses have been scaled from 0 to 1. *Source*: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006.							

For 2002, survey results also suggest that low trust in the police further limits support on security. As shown in Table 4.6, support for Uribe declines substantially as trust in the police decreases. By the end of the campaign, Uribe led Gaviria across all levels of trust in the police, but this preference was affected heavily by how much people trusted the police. Even voters with no trust in the police were still three times as likely to support him rather than Gaviria. The overwhelming support for Uribe among those who trust the police "a lot" is an example of a candidate overcoming this obstacle, especially a candidate bearing a civilian past. Voters who had "a lot" of trust in the police supported Uribe by about a 10 to 1 margin. As with the other patterns of support examined in this section, the difference in proportions is statistically significant (χ^2 = 17.6, df = 6, sample size N = 727, significance p = 0.007). Human rights evaluations therefore cut powerfully against the appeal that Uribe had for having improved security.

Table 4.6 – Trust in the Police and Support for Uribe							
	"How much confidence do you have in the police?"						
	None						A Lot
Vote Choice	0	0.17	0.33	0.5	0.67	0.83	1
Uribe 2006	62%	63%	63%	70%	75%	74%	87%
Gaviria 2006	23	23	21	17	14	12	8
Note: Survey responses have been scaled from 0 to 1. *Source*: Latin American Public Opinion Project 2006.							

Predicted Probabilities of Support for Uribe in 2002

The results from the deeper analysis of survey data provide more definitive evidence that human rights values cut powerfully into support for candidates who campaign on security. This analysis shows that poor assessments of the current government's job with human rights strongly reduce vote choice for Uribe for the 2002 election, as well as vote intention for Santos in 2010.

Table 4.7 shows the results of the analysis for 2002. Assessment of human rights strongly impacts support for Uribe, even after adjusting the results for the factors most commonly used in standard models of vote choice, including age, gender, education, race, socioeconomic status, economic evaluation, ideology, and party identification. Moving from the lowest to the highest human rights assessment makes a voter 6.8 times as likely to have voted for Uribe. The impact of trust in the police, alone without examining the impact of human rights assessments, is suggestive as a predictor of support for Uribe. Other notable predictors of support for Uribe include economic evaluations, with rosier evaluations leading to increased likelihood of support; and education, with fewer years being a predictor of increased support.

Table 4.7 – Human Rights Values Hinder Support for Uribe in 2002								
Logit Models of Support for Álvaro Uribe in 2002								
	Full Sample		Just Trust		Low Trust		High Trust	
Human rights assessment	1.916***	(0.327)			2.178***	(0.492)	1.815***	(0.484)
Trust in police			0.539†	(0.301)				
Security concerns	-0.030	(0.194)	0.063	(0.187)	0.126	(0.295)	-0.173	(0.266)
Sociotropic economic evaluation	1.452**	(0.479)	1.739***	(0.463)	1.014	(0.742)	1.639*	(0.659)
Age	0.007	(0.008)	0.006	(0.007)	0.015	(0.012)	0.004	(0.010)
Gender								
Female	0.096	(0.189)	0.189	(0.183)	0.215	(0.287)	-0.060	(0.261)
Education	-0.072**	(0.022)	0.021**	(0.021)	-0.092**	(0.034)	-0.046	(0.030)
Race								
European	0.713***	(0.214)	0.623**	(0.206)	0.954**	(0.317)	0.434	(0.295)
Income	0.015	(0.066)	-0.012	(0.063)	0.114	(0.109)	-0.056	(0.087)
Ideology	0.400	(0.335)	0.508	(0.321)	0.667	(0.498)	0.126	(0.470)
Constant	1.217		1.202		1.047		1.350	
Observations	744		744		323		413	
Note: † is 90% significance; * is 95%; ** is 99%; *** is 99.9%. Standard errors in parentheses.								

Figure 4.3 shows the probabilities of support for Uribe that are predicted by the statistical analysis, depending on different assessments of the protection of human rights. They illustrate how voters' skepticism about the public's protection from repression reduces support for security-emphasizing candidates. These predicted probabilities are shown for a voter with demographic and politically relevant psychological characteristics that might be common of voters in Colombia, who consider security to be the most important problem facing the country.

The figure shows the predicted probabilities for a 35-year-old mestizo man who considers security to be the most important problem facing Colombia, with no party identification, neither bad nor good sociotropic economic evaluation, 12 years of education, leftist ideology (15th percentile from the most leftist, or 2 on a left-right scale from 1 to 10), and income in the third lowest of six brackets. The figure shows two curves. In blue, the predicted probabilities are based on the results of the analysis using a sample restricted to respondents with higher than average trust in the police. In orange, the predicted probabilities are based on a sample restricted to respondents with average trust or lower. The dashed line shows the mean predicted probability of the vote for Uribe, even including voters who did not consider security to be Colombia's main problem.

The results are that among those with high trust in the police, poor assessments of the state of human rights reduce the predicted probability of vote choice for Uribe somewhat, even among voters concerned foremost about security. Yet Figure 4.3 shows that much more importantly, among those with low trust in the police, poor assessments of the state of human rights powerfully and dramatically reduce the predicted probability of vote choice for Uribe.



Figure 4.3 – Poor Human Rights Assessments Reduce Support for Uribe

For the predicted probabilities based on the results of the sample restricted to respondents with low trust, the probability of vote choice for Uribe is 55% when this person believes that human rights are not protected at all, much lower than the 77% in the survey sample as a whole, even including voters for whom security was not their most important issue. Moving to a belief that human rights were "completely" protected raises the predicted probability of support for Uribe to 91%. For the high trust predicted probabilities, moving from the most negative to the most positive human rights assessment increases the predicted probability for voting for Uribe from 77% to 95%.

These simulations show how the ability to convince voters that human rights can be protected will lead to increases in vote support.

The clear differences between high and low trust predicted probabilities must be noted. For such a person as the one given here, with high trust in the police, even the lowest human rights assessments did not bring the predicted probability of supporting Uribe below the average. Yet for such a person, with low trust in the police, the lowest human rights assessments bring the predicted probability of supporting Uribe well below the average, even an average that also includes voters who do not care about security as Colombia's biggest problem.

Predicted Probabilities of Support for Uribe: Additional Examination

Next, the results of an analysis based on 2006 vote intention are presented. The 2004 survey for 2002 vote choice may have involved voters projecting their assessment of whether the government under Uribe has protected human rights, based on their past vote support for Uribe: this is a case of "endogeneity." To resolve this issue, an examination of 2006 vote intention is done because the elections unfolded in similar contexts, with Uribe campaigning centrally on security, even if he was already the incumbent. The analysis of support for Uribe's 2006 re-election uses the results of a 2006 poll about vote intention.

Table 4.8 shows the results of the analysis for 2006, demonstrating that assessment of human rights impacts support for Uribe strongly. Moving from the lowest to the highest human rights assessment makes a voter 3.6 times as likely to support Uribe.

Trust in the police is also a statistically significant predictor of vote intention for Uribe. Moving from the lowest trust in the police to the highest trust makes an individual 2.4 times more likely to support Uribe. Additional predictors of support include economic evaluations, with rosier evaluations leading to increased likelihood of support; education, with fewer years being a predictor of increased support; and party identification, with Partido Liberal sympathizers less likely to support Uribe.

Table 4.8 – Human Rights Values Hinder Support for Uribe in 2006

Logit Models of Support for Álvaro Uribe in 2006								
	Full Sample		Just Trust		Low Trust		High Trust	
Human rights assessment	1.291***	(0.408)			1.062†	(0.606)	1.275†	(0.660)
Trust in police			0.880*	(0.301)				
Security concerns	0.293	(0.222)	0.293	(0.187)	0.668*	(0.322)	-0.086	(0.319)
Sociotropic economic evaluation	1.344***	(0.316)	1.575***	(0.463)	1.357**	(0.464)	1.322**	(0.450)
Age	0.000	(0.009)	0.000	(0.007)	-0.013	(0.013)	0.009	(0.013)
Gender								
Female	0.476*	(0.225)	0.224*	(0.183)	0.489	(0.324)	0.383	(0.325)
Education	-0.167***	(0.031)	0.030***	(0.021)	-0.197***	(0.045)	-0.133**	(0.044)
Race								
Indigenous	-1.466**	(0.513)	0.495***	(0.206)	-1.368	(0.937)	-1.531*	(0.650)
Income	0.107	(0.087)	0.121	(0.063)	0.265*	(0.132)	-0.049	(0.124)
Ideology	0.826*	(0.415)	0.844*	(0.321)	1.207*	(0.592)	0.504	(0.623)
Party identification								
Conservador	0.428	(0.418)	0.432		0.539	(0.593)	0.405	(0.608)
Polo	-0.101	(0.252)	-0.147		0.158	(0.366)	-0.387	(0.363)
Liberal	-1.968***	(0.423)	-2.076***		-1.979***	(0.601)	-2.054***	(0.613)
Constant	0.910		0.914		0.622		1.198	
Observations	575		580		272		302	

Note: † is 90% significance; * is 95%; ** is 99%; *** is 99.9%. Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 4.4 shows the predicted probabilities of vote intention for a 35-year-old mestizo man who considers security to be the most important problem facing Colombia, with no party identification, neither bad nor good sociotropic economic evaluation, 10 years of education, ideology in the 50th percentile from the most leftist (6 on a left-right scale from 1 to 10), and income in the third lowest of six brackets. Restricting the sample based on police trust does not result in statistically significant coefficients for human rights assessments, likely due to a smaller sample size in 2006. Therefore, just one curve is shown. The dashed line shows the mean probability of support for Uribe in the sample, including those who did not consider security to be Colombia's main problem.



Figure 4.4 – Human Rights Assessments and Support for Uribe

For such a person, human rights assessments affect support for Uribe in a notable way. Moving from the most negative to the most positive human rights assessment increases the predicted probability for voting for Uribe from 57% to 83%. Of the sample in this survey, 72% supported Uribe. Of note in this graph is that moving from lowest to highest assessments moved the predicted probabilities of vote choice from over 10 percentage points below average to over 10 percentage points above average. These results show how the ability to convince voters that human rights will be protected can lead to notable increases in vote support.

Predicted Probabilities of Vote Intention for Santos in 2010

The results for 2010 show similar results, except that the effect of human rights assessments on vote support is even higher. This is perhaps due to two factors: the fact that crime concerns were stronger in 2002 than in 2010, therefore washing out some of the effects, and perhaps also the fact that Santos was so closely related to the 2008 scandal with military units killing civilians.

Table 4.9 shows the results of the analysis for 2010. Moving from the lowest to the highest human rights assessment makes a voter 4.7 times more likely to vote for Santos. Trust in the police moderates this effect substantially. Among low police trust individuals, moving from the most negative to the most positive human rights assessment results in only being 5.7 times as likely. Yet among individuals with high trust in the police, moving from the most negative to most positive makes a voter 11 times as likely to support Santos.

Table 4.9 – Human Rights Values Hinder Support for Santos in 2010								
Logit Models of Support for Juan Manuel Santos in 2010								
	Full Sample		Just Trust		Low Trust		High Trust	
Human rights assessment	2.039***	(0.305)			1.748***	(0.441)	2.420***	(0.484)
Trust in police			0.455†	(0.261)				
Security concerns	0.401*	(0.168)	0.426**	(0.161)	0.366	(0.261)	0.426†	(0.223)
Sociotropic economic evaluation	0.603**	(0.211)	0.745***	(0.202)	0.996**	(0.329)	0.322	(0.279)
Age	0.000	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.005)	-0.003	(0.009)	0.003	(0.007)
Gender								
Female	-0.237	(0.158)	-0.167	(0.152)	0.001	(0.242)	-0.395†	(0.211)
Education	-0.028	(0.020)	-0.045*	(0.020)	-0.036	(0.034)	-0.020	(0.026)
Race								
Indigenous	-1.613*	(0.784)	-1.449*	(0.649)	-1.405	(1.091)	-1.761	(1.107)
Income	0.053	(0.061)	0.041	(0.059)	0.058	(0.098)	0.045	(0.080)
Ideology	1.673***	(0.311)	1.825***	(0.303)	2.366***	(0.503)	1.248**	(0.408)
Constant	-0.571		-0.555		-0.817		-0.343	
Observations	864		872		421		441	
Note: † is 90% significance; * is 95%; * is 99%; * is 99.9%. Standard errors in parentheses.								

Figure 4.5 shows the predicted probabilities of vote intention for a 35-year-old mestizo man who considers security to be the most important problem facing Colombia, with no party identification, negative sociotropic economic evaluation, 12 years of education, leftist ideology (2 on a left-right scale from 1 to 10), and income in the third lowest of six brackets. Restricting the sample to high and low police trust does not result in statistically significant coefficients for human rights assessments, likely owing to a smaller sample size in the 2006 survey. In fact, for two people with the given demographic characteristics but with differing levels of trust, at the lowest assessment of

human rights protection they are equally likely to support Santos, at approximately 20%. Yet when moving to the highest assessment of human rights protection, the low trust voter has a 60% predicted probability of support, while for the high trust voter it rises to 73%.



Figure 4.5 – Human Rights Assessments and Support for Santos

The dynamics in which trust in the police moderates the effect of human rights in different ways between 2002 and 2010 is very interesting. To some degree, this disparity may be due to differences in when each survey was carried out, relative to the election

day. It may also be due to the stronger dynamics of response to a human rights scandal, compared with Uribe. This is clearly an item that would be fruitful to examine with any further available public opinion survey data.

Worries About Repression and Support for Bedoya in 1998

Not only can public opinion analysis show how worries about repression affected support for Santos and Uribe: poll analysis for Bedoya in 1998 further helps to suggest that these dynamics also held in 1998. The analysis that follows in the next few pages is one of the few individual-level analyses on the bases of Bedoya's 1998 support.

This state of analytical affairs is due to the limited availability of quality individual-level survey data for the 1998 election involving Bedoya. The analysis makes use of a December 1997 poll administered by the now-defunct United States Information Agency, of 1,001 adults using in-person interviews. Importantly, it is one of the only opinion polls, for which individual-level data are publicly available, that specifically ask about support for Bedoya in 1998. The survey does so by asking about vote intention in a hypothetical runoff between Bedoya and Serpa, and for this poll, support for Bedoya was statistically indistinguishable from that of Serpa: 32% for Bedoya to 35% for Serpa.

The usefulness of this survey is hamstrung, unfortunately, because of two missing pages in the study documentation: these pages of documentation elude the survey data clearinghouse from which these data were obtained. These pages likely contained many of the demographic questions useful for analysis, and perhaps further questions on vote intention. Even more surprisingly, the full study documentation even eludes the

government body that now administers the records of the shuttered United States Information Agency: the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration does not have these pages (Teixeira 2011)!

Nevertheless, for the sake of original analysis of support for Bedoya, use of these data represent a strong effort for understanding how worries about repression weakened support for Bedoya in the 1998 election. To do so, the analysis undertook an examination of the intensity of core support for Bedoya among different demographic groups, operating under the assumption that if certain groups can be identified to be more likely to be worried about repression, they should also be less likely to support Bedoya.

The available pages of the United States Information Agency survey documentation do not suggest any questions that would uncover which demographic groups in Colombia were most likely to have worries about repression. Uncovering this information therefore required matching these groups with another survey for the same election year: the Latinobarómetro 1998 survey. The Colombia respondents in the Latinobarómetro survey were arranged by age groups, splitting the sample in thirds: ages 16 to 29, ages 30 to 44, and age 45 and up. Analysis of Latinobarómetro data showed that the oldest group had somewhat lower police trust. A survey question asking about police trust, with answers classified as "a lot," "some," "a little," or "no confidence," had about 11 percent of the oldest age group declaring no trust in the police at all, more than the approximately 7 percent for the other two age groups. Treating these groups as meaningfully different in terms of worries about repression can be seen because this difference in proportions is statistically significant (for the whole Latin America sample,

χ^2 = 73.4, df = 6, sample size N = 17356, significance $p < 0.001$; for Colombia specifically, χ^2 = 12.6, df = 6, sample size N = 1187, significance $p = 0.049$). Analysis of Latinobarómetro data also suggests that poorer people had lower trust in the police than other groups. With five socioeconomic groups, as determined by the interviewer based on respondents' living conditions and physical appearance, data suggest that poorer respondents in 1998 may have had lower trust in the police (for the whole Latin America sample, χ^2 = 34.7, df = 12, sample size N = 17095, significance $p < 0.001$; for Colombia specifically, χ^2 = 15.3, df = 12, sample size N = 1186, significance $p = 0.224$).

Core supporters for Bedoya were determined by matching the results of two questions in the United States Information Agency survey. Not only was there a question about vote intention in a hypothetical Bedoya-Serpa runoff, but there were also questions about vote intention in a hypothetical runoff between Serpa and candidates such as Pastrana, who would be the eventual winner in 1998. These questions all ask about matchups against Serpa because at that point in the campaign, many voters were looking to back an "anyone but Serpa" candidate. "Core Bedoya supporters" in this analysis were determined to be the set of respondents who would support Bedoya in a runoff against Serpa, minus the set of respondents who would back Pastrana in a runoff against Serpa. Set subtraction of these two sets isolates only those voters who were supporting Bedoya but not merely voting against Serpa regardless of whoever this competitor would be.

To create socioeconomic background variables and age group variables for the analysis similar to those used in the Latinobarómetro survey, socioeconomic background collapsed a three-value class background variable into a two-value classification of voters

as richer and poorer, in roughly similar proportions. Age groups were created to match the Latinobarómetro groups closely: ages 18 to 29, 30 to 44, and 45 and up.

Figure 4.6 shows that older, poorer voters, the group that was identified to have the most worries about repression, had the lowest proportion of voters who were core Bedoya supporters. Among poorer 18-to-29 year-olds, 17.6% could be classified as core supporters, and among poorer 30-to-44 year-olds, 16.7% counted as core supporters. Yet poorer 45-and-up voters had only 10.3% core supporters for Bedoya. This is also less than for richer 45-and-up voters, who had 15.5% core supporters. These results suggest that among poorer voters, there may be a difference in proportions of core Bedoya supporters across age groups ($\chi^2 = 4.26$, df = 2, sample size $N = 651$, significance $p = 0.119$). These results corroborate the argument of this study, especially in light of the fact that they are aggregations of voters based on age groups and income. Given the wide variety of considerations affecting vote intention, with age being only one of them, these results lend credence to the argument that many voters skeptical about protections from repression withheld their electoral support from Bedoya.



Figure 4.6 – Groups More Worried About Repression Support Bedoya Less

In sum for this section, individual-level analyses show for Santos, Uribe, and Bedoya that support was notably constrained among voters who had cause to worry about repression. These findings suggest strongly that human rights values make winning on public security much more challenging. Uribe and Santos had civilian career backgrounds, but even so, wide variation occurred in voters' responses to these politicians' attempts to portray themselves as respectful of human rights and democratic processes. Fortunately for Uribe and Santos, at least they had civilian backgrounds to which to point, in an attempt to limit the damage from these considerations.

VOTERS REJECTING AN EXCLUSIVE FOCUS ON SECURITY

Moving from the effect of career backgrounds to the effect of campaign approaches, this section shows how candidates' exclusive focus on security or a more balanced mix of issues leads voters to have greater or fewer worries about human rights on top of the benefits of having additional issues. This examination compares Bedoya with Uribe. As Bedoya's campaign continued, his narrow emphasis on security led some voters to support other candidates instead; this was the case even for those who had high opinions of his security proposals and leadership abilities. Uribe, in contrast, emphasized multiple issues alongside security, and this broad emphasis made his stand on security more palatable to skeptical voters.

Bedoya: Too Narrowly Focused on Security

Bedoya's narrow focus on security limited his appeal among voters because his plans cast him in the light of a single-minded individual who would be unable to attend to additional matters. In large part, his narrow focus on security led to media attention against him on economic issues, but this narrow focus also allowed the media to damage him on human rights issues as well.

Voters paid attention to Bedoya at the beginning of his campaign. As the head of the Partido Liberal think tank even noted, Bedoya rose early because "he was talking about some interesting proposals" (Bustamante interview 2009). Yet after an early surge in vote intention, voters eventually opted for Pastrana, who merged promises of security, through negotiations with the FARC, into a more comprehensive platform. It has been

seen that Bedoya's military background limited his electoral appeal from the start. But why did his support, although already trending lower, end up as low as it did?

Bedoya's continued fall must be seen as coming from his continued exclusive focus on security. As one analysis put it, "his policy program that revolves entirely on a plan of force has been running dry" (see *El Tiempo* 1998 5/29 "La malicia"). In February 1998, when Bedoya was in second place, security and corruption were the two things that he was talking about consistently. Although Bedoya started out focusing on both issues, by the end Bedoya focused only on security (Bedoya interview 2009). As Figure 4.7 shows, in the last month of the campaign, Bedoya barely talked about corruption, and instead centered principally on security.



Figure 4.7 – Bedoya's 1998 Focus on Security

Source: Content analysis of all candidate-generated articles in *El Tiempo* about public policy proposals by Bedoya, for May 1998.

Bedoya's focus on only security, using corruption less as an issue as time went on, allowed competing candidates to attack him on human rights matters. In February 1998, Bedoya and candidate Alfonso Valdivieso were both competing for the anti-Serpa vote, and both Bedoya and Valdivieso made harsh criticisms on each other. At this point, Valdivieso criticized Bedoya specifically on matters of security in a way that criticized Bedoya's one strength: his time as commander of the armed forces. Not only, he did this in a way that suggested that even when he was in charge of the military, Bedoya was not a conciliatory figure. Valdivieso declared that Bedoya had polarized the troops, stating, "that environment led to [...] a public order that went out of control" (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/19 "Campaña"). Bedoya's one single strength was the issue of security, yet his singular focus on it enabled himself to be painted as a polarizing figure with an inability to keep his forces cohesive.

Compounding these allegations of a lack of control of forces, Bedoya's singular focus on security led him to discuss other issues, to the extent that he did so, in a weak, imprecise manner. As Bedoya himself recalls, he did not have much interest in issues other than security (Bedoya interview 2009). As a surprising sign of how his lack of interest manifested itself in the campaign, Bedoya's plans for the economy largely involved improving security itself! In a February 1998 debate, Bedoya centered his economic program on six points, with the first of these not being about the economy at all but rather security: he declared that his three priorities for the economy would be "the re-establishment of security, [structural] adjustment of the economy, and an educational

revolution" (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/27 "La prioridad"). Bedoya's implication that improving security would be sufficient to improve the economy was a very different perspective from what Uribe would end up saying in 2002, that the economy could not grow unless security were fixed. Rather than this being limited to one campaign statement, references to "security" seemed to always foremost in Bedoya's plans for the economy. When candidates' policy coordinators debated economic policy in April 1998, other candidates' coordinators made their first points about reducing poverty or deficit spending. Yet Bedoya's representative declared that on fiscal policy, Bedoya would "guarantee security, order, the responsible management of public funds, and clear and stable rules of the game" (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/15 "Campañas aconsejan"). This use of the word "security" could also mean economic stability rather than public security, but Bedoya's use of the term "security" was clearly different from other campaigns' references to poverty, such that Bedoya's campaign definitely sounded as if it were a one-note song.

Bedoya did not completely avoid all other issues: after all, he still did talk about it when asked to say things about it. Bedoya did stake out positions on issues such as rural development, transportation, and the judicial system (Nieto 1998: 49-52). He never took the initiative, however, to bring up these other issues; where he did have to talk about them, he rarely elaborated on these positions. In a February 2009 debate, for example, Bedoya skirted many questions about economic issues, except for saying that he would privatize all parts of government that were inefficient (*El Tiempo* 1998 2/27 "La prioridad"). Later, when discussing Colombia's deficit, Bedoya promised that he would not raise taxes but instead would crack down on tax evasion and government inefficiency,

but did not further specify how else he would solve the country's fiscal problems (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/14 "Propuestas imprecias"). As a sign of his unclear economic platform, even responding to criticism of vagueness, the most specific Bedoya got on the economy was a promise to accelerate Colombia's GDP growth from 3 percent to 6 percent; to give a tax break to new companies in Colombia's medium-sized cities; and to give easy loans and tax breaks to farmers (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/22 "General").

Bedoya's choice of running mate, Jorge García Hurtado, was intended to compensate for some of his inattention to the economy. García, a former official in the ministry of the Treasury, was supposed to speak for Bedoya on economic issues (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/24 "Y los vices ¿en qué andan?"). That strategy, however, proved insufficient. Bedoya's economic plans continued to be seen as simplistic (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/14 "Bedoya debe concretarse"). At this point in the campaign, according to the head of a think tank affiliated with the Partido Conservador, the attitude of the media began to damage him (Araujo interview 2009).

By March 1998, Bedoya began to be seen less favorably. Negative media reporting about Bedoya toward the end of the campaign was not directed toward his military background in itself, but rather his perceived vagueness on economic proposals, education, and other non-security topics. Bedoya himself noted that he preferred talking about security rather than these other topics. Media criticized his "imprecise" proposals throughout April (*El Tiempo* 1998 4/14 "Bedoya debe concretarse"; "Propuestas imprecisas"). Most importantly, these criticisms can be seen directly among voters as well: on perceived competence in "improving the economic situation of the country,"

Bedoya scored the lowest of all anti-Serpa candidates. On his main issues, drug trafficking, guerrillas, and corruption, Bedoya scored the best. Yet he was the only candidate whose two lowest-scoring issues were the economy and social policy (Aigneren 1998). This suggests strongly that his low success at election time was due in good part to his failure to gain traction on issues other than security.

Uribe: Broad Attention to Multiple Issues

Uribe received a positive voter response because he pursued a multi-issue platform that balanced security among many topics. This focus allowed for a broad base of voter support, drawing the support of voters for whom security may not have been their most important concern. His multi-issue platform also gave him the benefit of continuing to be perceived as trustworthy on matters of basic protections and liberties.

Uribe clearly spelled out his positions on many topics other than security. This discussion of all the issues, with security coming first, was integral to the campaign's strategy:

> "It is not just about security that works in a campaign. It is all the issues. It is just that security comes first, because a country without security is a country falling apart." (Echeverri interview 2009a)

Uribe's campaign commented that security was needed first to be able to improve the economy, education, and other matters, so security was the centerpiece of his platform but was not the entire platform. Uribe's "100 Points" campaign platform made security a main idea, but paid attention to many other issues, making security one of a number of

topics. This published platform was not a mere exposition of Uribe's security proposals. Rather, Uribe made key points on education, health, and housing, in addition to his security proposals. His points about security were placed in the middle, rather than the beginning, of his program. For example, he included points about:

> Utility Costs: "We will not allow the 'tarifa de subsistencia' [the utility rate for the consumers who use the least] to increase faster than inflation."
>
> Education: "I propose to create 1,500,000 slots for primary education. We will strengthen public education [...] I propose to create 400,000 new university slots in the next four years."
>
> Health: "I was the sponsoring senator of the law that created SISBEN [Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales] [...] We need to save Social Security because the public option is essential to the working of health providers."

Of particular note was his mention of the Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales. This was a new socioeconomic ranking of individuals into six categories, with "1" being the poorest and "6" being the wealthiest; the purpose of these new government-assigned categories was to allow the poorest individuals to receive state-subsidized health and utility services. Uribe's broad attention to many topics can be seen in Figure 4.8. By May 2002, security was still clearly his main topic and single largest issue, but in the end there were many other topics about which he talked, such that security only made up about a third of his campaign focus.



Figure 4.8 – Uribe's Broad Issue Use in 2002

Source: Content analysis of all candidate-generated articles in *El Tiempo* about public policy proposals by Uribe, for May 2002.

Uribe's wide mix of issues clearly played to his benefit. Uribe's broad approach was already one of his main strengths by the autumn of 2001; growth in his support stemmed from the worsening of the country's conflict, plus his expansion to other topics, with analysts noting by August 2001 that Uribe was "much more than security" (*El Tiempo* 2001 8/25 "Uribe Vélez va en ascenso"). By January 2002, an increase in voter support for Uribe was directly attributed to his proposals on these other issues (*El Tiempo* 2002 1/13 "Tiene gasolina Uribe"). This appreciation for Uribe's wide use of issues is striking, especially when contrasted with leftist candidates who have won election in Latin American countries precisely by focusing overwhelmingly on just economic issues

(Cleary 2006). Instead, these positive reactions suggest that Uribe tapped successfully into voters' requirement for a broad, multi-issue platform.

CHANGE IN ISSUE MIX WITHIN A SINGLE CAMPAIGN

To show further that a mix of issues helps boost votes by making the candidate not entirely about security and allowing the possibility that there is some attention to human rights, the early part of Santos' campaign can be contrasted against the later part to show that having a balanced mix of issues clearly and independently affects success; it shows that political expertise is not an alternative explanation for the differences in support between Bedoya and Uribe. A narrow emphasis on security placed limits on support not just in 1998 for Bedoya, who was a political newcomer. It also placed limits on support for Juan Manuel Santos, a seasoned, very experienced political figure who was minister of commerce during the César Gaviria administration in the early 1990s, and who had run for president in 1998, just like his eventual 2010 competitor Mockus, but had failed early on. Santos had later also served under multiple administrations including as minister of finance under Pastrana and minister of defense during Uribe's second term.

Santos made security his trademark issue early on. He positioned himself as the candidate who would continue Uribe's security policies. Santos led polls during much of early 2010 in a crowded field of candidates. In late February, when the Supreme Court ruled that a third term for Uribe was unconstitutional, Santos moved to make himself the main candidate carrying Uribe's security banner. Becoming the official candidate of the

Partido de la U, a political party that had formed during Uribe's second term to support Uribe and his policies and which had since become the largest single party in Colombia at the congressional level, Santos moved to position himself as the main continuity candidate on security.

Other candidates seemed to sense that Santos' singular focus on security could be his liability, and attempted to exploit this. Already by February 2010, the campaign of Germán Vargas Lleras, representing the newly formed center-right party Cambio Radical, noted that throughout January and February, Santos had been hovering just ahead of the field of candidates, at just under 20% in voting intentions, but had not been able to break above this level of support. Vargas' campaign seemed to believe that this was because of Santos' focus on security alone, and therefore moved to position Vargas the candidate would handle security in addition to other issues, in an attempt to become Santos' main competitor and eventually defeat him (Villamizar interview 2010).

As Figure 4.9 shows, Santos' issue emphasis in March 2010 focused heavily on security. Santos' mix of issues in March 2010 looks remarkably like that of Bedoya in 1998, as Figure 4.7 has shown. Santos talked over and over against about security, continuing Uribe's policies of "seguridad democrática," and combating crime. This was his main focus to the point that even though he did talk a little about jobs and commitment to improving the economy, event-driven controversies about candidates' positions about whether they would exchange FARC-held government soldiers with government-held FARC combatants led Santos to give as much attention to that single matter as he did to economic issues in total!



Figure 4.9 – Santos' Issue Use in Early 2010

Source: Content analysis of all candidate-generated articles in *El Tiempo* about public policy proposals by Santos, for March 2010.

Santos began to refer in his campaign speeches to "democratic prosperity" starting in early February, as the signature idea of his own campaign, but this consisted blandly of references to prosperity that would result largely from his security policies:

> "I would say that Democratic Security needs to persevere, because the beast still is not dead, and also [it needs] more emphasis on urban security. Let's say it this way: not a step backward on Democratic Security, always ahead on Democratic Prosperity" (*El Tiempo* 2010 2/22 "Seguridad").

Santos gave lip service to many issues other than security, for example in March calling "democratic prosperity" as consisting of "the fight against poverty, the fight against inequity, the creation of decent jobs, and an effort to produce opportunities for all those

excluded from Colombian society" (*El Tiempo* 2010 3/14 "Por qué Angelino"), but without actually turning to those points in a sustained manner. This vague depicting of "democratic security" as things other than security, with few details, continued through mid-April. Santos appears to have believed throughout this period that security would be successful and would be all that was necessary to do well in the election (see *Semana* 2010 5/15).

Yet throughout March to mid-April, as Santos remained overwhelmingly focused on the issue of security, Mockus and his campaign, hammering away at issues of socioeconomic equality, not only consolidated the anti-Santos vote but drew voters from Santos. By mid-April, a poll showed Santos down six percentage points in just a few weeks to 30% while Mockus had climbed eleven percentage points to 20% (*El Espectador* 2010 4/16 "Nueva encuesta"). By late April, many considered Santos to be far behind Mockus: in one survey, Santos trailed 27% to 39% (*El Tiempo* 2010 4/30 "Mockus tendría").

The clear difference between a narrow focus on security and an expansive set of campaign messages can be seen in what happened next: by late April, Santos' campaign was beginning to falter, and in response he chose to reorient it, shifting it dramatically toward a broader mix of topics that focused on social issues. This adding of social issues by Santos was due to his recognition that he was falling behind Mockus (*Semana* 2010 5/8).

Only when Santos' message became more expansive did his support stabilize. In late April, Santos clearly re-oriented his campaign, turning to economic rather than to

security issues (Landauro and Crowe 2010). Shifting from his focus on continuing Uribe's "seguridad democrática" policies by the time of a major April 22 campaign speech welcoming Partido Liberal adherents to support his campaign, Santos laid out how his theme of "prosperidad democrática" would involve a focus on jobs, poverty, and housing (Ortiz 2010). At least from that point on, Santos continued to hammer away on economic issues, including jobs, poverty, and regulation, including proposing a new ministry of work. His traditional references to security were therefore balanced out with concerted attention to this new set of topics.

Figure 4.10 shows that by the end of his campaign, Santos made heavy reference to the economy, even slightly more than he did security. Rather than having an issue mix that closely resembled Bedoya's, as Santos did in March 2010, by May of that year Santos' mix of issues looked remarkably similar to Uribe's, as Figure 4.8 has shown: a broad mix of issues, of which security formed a notable but not dominating role. From this point, his polling numbers improved, leading to a virtual tie in polls by mid-May (*El Espectador* 2010 5/13 "Empate").



Figure 4.10 – Santos' Turn to Economic Issues Late in the Campaign

Source: Content analysis of all candidate-generated articles in *El Tiempo* about public policy proposals by Santos, for May 2010.

This improvement continued through late May (Ipsos Napoleón Franco 2010). By the time the campaign drew to a close, Santos attempted to portray his competence on all matters, regardless of whether they were security-related. For example, a week before the election, in a closing campaign speech, Santos did not mention security specifically, but merely implied it within a broader theme of competence on a multitude of issues: "You can sleep peacefully with me for the next four years. We do not want to jump into the abyss, we do not want to philosophize, we want results and for that we have a very important platform." Then, continuing to stress his theme of competence on any issue, in direct reference to Mockus' fame as a college professor who gained national attention for

once showing his rear end to his noisy college classroom to get them to be quiet, Santos quipped, "I don't lower my pants, I tie them up" (El Tiempo 2010 5/23 "Candidatos").

Figure 4.11 shows Santos' growth, decline, and reversal of this decline: Santos' campaign lost votes in March and early April, which is a substantial effect because he lost so many votes that he would have lost the election to Mockus. Then, in late April through May, Santos gained votes on his new mix of issues, enough to bring him back to the levels of voter support that he enjoyed in March.



Figure 4.11 – Vote Intention for 2010
Source: Ipsos Napoleón Franco polls, 2009-2010.

Even more than helping to reverse Santos' decline overall and lead to an improvement in his fortunes against Mockus, this shift to a broader issue base specifically

helped to maintain Santos' hold on security. Between March and late April, while Mockus rose dramatically in the polls through a focus on socioeconomic issues and clean government and Santos continued to focus only on security, Santos not only fell in voters' estimations of who was most qualified on socioeconomic issues, but he also failed to get much more traction on security. This stasis on security continued even as minor candidates continued to plummet, which should have helped him.

From late April to May, the period of Santos' re-orientation, Santos benefited from improved perceptions of his relative qualification on the socioeconomic issues of jobs and housing, but more than that, voters also saw Santos as even better on security matters. As Table 4.10 shows, Santos received a several percentage point boost in his relative qualifications on getting the economy going and construction of affordable housing; at the same time, it also suggests that he also received boosts in his perceived qualifications of combating guerrillas and drug trafficking. The timing of the April survey is especially suited to demonstrate the effect of Santos' wider set of issues: the survey took place starting the day that Santos made the speech that re-oriented his campaign. The increases from late April to the end of the campaign were not merely the result of increased popularity in general. Voters did not increasingly see Santos as the most qualified on non-security issues that he did address: for example, on education and foreign policy, Santos slid from March to late April, but did not improve appreciably from late April to May.

Table 4.10 – Santos' Turn to the Economy Also Helped Him on Security			
Santos is the most qualified candidate for:	March	April	May
Security			
Combating guerrillas	54%	55%	57%
Combating drug trafficking	47	48	51
Jobs and Housing			
Getting the economy going	30	26	29
Construction of affordable housing	29	26	28
Source: Gallup Colombia polls, 2010.			

Even more notably, even between March and late April, while Santos remained fixated on security issues alone, this emphasis did not improve voters' perceptions of his competence on security. Between March and April, support for candidates other than Santos and Mockus leaked away quickly, yet more people did not consider him most qualified on security and most of this movement away from other candidates went to Mockus, not Santos! Between April and May, the bottom had already fallen out of the support for candidates other than Santos and Mockus, yet it was in this time period that Santos' perceived qualifications on both security and socioeconomic issues increased. Therefore, while Santos remained fixated on security alone, he was losing ground on security; when he expanded, he gained ground on the topic.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED FOR A MEASURED HAND

In *Heike Monogatari*, one of the first enduring epic poems of the Japanese language, military forces of the newly established Minamoto rulers are attempting to dismantle the security threat posed by recalcitrant forces in central Japan, when one

Minamoto leader, Yoshimori, says to another: "One leader is the same as another to provincial musters. They will follow anyone who seems likely to end the disturbances and maintain order."

Such a statement would increasingly ring untrue in contemporary Latin America. When it comes to establishing public security, not all leaders are the same. A measured hand would now seem to be a requirement for successful appeals on the issue of security: a civilian background coupled with a broad mix of issues. These attributes are in stark contrast with existing research that portrays easy success on security. The take-away point of this chapter is that candidate- and campaign-related factors affect whether voters translate their concerns about security into support for security-emphasizing candidates. Campaigns from 1998, 2002, and 2010 show a highly conditional pathway to success. Despite continued horrendous crime and violence throughout these years, a situation that would seemingly make it easy to win votes, the effective use of security was far from uniform.

Bedoya's topping out of support, followed by his protracted decline, shows that military career candidates are disadvantaged by their backgrounds when they make campaign appeals on security. Of course, candidates who win few votes usually have a myriad of factors that are responsible for their low performance. Yet although existing views see two items, a military background and a narrow focus on security, as being beneficial, this was not the case. Instead, they harmed candidates' chances to win votes.

Bedoya was popular in his capacity as a military leader, but he could not convert this popularity into support as an elected political leader. His military career background

led to voters' fears that he would usher in militaristic rule. Then, later in the campaign, Bedoya's lack of clear proposals on issues other than security caused voters to abandon him even further. His proposal to improve the economy just by improving security stands out as a stunning example of how Bedoya's narrow focus limited his support.

Uribe's success shows the effect of these two key conditions when they are favorable. First, his attention to a wide set of issues helped to fuel his growth in support. In contrast with Bedoya, Uribe's argument that life in Colombia could not be improved without improving security, but that he would also attend to other issues, made more sense to voters. Combining his hard stand on security with a broad set of other issues helped catapult him into first place. Then, Uribe worked to maintain an image of being a respectable caretaker of human rights, defending himself from charges of being authoritarian or repressive. By the time that Uribe was catapulted into first place, he defended himself from allegations of association with repression by continually pointing to his civilian experiences, reinforcing his promise that he would stick by democratic traditions and would respect human rights.

Santos shows that these dynamics are not limited to just Bedoya and Uribe. Like Uribe, Santos also benefited from a civilian background. His references to his successes in dealing with security in a civilian capacity helped him to promise that he was committed to human rights. Meanwhile, although his initial exclusive focus on security hurt him, his late shift to include security among a raft of multiple issues allowed him to build out his support once again, not only by gaining credibility on his additional issues, but also on the issue of security itself.

Military career backgrounds are now no longer solely beneficial for candidates who campaign on security. Quite the contrary: voters often reject military backgrounds on human rights grounds, making military professionals less able to win votes. Although certainly possible, less frequent should be cases of military professionals winning elected office, such as Antonio Bussi, an ex-general and human rights violator who became governor of Tucumán province in Argentina in 1995. More frequent, instead, should be cases such as Enrique Venturino, one of three presidential candidates in Argentina in 2003 with a military career, who pointed to his military background to promote a zero tolerance policy on rising crime, and yet failed to get much support (Yang 2006).

Rather than succeeding by simply shifting voters' focus to security, candidates who campaign on the issue now must also be prepared to cover socioeconomic issues in a serious way as well. Rightist candidates may have a difficult time making elections entirely about security. This finding runs counter to the existing view of how security can be used by rightist candidates in campaigns. Candidates who run on security can no longer simply promise a strong hand to beat down problems of crime and violence. For candidates to win votes on security, there is now a need for a measured hand.

In the end, support based on candidates' use of security depends not only on candidates' career backgrounds or the weight they give to security in their campaigns, but also on what exactly they pledge to do about security. The content of security messages can vary widely, and some may be more convincing than others. The next chapter turns to how the content of candidates' security messages affects winning votes: the final condition for success.

CHAPTER 5: PUNISHMENT IS OUT, ENFORCEMENT IS IN: CONTENT OF SECURITY MESSAGES AND WINNING VOTES

The theoretical framework of this study argues that attention to human rights creates conditions that must be met for security to be invoked as an issue and to gain support on it. Chapter 3 focused on the factors that affect use of the issue, and Chapter 4 examined two factors that affect skepticism about the protection of human rights: candidate backgrounds and campaign approaches. This chapter shows how the content of security messages affects voters' worries about whether candidates' security policies will result in repression. This is the fifth and final item in the presentation of the theoretical framework.

The contribution of this chapter is to refute the existing work that claims that "mano dura", a combination of ruthless enforcement and increased punishment, is the key winning message type on security in Latin America (see Fuentes 2004; Hume 2007; Kliksberg 2008; Holland 2009; Krause 2009). Instead, it shows that "careful enforcement" is another viable path to success on security, one that in countries with widespread human rights values may be even more successful than promises of "mano dura" policies. Human rights considerations therefore allow for winning campaigns on security that do not invoke punishment as a central component of security promises.

Candidates' messages on how to improve security can be grouped into three types: namely punishment, enforcement, and prevention. This chapter suggests that high-crime contexts lead enforcement messages to become more effective politically,

rather than messages that focus on punishment or prevention. More important, it shows that human rights values cause voters to favor having this enforcement be careful, rather than unbridled. The findings on "mano dura" campaigning miss the point that the popularity of those proposals are due to their crime fighting ability; most voters, however, would likely prefer a policy that promised to be equally successful at combating security threats while also avoiding repression and abuses.

Since security forces in Latin American countries are often seen as being part of the problem rather than the solution to crime, successful security-focused candidates in Colombia have tapped into a demand for a more careful enforcement. Such messages promise deliberate enforcement by trained bodies of the state to bring about control of security, taking account of human rights. In other words, candidates must promise that they will be able to direct police and military forces to pursue the correct targets, not incorrect targets such as innocent civilians.

It does so by focusing on the trends in security message use among Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos. Bedoya used campaign messages mostly of enforcement, including some attention to punishment, like the "mano dura" policies that have been popular in certain Latin American contexts. Uribe's highly successful messages had some focus on punishment, but he used enforcement messages much more than punishment. Furthermore, Uribe promised enforcement policies unlike the unbridled, ruthless punishment of mano dura programs: he promised careful enforcement, with attention to human rights. Furthermore, as a sign of attention to human rights considerations, Santos also used messages of enforcement without any messages of punishment, even more so

than Uribe had, and he also did so by emphasizing attention to human rights while avoiding attention to punishment. Not only this, all the candidates in 2010 seemed to take on security messages centered on enforcement, regardless of their ideology. Santos' competitors clearly saw the need to take up enforcement going into the campaign season. This convergence of security policy proposals around careful enforcement strongly demonstrates the appeal of careful enforcement as a viable and appealing security message.

To show these dynamics, the content analysis presented in parts in chapters 3 and 4 was extended by an additional step, to the specific content of security messages. Security messages were classified into one of four categories: generic, punitive, enforcement, and preventive. Generic messages were those that highlighted the problem of security without having to discuss the policies to improve security. Punitive messages were those that focused on increasing punishments and criminalizing certain activities. Enforcement messages were those that focused on increased use of the police or military, or increased funds and technological capacity for these security forces. Preventive messages included policies such as citizens' watch groups, and community involvement. To distinguish among punitive, enforcement, and preventive messages when discussion of multiple options might be combined in the same article, classification of the article was determined by which message was given the strongest emphasis by the candidate.

This chapter is not about the effectiveness of punitive, preventive, and enforcement policies on the actual state of crime and violence; rather, it is about the political effectiveness of these different security messages. Research about which policy

"works" to best improve public security often produces cross-cutting and seemingly contradictory findings, depending on the local context and time period of each analysis (see Spelman 1994; Spelman 2005; Reiner 2007; McAra 2008). It may be more tractable, however, to examine the political effectiveness of these message types.

SECURITY MESSAGES: PUNISHMENT, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION

Public security policies fall under three broad types: punitive, policing, and preventive measures (Arriagada and Godoy 2000: 123; see Spelman 2005: 151-152; Reiner 2007: 158-167; Keating 2010: 249-251). Recently in Latin American countries, militaries have been deployed to fight violence and nonpolitical crime (Pion-Berlin 2011), so consequently, it makes most sense in Latin American contexts to broaden the term "policing" and use the term "enforcement," making these security message types best termed "punishment," "enforcement," or "prevention."

Punishment involves increasing the sanctions or penalties for existing crimes or broadening the scope of activities that could be classified as crimes and therefore subject to punishment. In Colombia, in the 1980s and 1990s, punishments for many crimes increased markedly from the punishments prescribed during the 1970s. In the 1970s, the carrying of personal firearms led to a sentence of up to one year, while in 1988 it was made five to ten years; for extortion, the maximum sentence increased in 1993 from ten years to 20 years; for kidnapping, sentences of 8 to 12 years increased in 1993 to a maximum of 60 years (Pérez, Vanegas, and Álvarez 1997: 135-136). As examples of punitive security messages, in Honduras in 2005, Porfirio Lobo campaigned on bringing

back the death penalty, which had been abolished in the 1950s (Taylor-Robinson 2007). In Mexico in 2006, winning candidate Felipe Calderón proposed life sentences for kidnappers of children (Jiménez 2006). In Uruguay in 2009, candidate Luis Alberto Lacalle proposed more severe penalties for crimes, especially for killing police (*Primera Hora* 2009).

Enforcement includes increased use of security forces such as the police and military to fight crime and violence. This includes increasing the size of security forces, increasing technology and weapons capacity, putting more police or military forces on the streets, and creating more permissive rules of engagement. As examples of enforcement messages on the campaign trail, in Costa Rica in 2010, winning candidate Laura Chinchilla promised to enlarge the police force and provide more training and better weaponry (see Chinchilla 2010). In Panama in 2009, one of the components of winning candidate Ricardo Martinelli's "Calles Seguras" security plan was to improve police training (Loo 2009).

Prevention involves social and economic programs to combat the root causes of certain types of crime or violence. This often involves rehabilitation programs, as well as social expenditures to reduce poverty and inequality, such as welfare programs. In many European countries since the 1990s, governments have frequently pursued preventive crime control policies (Crawford 2009). As examples of preventive security messages, in Chile's election in 1999-2000, Ricardo Lagos promoted social programs as the way to improve security (Hughes and Parsons 2001). In Argentina, 2007 candidate Roberto Lavagna characterized security as depending on general social conditions, and

characterized reductions in crime as requiring economic growth and social improvements (see Nueva Provincia 2007). In 2011, Cristina Fernández's re-election campaign included advertisements that depicted crime as solvable through a combination of enforcement, through wider use of security forces, and prevention, through "building roads and schools" (see Télam 2011). In Guatemala in 2007, winner Álvaro Colom also called for combating crime largely through social programs.

So-called "mano dura" programs include a mix of punishment and unbridled enforcement. For example, in 2004 in El Salvador under president Antonio Saca, the Super Mano Dura criminalized gang membership and increased penalties for crimes if the perpetrator was a gang member; it also deployed military anti-gang units and increased the power of police forces to search and arrest suspected gang members (Hume 2007: 145; Seelke 2009: 10).

Voters are portrayed, based largely on the experience of the U.S., as responding readily to punitive messages (Tyler and Weber 1988; Marion and Farmer 2003). Although with some vacillation across time (Beckett 1997), punitive measures are successful because of their deterrent value, their symbolic value, and because of voters' desire to punish criminals (Tyler and Weber 1982). Punitive messages help carry "law and order" candidates to office (Beckett 1997; Flamm 2005). Findings of punitive attitudes hold for other advanced industrial contexts such as England, Scotland, and Japan (Garland 2001: 202; Keating 2010: 249-251; Hamai and Ellis 2006).

In Latin America, the "mano dura" appeals of candidates in El Salvador suggest that such punishment is an electorally effective appeal within the region as well (Hume

2007: 745). Additional research on Latin America has found that security problems cause public opinion to call out for punitive legislation (Aguilera 2008: 134). Of course, not everyone clamors for punitive measures, even in the U.S. (Cullen, Clark, and Wozniak 1985; Cullen, Cullen, and Wozniak 1988), and voters also recognize the limits of punishment and also often support rehabilitative programs (Reynolds, Craig, and Boer 2009: 167). Yet the dominant existing view is that punitive messages are more politically effective.

Yet even enforcement is not seen as a particularly useful appeal, when compared with prevention. Existing research has suggested that prevention is the next most popular type of message: framing security in terms of prevention is seen as a way for leftist candidates to reverse rightists' "ownership" of security in the minds of voters. In the U.S., casting crime as something to be solved through preventive programs can reverse rightist ownership of security (Beckett and Sasson 2004; Holian 2004).

Enforcement is actually seen by existing research as last in the list of presumed effectiveness. In the U.S., the general public prefers prevention to enforcement: when forced to choose between allocating money toward "attacking the social and economic problems that lead to crime through better education and job training" or "deterring crime by improving law enforcement with more prisons, police, and judges," prevention was preferred over enforcement, by about a two-to-one ratio (Roberts and Hastings 2007: 201). Seemingly, then, punishment comes first, followed by prevention, and with enforcement trailing behind both types of messages.

ENFORCEMENT WITH CARE AND WITHOUT PUNISHMENT

The success of punitive messages in the U.S. and the success of a combination of punishment and enforcement in Latin America make it seem that the electoral effectiveness of punitive messages is what these regions have in common, but this may not actually be the case. The success of punishment in the U.S. may be an artifact of high trust in security forces and in judicial systems' ability to do their job. Instead, in Latin America there may really just be a thirst for better enforcement: more of it, and more effective without committing as many abuses.

High crime rates in many Latin American countries may make enforcement central to success, rather than punishment. Even though the U.S. is often portrayed as a country with higher crime rates than other advanced industrial democracies (see Kalish 1988; Kliksberg 2008: 14), especially in terms of homicide rates (Beckett and Sasson 2004), compared with many Latin American countries it is more accurately considered a "medium-crime" context. In such medium-crime contexts, punitive measures are successful, because of deterrence, their symbolic value, and voters' desire to punish criminals (Tyler and Weber 1982); in high-crime contexts, this cachet stays stable but likely does not increase appreciably. Meanwhile, preventive messages decline in appeal: many voters may view preventive measures as necessary for a long-term reduction in crime and violence, but may also see such measures as too indirect to reduce violence immediately.

In contrast, in high-crime contexts the appeal of enforcement skyrockets. Signs of the thirst for enforcement activity in high-crime contexts include over three-quarters of

people in Mexico in 2009 favoring allowing U.S. military officers to train Mexican police and military personnel, and 40 percent favoring "allowing the United States to deploy troops in Mexico" (Angus Reid 2009). In El Salvador in 2006, where homicide rates topped the region at almost 60 (World Bank 2011), a similar survey had 29% favoring "deploying the army" and 24% favoring "tougher punishments" (Angus Reid 2006). In a 2011 survey in Guatemala, taking place in urban neighborhoods in Guatemala City, 63% wanted a larger police force, and 70% wanted more police patrols (Asociación Grupo Ceiba 2011: 16). These figures demonstrate clear demand for more enforcement.

High crime and violence therefore drastically reduces the value of preventive messages, and makes the value of enforcement increase dramatically, while keeping that of punishment relatively stable. Contexts of high crime should therefore have the possibility of both enforcement and punishment as electorally effective messages. Voters will value enforcement as a way of directly confronting problems of crime and violence: less symbolic than punishment, yet more directed toward the immediate task of lowering crime and violence than prevention. Both "mano dura" policies and the "careful enforcement" that is pointed to in this chapter have this component of enforcement in common.

Yet Latin American countries have not only high crime, but also voters who have worries about the violation of basic rights. These worries about repression should alter the thirst for enforcement by making voters respond more positively to messages of "careful enforcement" that promise to target the true security threats, to be measured in the use of force and to be deliberate in security forces' actions.

Certainly, through the region in the 1990s, the main security policy type was repression-based and often inobservant of human rights (Ungar 2009: 170). Yet now, there is strong demand among the public to improve the practices of the police, specifically to avoid repression. In Guatemala, for example, only 31% of respondents said that police would respect the rights and physical integrity of people when resolving violent situations, while 38% were certain that the police would not (Asociación Grupo Ceiba 2011: 12); the remainder believed that the police would respect people's rights and physical integrity some of the time: hardly a resoundingly positive assessment of police conduct.

These concerns could be dealt with by a "careful" enforcement that relies on training of the police. Careful enforcement means police and military forces that are well trained to avoid repression against innocent individuals, even as they crack down on actual criminals and violent actors. Even in El Salvador, where there is high demand for tougher laws to combat crime, people also want better training: in fact, 35% believe that crime is high because there are "soft laws", and 25% believe that it crime is high because "policemen are not well trained" (Cruz 2006: 165-166). In the early 1990s in Colombia, trust in the police plunged from the already low rates that it had, to 21%, precisely because of the militaristic behavior of the police at the time, which was then rectified in police reforms in the mid-1990s (Llorente 2006). To combat this, there is a call for police training. In Guatemala, 83% support more police training about peace issues (Asociación Grupo Ceiba 2011: 17).

These beliefs lead to separate responses among voters toward messages of "careful enforcement" and messages of "mano dura." Both use enforcement, and both involve promises to be highly effective against security threat; these allow both messages to be popular. Although the excesses in security forces' conduct and punitive measures embodied in "mano dura" might be acceptable to voters if this is the way to establish security, "careful enforcement" promises to establish security while avoiding these excesses should lead voters to respond even more positively. The benefits from such "careful enforcement" are well known, helping to motivate voters' acceptance of such a message and candidates' use of such messages. There are strong efforts in Latin American countries to train police to be less violent, rather than merely punishing police violence after the fact (see Mesquita 1999). Police training does seem to be effective at reducing repression: community policing practices involving trained members of the police and intended to reduce repression, do result in slightly higher trust in the police among the public (Frühling 2009), in addition to leading to reductions in crime (Silva 2000). Moreover, such community policing efforts also lead people to feel safer and calmer in their neighborhoods, due to less police brutality (see Frayssinet 2009). These findings are in line with existing research on the U.S. that shows that in-service training of police does lead to fewer police brutalities (Cao 2002).

Therefore, promises of careful enforcement can have electoral success. This finding shows another means of winning votes on security beyond the electoral effectiveness of "mano dura" proposals (Kliksberg 2008; Holland 2009; Krause 2009).

Despite "mano dura" messages being popular, it is not the only type of security message that can be successful.

URIBE: CAREFUL ENFORCEMENT WITH A SOLID LEAD

Uribe demonstrates how promises of careful enforcement can be very successful, even as opponents attempted to label his policies as harmful to basic rights. Messages of careful enforcement messages by Uribe can be seen as refinements of the messages of Bedoya, who already promised enforcement. Uribe's use of careful enforcement resounded so well in part because his competitors did not take up similar messages of careful enforcement, leaving him the sole candidate broadcasting this message. Uribe's use of careful enforcement messages was in clear contrast with his 2002 competitor Serpa, who avoided using security, and with his 2006 competitor Gaviria, who talked about security only in preventive terms.

Bedoya Already Used Enforcement But Not Careful Enforcement

Bedoya promised enforcement, but it was not careful. Bedoya's proposals centered on the unbridled enforcement that is also common to mano dura policies. He did not, however, use many messages of punishment.

As Figure 5.1 shows, content analysis of reporting on Bedoya suggests that security formed 55% of Bedoya's attention to issues on the campaign trail. Of these messages on security, 50% were generic messages that merely talked about need for

security. In addition, 8% were punitive messages, about 33% were enforcement messages, and 8% were prevention messages.



Figure 5.1 – Bedoya's 1998 Use of Security and Messages on Security

Bedoya's messages of enforcement included opposing a demilitarized zone inside Colombia, which guerrillas were seeking as a precondition for negotiations (Ronderos 1998); this policy stand is clearly a message of enforcement because it is a promise of making the military have a direct presence in that area of the country's territory.

Bedoya's messages of enforcement did not place much emphasis on being careful, however. In addition to his attention to enforcement messages, Bedoya frequently used generic messages that merely highlighted the problem of security or promised more

security. These messages, however, were firm against crime and violence, but they did not signal a willingness to be measured and deliberate in this firmness. For example, Bedoya used phrases such as saying that Colombia will achieve peace "with order and authority; arranging justice, prisons, and fighting against corruption; and authority for those who are outside of the law, unless they take advantage of all the pardons and amnesties that I will offer, they will suffer the full weight of the law" (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/22 "Paz"). Bedoya's messages were therefore ones of enforcement, but not a careful enforcement.

Uribe Used Careful Enforcement

Uribe followed in the footsteps of Bedoya in the sense that he also used enforcement messages heavily, but a key difference is that even though he campaigned in a context of even more severe problems of security, he made a careful enforcement the core of his security proposals, even though he did use some messages of punishment. Uribe called for a break from the negotiations of the Pastrana administration, and instead of defeating guerrilla groups through military means. He did not rule out a future negotiated settlement with guerrillas, but declared this a possibility only if the guerrillas were to declare a ceasefire (Dugas 2003: 1128; Kline 2009: 3). In addition, Uribe included many more messages about enforcement, proposing to double the size of the military and to create a civilian militia (Serafino 2002: 4). He also promised to increase military and police capacity, by extracting more money from the U.S. through Plan Colombia to fight drug traffickers (Serafino 2002: 5) and from the European Union to

fight terrorism (*El Tiempo* 2002 4/2 "Uribe pedirá a Europa"). These proposals reflected a view that a lack of state capacity was the root cause of many of these problems: even several years into Uribe's second term, the focus of pro-Uribe parties was increasing state control over all of Colombia's territory and seeking the resources necessary for this task (Benítez interview 2009). Furthermore, Uribe's proposals also included modernizing the weaponry and logistical technology of the police and military.

As Figure 5.2 shows, content analysis of reporting on Uribe's campaign suggests that approximately 31% of Uribe's issue attention was on security. Of his messages on security, the bulk of the messages were not merely generic messages highlighting the problems of crime and violence, but rather invoking messages specifically about enforcement: 27% were generic messages, 27% were punitive messages, and 45% were on enforcement.

Uribe actually used more punitive messages in 2002 than Bedoya did in 1998. He proposed an antiterrorism law that would increase the government's capability to detain people, and also to increase penalties for crimes such as vehicle robbery (*El Tiempo* 1998 5/14 "Candidatos hablan"). These proposals were not merely rhetoric, but genuine: after Uribe took office in 2002, the Colombian congress, under the control of pro-Uribe legislators, did pass anti-terrorist statutes and a flurry of other punitive legislation (Tickner and Pardo 2003; Qi 2004).

These punitive messages, while certainly a part of Uribe's proposals, were not the centerpiece of his security messages. When Uribe came to office, these punitive measures took a back seat to his general program of enforcement activity beginning in

2002 and 2003: enlarging the army; recruiting soldiers in villages to buttress the regular military; creating informer networks to help Colombian intelligence agents; increasing the military budget from 2.8 to 3.3 percent of GDP; and deploying tens of thousands of troops to departments in southern and eastern Colombia such as Amazonas, Caquetá, and Guaviare (Kline 2009: 39-48).



Figure 5.2 – Uribe's 2002 Use of Security and Messages on Security

On the campaign trail, Uribe's enforcement messages focused on more police powers, using state authority to "contain guerrillas," "control violence," and focusing on soldiers to fight guerrillas and capture paramilitaries. He talked about "applying"

security in the sense of unleashing enforcement activity by security forces: "What the country needs to do is to apply security and not to enter in these discussions [of demilitarized zones for guerrillas]," he declared (*El Tiempo* 2002 5/20 "Candidatos rechazan otro despeje").

At the same time, he promised that such activities would be done carefully. One of the major security points of his program was to "direct public order befitting of a democratic society in which public forces respect the popularly elected rulers" (Uribe 2002). This is clearly a message of careful enforcement: one that does not overstep its bounds, and which sees itself as bound clearly by the respect for law.

One of Uribe's especially controversial proposals was to have a United Nations force enter Colombia to maintain peace. This was often portrayed as wanting "foreign troops" on the ground. In fact, Uribe's initial intent with the proposal, according to his campaign chief Echeverri, was to do so because it would be a proposal that would have some credibility on human rights. Echeverri argued that Uribe proposed having troops from the United Nations because:

> "the *cascos azules* have a human rights mission and knew what was going on in the country. They had money, experience, international credibility, and international goodwill. So the international community would believe them." (Echeverri interview 2009b)

Uribe had high success on security while using messages of careful enforcement, while existing research would predict that only "mano dura" promises would win votes. This is not to say that Uribe avoided messages of punishment. The point is, rather, that

Uribe's resounding success centered heavily on enforcement, not punishment, and his messages promised a careful, controlled enforcement, not an unbridled enforcement like that of "mano dura" platforms. Instead, it was program of careful enforcement, with some punitive components.

Serpa: Losing Elections by Not Paying Attention to Security

Uribe's strong use of careful enforcement must be seen in direct contrast with the strategy set out by Serpa. Although Uribe made strong use of enforcement messages in 2002, Serpa largely failed to address security. He paid almost no attention to the issue in 2002. Yet he had already lost the 1998 election to Pastrana; then, in 1998, Serpa had campaigned on peace by noting his experience as a negotiator in a 1990 peace process (Boudon 2000), but did not discuss how he would improve individual security from politically violent groups. Pastrana campaigned on peace as well, laying out a conciliatory platform including social programs and dialogues with guerrillas and with paramilitary groups that allowed him to take the lead over both Serpa and Bedoya (Boudon 2000: 46).

Perhaps this loss in 1998 ought to have taught Serpa a lesson to focus more strongly on security when he ran again in 2002, but this loss did not change Serpa's campaign issue focus. Serpa's non-use of security in public on the campaign trail is striking because in private, Serpa apparently did have well-thought-out personal beliefs on public security that continued to evolve. According to the head of the Partido Liberal think tank, who knows Serpa well, Serpa did have ideas on security:

> "Serpa was in favor of exchange and negotiation with the FARC in 1998; then, in 2002, he was in favor of negotiation plus mano dura; then in 2006 was in favor of more mano dura." (Bustamante interview 2009)

In his 2002 campaign, Serpa focused on social issues and the peace process with the FARC. His emphasis on peace issues was different from that of security: he did not discuss the conflict in terms of how ending it would improve security for individuals, and did not talk separately on what else he would do to improve security. Serpa specifically chose not to talk tough about security, according to a regional Partido Liberal leader (Luis Fernando Gómez interview 2010), simply continued, as he had in 1998, to push for peace. This focus on socioeconomic issues and peace was in line with Serpa's previous strengths: Serpa had decades of experience in government, as a representative, senator, and in positions as various government ministers, and he had championed socioeconomic issues throughout his career.

Serpa refused to discuss security even in the face of advice from his campaign advisors and colleagues. Serpa's political advisor Ángel Becassino, a communications director from Argentina with experience advising other campaigns in Latin American countries, told Serpa that he had to raise issues of security or that he would lose to Uribe. Becassino continually told Serpa that he had to toughen up his talk on security (Luis Fernando Gómez interview 2010). Yet Serpa, in the words of a regional Partido Liberal manager, "was very stubborn." According to this regional director, Serpa declared that he "was a man with only one way of thinking" and claimed that it was against his

principles and couldn't change his message in the middle of the campaign (Luis Fernando Gómez interview 2010).

Serpa's continued refusal to use security became even more dramatic: his campaign advisor Becassino even attempted to tap Partido Liberal figures to plead with Serpa to talk up security. In March 2002, newly elected members of Congress took office, including a new crop of first-time Partido Liberal congressmembers. Becassino specifically sought out these new congressmembers and exhorted them, between then and the May 2002 election, to try to convince Serpa to begin talking about security as one of his campaign issues. As an example, Ramón Elejalde was one such Partido Liberal congressmember in 2002; he recounts trying to talk with Serpa and running into resistance from him. Despite the efforts of these other Partido Liberal figures, Serpa continued to refuse to campaign on security (Elejalde interview 2010).

Uribe's security messages on enforcement were highly effective in winning him votes. This was likely helped by Serpa's avoidance of the topic of security altogether, but the distribution of voters' preferences on security strategies favored Uribe, and support for him mirrored these preferences. In a January 2002 survey where Uribe led Serpa 40% to 31%, the top three mentions for priorities for the government included 47% mentioning combating the guerrillas and paramilitaries, which was the enforcement stand that Uribe took. Only 25%, in comparison, mentioned wanting to work for a negotiated peace, which was Serpa's stand toward ending the conflict with guerrillas. When it came to who was more trusted to combat these guerrillas and paramilitaries, 51% said Uribe and 25% said Serpa: this was not merely a reflection of voters who preferred Uribe

reflecting their vote intention back on their assessments of ability, for on assessments of who would be most trusted to improve education, Serpa, Uribe, and Noemí Sanín were all most trusted by equal portions of the population, at 27% each (Centro Nacional de Consultoría 2002). Although the survey results do not prove conclusively that people trusted Uribe much more on security specifically because of his messages of enforcement, these survey results do provide corroboration for the argument. This is especially the case because by this point in the campaign, both candidates' promised approaches to the conflict were well known, especially for Uribe, for whom his enforcement approach had been his main campaign plank since the fall of 2001.

Uribe's message of careful enforcement appealed specifically to many "dovish" voters. Although voters perceived him as the candidate most in favor of a military solution to the conflict rather than dialogue, their preferences were much closer to Serpa and Garzón than to Uribe. On a "dove-hawk" scale of 1 to 5, with "dialogue" being 1 and "armed means" being 5, voters placed themselves at 2.9, and placed Serpa at 2.7, Garzón at 2.8, and Uribe most hawkish at 3.4 (Hoskin, Masías and García 2011: 439). Yet despite this platform that made Uribe much more of a "hawk" than a "dove" than voters and other candidates, Uribe was able to pick up notable support from both ends of this spectrum. Among "hawks" Uribe led Serpa 74% to 9%. Support for Uribe was lowest among those who placed themselves at 4 on the scale: here, Uribe led only 56% to 34% for Serpa; support for him was also low among centrists and dovish moderates. Yet among "doves," those who placed themselves at a 1 on the 5-point scale, support for Uribe rose again to lead 72% to 13% for Serpa: that is, almost the same intensity of

support as hawks (Hoskin, Masías, and García 2011: 424). The strong support for Uribe among voters who considered themselves "doves" suggests the appeal of Uribe's careful enforcement among voters who actually may have paid closer attention to issues of human rights than other parts of the Colombian electorate.

Further evidence of voters' response to Uribe's strong use of careful enforcement can also be seen in the following example of how vote support was transferred directly from Uribe to Serpa in a city where voters were very concerned with security. This example is Serpa's September 2001 campaign visit to Neiva, in the department of Huila south of Bogotá. As recounted by former congressmember Elejalde, who had also served as a regional director of Serpa's 2002 campaign, Serpa had gone to Neiva and had been "received like a hero," with people in Neiva being strongly for Serpa (Elejalde interview 2010). Yet soon thereafter, Consuela Araújo, the wife of the attorney general, was killed by the FARC (Livingstone 2003: 91). This high-profile killing shifted public support against Serpa and dramatically in favor of Uribe. People demanded that something be done directly by the government to put an end to such assassinations. Within a month, it seemed as if "everyone in Neiva was for Uribe" (Elejalde interview 2010).

Voters continued to shift away from Serpa and toward Uribe through late 2001, as Pastrana's talks with the FARC continued to lack results. By the middle and third week of January 2002, polls placed Uribe as the front-runner. In late February 2002, Pastrana announced the end of talks and moved the military into the zone that he had once granted to the FARC. Even after Serpa sank to second place behind Uribe, he refused to emphasize security. Serpa demonstrates that there is clear variation in individual

candidates' propensity to use security. Uribe consistently used careful enforcement messages, but Serpa was personally opposed to discussing security in any sustained manner, resulting in a situation in which Uribe alone used such messages, and consequently won over voters from Serpa.

Gaviria: Missing the Point by Only Using Prevention

Gaviria, Uribe's main competitor for 2006, also allowed Uribe to lead on messages of careful enforcement. Interestingly, Gaviria refused to discuss security in any terms other than prevention. After a 2005 constitutional change permitted presidential re-election, Uribe ran for a second term by promising to continue the "seguridad democrática" policies of his first term. Gaviria, of the newly formed leftist Polo Democrático Alternativo, spent a good deal about of time critiquing Uribe's security policies, but not on grounds that would allow him to present a clear alternative program on security. Gaviria's campaign focused principally on socioeconomic issues. According to José Arnulfo Bayona, on the national committee of the Gaviria campaign, Gaviria's focus was about "80 to 90 percent" on socioeconomic issues (Bayona interview 2009).

Gaviria seems to have missed what motivated voters to be concerned about security. According to a 2006 consultant to the Gaviria campaign, Gaviria "very consistently criticized [Uribe's program of] democratic security" (Sánchez interview 2009). Yet Gaviria discussed security entirely in terms of prevention: solving poverty and inequality. Sounding in many ways like third-place 1994 candidate and ex-guerrilla

Antonio Navarro, who focused heavily on the socioeconomic roots of crime and violence (El Tiempo 1994 5/25 "Llegará"), in 2006 Gaviria cast any discussion of security in terms of needing first to address poverty and inequality. Gaviria also frequently mentioned "sovereignty" and declared that outside involvement from the U.S. on matters dealing with security, such as Plan Colombia, was merely an imposition from the U.S. that infringed on the "sovereignty" of Colombia. These concerns were not simply a rhetorical matter of declaring that something went against "sovereignty": rather, it was something about which leftists in Gaviria's campaign were deeply concerned. For example, a representative of Gaviria's primary campaign in the Polo Democrático Alternativo declared that the U.S. bases controversy of 2009 was simply a move by the U.S. "to have territorial control through [the fight against] drugs and terrorists" (Bayona interview 2009).

Gaviria's almost total focus on matters of inequality and freedom from foreign influence were at the core of his campaign. According to Hernando Gómez, the Bogotá regional chair for the Gaviria campaign, the idea of social equity was the main plank of the campaign that "ran through all twelve points" of Gaviria's platform (Hernando Gómez interview 2009).

Uribe's use of careful enforcement in 2006 also contrasted starkly with Gaviria's complete unwillingness to use messages of enforcement. Even toward the end of Gaviria's failed 2009 Polo Democrático Alternativo primary run for the 2010 election, a member of his national campaign committee noted:

> "There has not been a speech yet where Gaviria has talked about security. Instead, he talks about everything in terms of justice. Without justice, there can be no peace, that is the main idea of Carlos Gaviria's argument. He talked about sovereignty, not security." (Bayona interview 2009)

In sum, Uribe's highly successful 2002 campaign involved messages of careful enforcement, winning support from both "hawks" and "doves," and drawing voters away from Serpa, as the example of support in Neiva shows. Serpa's campaign was marked by his refusal to campaign on security at all, much less careful enforcement. This refusal persisted despite the exhortations of Serpa's own campaign advisor and of members in his own party. Given this inattention, when voters concerned about security needed to choose between Uribe and Serpa, they turned definitively to Uribe. In Uribe's re-election campaign, his competitor Gaviria's use of preventive messages instead of enforcement also allowed Uribe to shine as a clear example of high success using messages of careful enforcement, rather than promises of mano dura.

SANTOS: ALL ENFORCEMENT BUT A DIMINISHED LEAD

Santos' 2010 campaign shows that campaigning on careful enforcement can be very successful even without messages of punishment alongside it. Santos used messages of careful enforcement, providing assurances of continued security while emphasizing the protection of human rights. Like Uribe, centered his discussion of security on enforcement messages. Importantly, all of the major candidates for this election also took up security as an issue and did so through messages of enforcement.

This convergence of security policy proposals around careful enforcement strongly demonstrates the appeal of careful enforcement as a viable and appealing security message. The convergence even included two very different competitors of Santos at different parts of the campaign, Rafael Pardo and Antanas Mockus, thus demonstrating the appeal of careful enforcement. Unlike Uribe, however, Santos avoided messages of punishment, and took even greater steps to cast his plans as ones of careful enforcement. This example shows clearly the appeal of careful enforcement, and it is an appeal that does not require being paired with messages of punishment.

Security Gets Candidates Through the First Door

Practically all candidates incorporated some discussion of security for the 2010 campaign. Security remained an issue because guerrillas were still present, if much weakened, and crime continued to be a problem; the "paradox of success" was incomplete, meaning that the reduction of its profile as an issue was incomplete. The fact that so many discussed security would have given some opportunity for some of the many candidates at the time to raise messages of punishment rather than enforcement, to differentiate themselves from the crowd.

Instead, candidates stuck to promises of continuing Uribe's policies of enforcement. All the major candidates use messages of enforcement, although some toward the center and left also used some messages of prevention. Partido Conservador contenders Noemí Sanín and Andrés Felipe Arias jostled with each other and with Santos to represent the continuity choice for Uribe's policies. Germán Vargas Lleras of the

center-right Cambio Radical aimed to position himself to be seen as the candidate of "security plus," meaning a major focus on security but also attention to some social topics:

> "The campaign has been trying to get [Vargas] to be seen as, 'security plus.' That is, there are two doors into the election. Security gets you in the first door, but you need something else to get past the second door." (Villamizar interview 2010)

For the campaign of leftist Sergio Fajardo, a policy representative commented that Fajardo saw inequality and violence "as two things to do at once," meaning at the same time (Urrutia interview 2010). Even Gustavo Petro, of the leftist Polo Democrático Alternativo, showed a willingness to keep Uribe's enforcement policies, declaring in February 2010 that from that point onward, security ought to be a "national promise" in which he pledged to "continue and guarantee security policies, but with social equity" (*Semana* 2010 2/26 "Candidatos").

The mix of all issues used by Santos was broader than for Uribe and Bedoya, yet on the specific issue of security, Santos almost entirely used messages of enforcement. As Figure 5.3 shows, content analysis of news reporting suggests that by the end of his campaign, security formed only 18% of Santos's discussion of issues, but these were overwhelmingly messages of enforcement. Santos seemed to talk barely at all about punitive messages or preventive messages. Of his security messages, 89% were composed of enforcement messages.



Figure 5.3 – Santos' 2010 Use of Security and Messages on Security

Santos used enforcement messages by pledging continuity with Uribe's security policies, which he described as combining "an outstretched hand and a firm hand" ("la mano tendida y el pulso firme") (Santos Presidente 2010: 55). He linked himself tightly to Uribe, for example declaring, "I want to be the president of the [Colombian people] to defend the policy of democratic security and the legacy of president Uribe" (*Semana* 2010 2/26 "Candidatos"). He promised to be "implacable" in dealing with criminal bands and armed illegal groups (*El Tiempo* 2010 5/17 "Desplazamiento forzado"). Santos even cast enforcement as the solution to many related problems. For example, he said that the problem of forced displacement would be avoided "with more democratic

security" and proposed to create a coordinating center "for the fight against the organized bands, and the criminal gangs that plague our cities. We will strengthen justice in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism" (*El Tiempo* 2010 5/26 "Desplazamiento").

Santos also promised to tackle nonpolitical crime through enforcement rather than punishment. He proposed to establish a viceministry within the Ministry of Defense for the police, and to modernize the police especially in its capabilities for urban security (*El Tiempo* 2010 5/12 "Lucha contra el delito"). He also promised to promote getting the police to have a finer knowledge of their neighborhoods, with volunteers helping them (*El Tiempo* 2010 5/12 "Los retos"). In his official platform, Santos proposed more police with better logistical technology. In it, he also declared, "We will transform the strategy of the National Police to guarantee security in the cities," and proposed reforms similar to community policing: cooperation with neighborhood associations and businesses (Santos Presidente 2010: 55).

The low profile of punitive messages in Santos' campaign is notable. Tellingly, punishment was not promoted by Santos, even in the face of circumstances that could have allowed Santos to make use of punitive security messages. In 2009 and 2010, in parallel to the presidential campaign, there was a major proposed referendum that would have asked voters whether they wanted to allow the possibility of life sentences for those convicted of the murder or rape of children. The presence of this referendum suggests a continued demand, among certain segments of the public, for punitive policies, thus giving Santos an easy constituency to win over on security. Santos eventually came out saying that it would be a good idea (*El Espectador* 2010 4/24 "Santos asegura"), yet

beyond mentioning his support, he did not make it a part of his campaign platform. The Corte Suprema de Justicia eventually prohibited the holding of this referendum in May 2010, on technical grounds related to the documentation of the funding for the petition drive asking for the referendum (*Universal* 2010). Thus, although there was demand for some sort of punitive anti-crime policy among portions of the public, when it came to the presidential campaign, punitive messages were not common, and candidates instead focused fully on enforcement.

Notably, Santos accompanied his enforcement messages with strong promises that such enforcement could be trusted to avoid repression and respect human rights: in other words, to ensure that it would be a targeted enforcement, with only proper, legally prescribed punishment rather than extrajudicial punishment or excesses of force. Santos declares in his program, "Our security program is committed to the protection of Human Rights; we will maintain and strengthen the education and commitment of the agents of the armed forces and police. Examples will be made of those who violate Human Rights" (Santos Presidente 2010: 56).

Santos, furthermore, used his vice-presidential pick in part to present an image of a measured caretaker of human rights. He referred to his vice-presidential pick, Angelino Garzón, as "a leader with heart and social experience" (Santos Presidente 2010: 2). Reflecting Santos' portrayal of Garzón, in an opinion letter to *El Tiempo*, Colombia's largest newspaper and the newspaper owned by members of his extended family, Santos laid out his reasons for choosing Garzón. Santos not only underscored Garzón's leftist roots and his extensive past work for many government positions, but also Garzón's work

in human rights and his democratic background. As Santos wrote about Garzón he stated, "As ambassador in Geneva for the United Nations [...] he earned the respect of all the governmental and nongovernmental organizations concentrated in Switzerland and the organizations dedicated to workers' rights and human rights in general [...] We represent a new, modern stream of opinion" (*El Tiempo* 2010 3/14 "Por qué Angelino"). Santos' messages on security therefore placed himself squarely with enforcement messages, but also with strong statements about human rights in messages of careful enforcement, as a way to convince voters that repression would be avoided.

Pardo and Mockus Also Turned to Careful Enforcement

Santos' competitors Rafael Pardo and Antanas Mockus also staked out messages of careful enforcement. This embrace of security messages by these candidates would seem to serve as an example of campaign learning by the Colombian left. These competitors' used messages of enforcement, with extra emphasis on justice and human rights matters.

Rafael Pardo, the candidate of the Partido Liberal in the 2010 election, illustrates the gradual shift of the Colombian left toward addressing security through messages of enforcement. Pardo's campaign slogan, "Una Colombia más igualitaria," appealed to concerns of socioeconomic equality, with his top three issues being social security, education, and jobs. Pardo still "wanted the campaign to be a social [issue-emphasizing] campaign" (Fierro interview 2009), since the campaign's preparatory polls and focus groups found that in smaller cities and towns, people were more interested in these three

issues than in security, and it was principally in the larger cities where people were most interested in security. Although the campaign decided to have security points far down their platform, at points numbered 14 to 16 out of his twenty main points, Pardo was the first candidate from anywhere on the left side of the Colombian political spectrum to begin talking up issues of security.

Pardo called for a "post-Uribe" approach, rather than an "anti-Uribe" approach (Fierro interview 2009). Unlike many in the Colombian left who railed against Uribe's security policies, Pardo agreed that Uribe's policy had helped security in many ways. Instead, he declared that Uribe's policies would not eliminate all of the problem, and thus other policies beyond Uribe's security policies were needed. The Pardo campaign incorporated some points on security directly into Pardo's platform, especially safety from urban crime.

Pardo sought to make use of his former position in 1991 as the first civilian minister of defense since the 1950s, to burnish his reputation on security matters (Fierro interview 2009). In particular, Pardo's three main points related to security were: peace, urban security from common crime, and drugs. On peace, Pardo proposed enforcement and conciliation: the campaign maintained that Uribe's policies had made Colombia a country at war, and preferred a negotiating approach like that attempted under Pastrana.

Pardo's platform also drew much from Uribe's focus on enforcement, not just on guerrilla violence, but also on all other aspects of security. Most notably, his platform called for fighting guerrillas until they would negotiate, not being the first mover in negotiations. Even more, on urban security, Pardo also proposed enforcement. His

issues representative noted that the focus should not be just on guerrillas in the jungle, but also on urban areas to protect people from common crime, citing the fact that demobilized paramilitaries have turned into gangs and fueled crime in Medellín in 2009 (Fierro interview 2009). On drugs, Pardo also presented enforcement messages: noting that drugs fed political violence and crime, and proposed more cooperation with other South American countries and with the U.S. to deal with the problem.

Messages of careful enforcement came in full force in Santos' main 2010 competitor on the left, Antanas Mockus. Mockus represented the newly formed Partido Verde; his use of security kept the topic from being solely discussed by Santos' campaign. Importantly, his use of security attempted to place a special emphasis on human rights, making it a message of especially careful enforcement. Mockus' three main issues, a clear contrast for a leftist candidate, were education, clean government, and security. Mockus also used preventive messages, such as his party's slogan of "with education, anything is possible." Yet his enforcement messages plus his attention to human rights give him a position of targeted, careful enforcement.

Mockus' security proposals of "legalidad democrática" combined much of Uribe's "seguridad democrática" program with a focus on involving bringing past violators of human rights to trial for their crimes (see *El Espectador* 2010 4/19 "Mockus"). Mockus' use of a term ending with the word "democrática" marked it, like Santos' platform, as deriving from Uribe's own security policies. It co-opted messages of enforcement, combining what was popular about Uribe's policies while opposing what was unpopular with it among human rights circles. The introduction of the term

"legality" implied an attempt to co-opt the issue while showing his opposition to the "false positives" killings, trying to demonstrate a clear difference between himself and Santos on this matter. Mockus therefore co-opted enforcement, based on support for a selective continuation of Uribe's "democratic security" policies. Thus, by 2010, candidates on the left side of the Colombian political spectrum had begun to pay attention to security and to do so through messages of careful enforcement.

A definite shift can be seen in 2010, compared with the campaigns of 1998 and 2002. By 2010 all candidates were using messages of careful enforcement. Santos' promises of continuing Uribe's security policies involved messages of careful enforcement, but without any use of punitive messages. Even more, by 2010 the Colombian left had come to embrace the issue of security, using messages of careful enforcement while attempting to highlight their own brand of careful enforcement that focused on being especially observant of human rights.

CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS: ENFORCEMENT IS IN

The take-away point of this chapter is that winning votes on security in Latin America does not always require a "mano dura" platform. Rather, success can come through an entirely different message: that of careful enforcement, involving promises of deliberate enforcement by properly trained agents of the state to bring order in a way that respects basic rights. Enforcement, not punishment or prevention, was the central security message in 1998, 2002, and 2010. Rightist candidates, starting from Bedoya and

continuing to Uribe and Santos, eventually dropped a mix of enforcement and punitive messages in favor of enforcement alone. Leftist candidates started out ignoring the issue or only using preventive messages, but by 2010, even leftist candidates had come to use messages of careful enforcement. This dynamic contrasts not only with the success of punitive messages of U.S. presidential candidates in the 1960s and 1980s, but also with existing views of the dominance of "mano dura" security policies in Latin America.

Voters' worries about the potential for repression to occur led candidates to pitch enforcement in ways that alleviated these concerns, doing so through declarations that they would protect human rights. Santos especially exemplified these dynamics, yet Uribe made this careful pitch of enforcement as well.

The Colombian left's stunning failures to use enforcement messages for several election cycles brings up the question of why many leftist politicians in Latin America may have been so reluctant to discuss security. Serpa steadfastly refused to use enforcement in 2002, and so did Gaviria in 2006. Even Pardo, who wanted to talk about security, often sought to move away from it in favor of socioeconomic issues. Ideology may also be part of the cause. Leftists may see poverty as more pressing, or may treat problems of poverty as one of the root causes of crime; human rights violations that occurred during periods of repression may have made leftist candidates from older generations unwilling to use the activities of security forces against others, when it has been done to them. It took the left until Antanas Mockus, who did not have personal experience with repression, to embrace security in a full-fledged manner.

In the end, this chapter demonstrates that enforcement is "in" as a message that effectively sways voters. Unlike the past findings of other countries in the region, messages of careful enforcement can be the most electorally effective. These dynamics of the content of security messages make the experiences of advanced industrial democracies and those of Latin American countries distinct from one another.

CHAPTER 6: ISSUES AND ELECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Public security problems have turned security into one of the main issues of importance to voters throughout Latin America. These concerns have made the issue appear ripe for politicization, seemingly allowing presidential candidates to win office easily by seizing on the issue. As this study has shown, however, success on security is more contingent on specific conditions that allow candidates to overcome opponents' pressures about human rights and that alleviate voters' worries about the potential for repression. Rather than automatically occurring, sparking a transmission from voters' concerns to the effective use of the issue requires favorable circumstances.

This chapter pulls together the core findings, offers comparative perspectives grounded in other Latin American countries, reflects on the theoretical contributions of the study, and details future directions of research. It highlights the core findings and shows their application to four other Latin American cases. The chapter also shows that the findings of this study have many theoretical implications. Moving from close, direct impacts to broader, more indirect impacts, this project shows limitations of the sociological school of voting and suggests limits to rightists' ownership of issues of security. For the body of research on Latin American politics, it helps to explain recent patterns in leftist and rightist success in the region. It also demonstrates the importance of attention to changes in political culture in the comparative study of politics, and suggests key ways in which the results open up avenues for future research.

CORE FINDINGS

Ideas and values matter centrally in politics: the dynamics of public security as an issue show this strongly at work. This study has emphasized how human rights values, involving broad human rights discourse and an intolerance of repression, constrain the prospects for success on security by making it contingent on specific conditions. It criticizes current understandings of the topic that predict consistently easy use and winning of votes. Existing research overpredicts the viability of security as an issue in contemporary Latin America: instead, this study shows that conventional understandings now do not always apply. Human rights values combine with persistently low trust in security forces to make it easy for opponents to raise issues of human rights and to activate skepticism among voters that security programs can avoid repression. These dynamics make success dependent on favorable conditions, making contemporary Latin America different from Latin America's past and also different from advanced industrial democracies today.

These findings emerge from an analysis of presidential elections in Colombia. Specifically, this study examines the impact of conditions that affect candidates' ability to invoke the issue of public security and to gain votes in this way; the conditions are the products of the advance of human rights in the region. As chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate, certain conditions can impede use of the issue and additional conditions can affect the winning of votes once the issue is invoked. Chapter 3 shows how human rights values allow for two key conditions to affect issue use. The main point of the chapter is that diffuse security threats and the shadow of recent repression constrain candidates' use

of the issue in the first place, by allowing other candidates to bring up issues of human rights. Both the campaigns of Samper and Pastrana in 1994 illustrate the constraints placed by these conditions.

Chapters 4 and 5 show the conditions under which voters concerned about crime and violence become more likely to support security-focused candidates. Chapter 4 shows how human rights values lead to key conditions for winning votes: success is most likely for candidates with civilian backgrounds rather than military professionals, and for those who discuss security within a balanced mix of issues rather than focusing almost exclusively on it. The main point of chapter 4 is that military backgrounds and narrow approaches reinforce voters' skepticism about candidates, by priming worries about potential problems with human rights. Bedoya's initially high support might be expected by the conventional view on the politics of security, but instead, unfavorable conditions caused his support to fall in the long term.

Chapter 5 shows how human rights values lead the content of security messages to affect winning votes. The main point of chapter 5 is that winning votes can be done using careful enforcement messages, rather than the "mano dura" messages uncovered in other analyses of Latin American security campaigning. Rather than punishment and unbridled enforcement being the path to winning votes, enforcement coupled with promises to guarantee human rights can be a winning security message.

These factors are different items that affect the prospects for security on the campaign trail. They are all manifestations of the spread of human rights making campaigning on security harder. Campaigning on security requires favorable conditions

just to keep the topic in the political spotlight. These conditions serve as structural constraints that affect the opportunities to bring up issues of security; if conditions are favorable, candidates are in a position to act and take advantage of these opportunities, whereas if conditions are unfavorable there are fewer opportunities for candidates to exploit. Even then, winning votes requires a firm hand but not an authoritarian hand, with a modern face that promises careful enforcement while broadly campaigning on many issues in addition to security. Not just any politician can decide to campaign on security and expect to win, not even when rampant crime and violence leave voters frightfully concerned. "Law and order" appeals and "scare tactics" are not always successful, meaning that the candidates who are doing it successfully should be seen as doing something "correct" in how they campaign.

This in-depth study of Colombia shows that success can become difficult in the face of directly competing considerations of human rights. Human rights values do not cancel out desires for security; people certainly want something to stop crime and violence, and candidates' hard discourse on crime often resonates with voters. Yet for security to succeed widely as an issue, there must be campaigning that ameliorates the effects of these overlapping concerns, notably promises of a "careful crackdown" that is deliberate and targeted.

Several surprising findings unearthed from this study's examination of Colombia are worth underscoring. Bedoya, the former commander of the armed forces who was very successful in his military operations, could not convince voters that he was well rounded enough in his campaign platform to be able to rise to the presidency. Also

surprising, Serpa's principal stumble in losing to Uribe was his stubborn refusal to shift away from the socioeconomic issues that he had championed throughout his career, unwilling to compromise by discussing non-socioeconomic issues such as security. Serpa's campaign, involving his rejection of security issues as a result of wanting to maintain his issue reputation and ideological coherence, shows how there is truly individual variation in the degree to which different candidates are willing to discuss security. Clearly, candidates vary in their willingness to talk up security, and even though Bedoya, Uribe, and Santos were disposed to doing so and ended up using the issue centrally, their success was dependent in part on how much their competitors were willing to use the issue as well. It is when candidates would seem to benefit so much from campaigning on security, yet do not do so, which is the most notable example of difficulty in success. The examples of Pastrana and Samper show this dynamic.

Another notable substantive finding is that Uribe's leveraging of his progressive past helped him to burnish an image of being more attentive to human rights and respectful of democratic processes. This shows precisely how successful security candidates are those who present a democratic face instead of one that would lead to fears of authoritarian rule and a suppression of human rights. Uribe promised a "firm" hand rather than "hard" hand in 2002 and 2006, and similar phrasing of a "firm" hand has since been used by other candidates such as Sebastián Piñera in Chile in 2009-2010 and Laura Chinchilla in Costa Rica in 2010.

Santos shows the complex interplay of using the issue and winning votes: he started with security as his main issue by far, but could talk less forcefully because of

pressure by other politicians about human rights. His careful rhetoric, including having to say that he and his vice presidential pick Garzón, represented a new, modern stream of opinion is a key shift from security promises in other Latin American campaigns of favoring an unbridled crackdown on crime and violence. Yet early in the campaign, Santos was not as successful at winning votes on security because of his narrow focus on the issue. After falling behind his main competitor, he then changed tack to talk about these other issues.

This study has a clear contribution for the analysis of elections: offering a straightforward, concrete understanding of ongoing Latin American campaigns and elections. Many countries with rampant crime and violence have many voters concerned with security. Rather than assuming that in such countries, candidates will make security a central campaign theme, this study provides a framework for analyzing each campaign. Analysts should first ask: are security threats organized and has the recent past been free of repression? Then, for each candidate who does use the issue, analysts should ask: what kind of candidate is campaigning, someone with a military career or a civilian? Does the candidate include a broad base of issues in addition to security? Finally, what kind of message on security is this candidate staking out? This highly contextual way of thinking about the campaigns in Latin American presidential elections is certainly not as simple as the findings of current research. Yet in just a few steps, it provides a much closer fit.

This study also presents direct practical contributions for politically attuned voters who are concerned about crime and violence in their countries. Those who want just

anybody to crack down on crime and violence, due to their personal desperation with these problems, should know that the candidates who most stand a chance to be elected on the issue are civilians with a restrained approach to security and a balanced attention to many other issues: in other words, not just anybody. Such individuals questing deeply for security might best spend their efforts not by supporting the candidacy of hard-line military professionals who may single-handedly focus on security or propose punitive solutions to security, but rather by strategically supporting civilians who stand a better chance of being elected. Even more, if candidates are not even focusing on security as an issue, perhaps security-starved individuals should consider that an improvement in human rights might be a prerequisite for allowing the issue to be addressed politically head-on.

For political leaders and policymakers, there are also concrete implications. Although this work does not examine the crime control effectiveness of various security policies, it does shed practical light on these proposals' political viability. It is clearly of "brass tacks" political use to know that the punitive policies that have proved so popular in medium-crime contexts actually are not perceived in high-crime contexts as being able to do the trick. Regardless of the difference in effectiveness of measures involving enforcement compared with those that involve punishment or prevention, it is important for policymakers to know that truly high crime situations may require more attention to enforcement, even in contexts of low trust in security forces. Policymakers who prefer enforcement-based solutions to crime and violence should be heartened by the evidence which suggests that demand for such policies increases among the public as crime and

violence grow ever more dire. In contrast, policymakers who prefer policies that focus on punishment of criminals and violent actors may need to prepare themselves for greater difficulties in convincing the public.

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES: ADDITIONAL LATIN AMERICAN CONTEXTS

This study has focused on campaigns within Colombia, yet the theoretical framework applies to broader Latin American contexts. In this section, the key conditions affecting success are shown at work in four cases beyond Colombia demonstrating that the findings are more widely applicable, and eliminating additional rival explanations. These cases are drawn from Brazil in 2002, Guatemala in 2007 and 2011, and Chile in 2009-2010.

Their selection satisfies three important criteria. First, these contexts shadow the Colombia cases in that they feature extensive concerns about security, making them all cases that existing research would predict should have ready success on security. Security was a pressing concern in each country: the most important matter to 32% of voters in Guatemala in 2007 and 30% in 2011 (Borge y Asociados 2007; Latinobarómetro 2011), 35% in Chile (LAPOP 2008), and although somewhat lower at 21% in Brazil (Costa 2002), still so substantial that existing research would predict steady use of security.

Second, the cases include the full range of conditions affecting success. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Serra in Brazil in 2002 are cases of recent repression and

relatively diffuse threats. These conditions inhibit the use of security in the first place, leading these cases to represent the lowest success on security. Otto Pérez Molina in Guatemala 2007 represents a case of strong issue use but largely unfavorable conditions for winning votes, rendering his campaign a case of low success. His 2011 bid for the presidency involved a mix of favorable and unfavorable conditions for winning votes, making his campaign a case of medium success. Sebastián Piñera in Chile in 2009-2010 represents a case of strong issue use, a favorable candidate background, a balance of security with other issues, and using enforcement messages. All the conditions in the theoretical framework were favorable, resulting in the highest level of success.

Third, the strikingly different countries in which these campaigns take place represent a wide variety of contexts within Latin America. Brazil, with a population of almost 200 million and an area eight times the size of Colombia, is by far the largest country of Latin America by population and area; Guatemala, in contrast, has a population of 13 million and an area one-tenth that of Colombia. Of Chile's 17 million people, its urban population, unlike Colombia, is centered distinctly around a single metropolitan area; its area, slightly smaller than that of Colombia, has its northern and southern extremes spread about the same distance apart as it is from Anchorage to Honolulu. Within Latin America, Chile is relatively wealthy, with a current GDP per capita similar to that of Malaysia; Guatemala is relatively poor, similar to Sri Lanka. Brazil has particularly sharp geographical contrasts in wealth: its richest states are as wealthy as Chile and its poorest states are much poorer than Guatemala as a whole. These three cases therefore contrast with Colombia in important ways, and differ from

each other in other notable ways. By including such variety among these three settings, the selection of Brazil, Guatemala, and Chile constitutes a "different systems" approach. Building off this study's Colombia-based chapters and its "most similar systems" approach, this section's illustration of security campaigning in these three widely varying contexts suggests that the conditions presented in those chapters remain valid across a diversity of contexts.

In Brazil, confounding factors might also make campaigning less likely than in Guatemala or Chile: Brazil is large and its federal government is less responsible for public security than are unitary national governments. Yet the importance of these conditions can still be seen. Security threats were diffuse: individual criminals or small groups of individuals in the poor areas of major cities. Furthermore, there was recent repression: rampant police brutality in Brazil, including widespread killings of mere suspects, had not declined after the 1985 end of military rule. Instead, they continued at a rate considered high even when compared with other Latin American countries (Brinks 2008: 43-44). These killings peaked in the late 1990s, then increased sharply again in 2001 (Ahnen 2007: 153).

Consequently, representatives of Amnesty International, concerned with the state of human rights in Brazil, met with Lula, Serra, and two additional candidates, Anthony Garotinho and Ciro Gomes, to ask them to address human rights whenever they talked about the issue. This pressure even managed to invert candidates' attention to issues: without mentioning security, or barely mentioning it, these candidates then promised to respect human rights (*Folha* 2002 9/19 "Anistia"; *Globo* 2002 9/19 "A campanha";

Globo 2002 9/21 "O dia"). Recent repression further led Serra to focus on human rights in a way that impeded his use of public security. Unlike his later presidential run in 2010, in 2002 Serra discussed public security as a matter that would simultaneously require the protection of human rights (*Folha* 2002 8/16 "Leia").

Lula may have been more interested in security than the rest of his Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), but his use of it was minimal. He called for the issue to be discussed in presidential debates (Bitencourt 2007: 183) and endorsed a report on security that the PT's think tank produced (Hinton 2006: 197; Ruy 2008). Yet the PT was focused on human rights related to repression, not security: during the campaign, the party focused on securing indemnity money from repression during the military dictatorship (*Folha* 2002 9/13 "PT pretende ampliar").

Diffuse threats limited the use of security for Lula and Serra. These candidates had only limited discussion of security, even after two of the most shocking, high profile crimes of the year. The murder of a mayor in São Paulo state, Celso Daniel, led outgoing president Fernando Henrique Cardoso to declare a need for a war against crime (*Latin American Regional Report* 2002). Yet candidates did not seize on it. Only Lula spoke on it, calling for an investigation but not linking it to his campaign (*Globo* 2002 1/19 "Mobilização"). Then, the kidnapping and murder of reporter Tim Lopes at the hands of drug dealers was reported on substantially, leading security to rise above the economy as voters' top concern in June (Bitencourt 2007: 183). Despite this high-profile killing, only Serra seized on the murder, proposing to double the federal police in size. Notably, however, he did not make anyone the target of this discussion of security: he did not

propose cracking down on anyone (see *Globo* 2002 6/11 "Festa na política"). Even more, during this time, the other candidates continued to focus on economic issues.

Pérez in Guatemala in 2007 is a case of strong issue use and taking the lead on enforcement, but with an unfavorable candidate background and excessive attention to security, leading to medium success. Pérez ended a second election round trailing 47% to 53%, and he did poorly among security-concerned voters: analysis of poll data for that election show that, in a poll that had him trailing 14.7% to 38.8% for Colom among voters overall, those concerned foremost about security only supported him 15.3% to 36.5% (LAPOP 2010).

By this time in Guatemala, past repression still cast a dark shadow, but was becoming less uniformly prominent. The 1960-1996 civil war produced many human rights violations that were most intense in the 1970s and 1980s, and was the strongest in the countryside. In Guatemala City, however, where crime had since become most intense, the brutal repression of the civil war had been slightly less intense. Álvaro Colom, Pérez's competitor, repeated assertions by international human rights organizations that Pérez had been involved in political assassinations (Roig-Franzia 2007). As was the case with Bedoya, however, these allegations against Pérez could not be backed up by clear proof. Furthermore, there were organized security threats, and Pérez pointed directly to them as clear targets in his campaign. Gangs had become responsible for much of the crime in Guatemala. In his campaign, Pérez mentioned gangs extensively to emphasize security (Benson, Fischer, and Thomas 2008). Among his proposals were to use "states of exception" to fight crime, arguing that these measures

would "reduce the actions of youth gangs and retake control of neighborhoods" (Seijo and González 2007).

Pérez did not purely use enforcement proposals, but also included punitive measures; in fact, his "mano dura" platform was driven home by a campaign symbol of a clenched fist (Krause 2009). Pérez proposed increasing the military's involvement against crime, and reinstating civil patrols that were used in the 1982-1983 dictatorship. More controversially, he proposed a punitive measure, bringing back the death penalty, but the bulk of his proposals were centered on enforcement. Colom also used enforcement messages, but much less than did Pérez. Instead of focusing his security messages overwhelmingly on enforcement, as Pérez did in 2007, Colom's main security message was that "violence should be combated intelligently," implying enforcement combined with social programs and judicial reforms (Jasper and Cook 2008).

Pérez's career background and mix of issues, however, were not so favorable. First, his military background compromised his electoral support. Even though many of his supporters backed him fervently, his military past raised concerns about authoritarian government. Pérez pointed to his career as a general to show that he could confront crime (Sonnleitner 2007), yet his loss to Colom was widely considered to be a rejection of what many voters saw as a return to power of the military (CIDOB 2008). At this time, many people in Guatemala continued to worry about building up the military, and voters continued to consider Pérez as closely linked with the military. Among voters who could say what "the worst thing you see" about Pérez was, 29% pointed to him being a "military figure," much more than the 10% who said that he was "overbearing"

(Borge y Asociados 2009: 12). Human rights organizations within Guatemala, such as the Coordinadora de Organizaciones Civiles, launched a campaign "not to vote for military" figures (Arrazola 2007). Pérez attempted to loosen this liability of his military background: he portrayed himself as committed to democracy by underscoring his role in the 1990s peace talks, and attempted to nickname himself "the general of peace" (Arrazola 2007; Krause 2009). Yet Pérez was unable to run away far enough from this background: Colom continued to point to Pérez's military career as a way of painting Pérez as incapable of committing to democracy (Sabino 2007).

Pérez's almost exclusive focus on security during his 2007 election campaign further weakened his support. He briefly took on topics such as development, education, and health (Font and Méndez 2007; Jasper and Cook 2008), but remained focused almost entirely on security, even in the second round against Colom (Sabino 2007; Sonnleitner 2007). Pérez's continued narrow focus appeared repetitive (Sabino 2007), despite using catchy jingles and flashy commercials skillfully to promote his focus on security (see Reuters 2007). Toward the end of the campaign, many people began to criticize Pérez for his singular attention to the topic (Sonnleitner 2007).

Pérez's election to the presidency in 2011 counts as a case of medium success: he had a military background, but a broader mix of issues. Pérez continued to suffer from reaction against his military background, but voters responded positively to his newly expansive message that included other topics. Pérez had more successful use of security in 2011 than in 2007; in his 54% to 46% victory over Manuel Baldizón, 38% of his supporters choose him specifically because of his stand on security (*Prensa Libre* 2011).

Pérez's focus on security continued in his 2011 campaign as it had in 2007, also by targeting the threat of organized crime specifically (Núñez 2011); for much of the time between 2007 and 2011, Pérez continued to voice his opinions on security matters in Guatemala. Yet his 2011 campaign, despite continuing to use "mano dura" messages as he had in 2007, was a clear departure from the narrow focus on security that had earned him such criticism in 2007 (Abellán 2011). This time, Pérez coupled security with promises of ambitious economic growth, and also campaigned on transparency, corruption, and hunger (Elías 2011; Núñez 2011). Compared with the 38% of Pérez voters who did so because of his security proposals rather than other issues or personal qualities, a notable 10% of Pérez voters did so because of his social proposals (*Prensa Libre* 2011). At the same time, some people continued to reject Pérez because his military background signified anti-democratic tendencies, despite his continuing efforts to show his commitment to democracy (Elías 2011).

In Chile, Piñera's 2009-2010 campaign represents a case of the highest success. Conditions were favorable for Piñera to use security. Past repression was less prominent. Repression during the 1973-1990 Pinochet dictatorship was even more intense than it had been under Brazil's dictatorship, and critics drew attention to Piñera's ties with the Pinochet era, comparing his security proposals directly with the activities of the dictatorship (Margotta 2010). Yet public remembrance and attention to this repression, much stronger in previous Chilean presidential elections, had faded with time. Limited repression allowed Piñera to use security even though threats in Chile were diffuse. One of the major points in his platform, in addition to "We Will Defeat Crime," was "Frontal

Combat Against Drug Trafficking". As an example of this direct use, one of Piñera's television advertisements about security featured a vignette about an individual's experience with repeated crime. The advertisement then showed Piñera criticizing the judgment of his competitor, ex-president Eduardo Frei, for pardoning drug traffickers during Frei's previous 1994-2000 term, and finished by highlighting Piñera's proposal to put 10,000 more police on the streets (*La Nación* 2009 11/29 "Piñera critica a Frei").

Piñera used his civilian background to convince voters that he would protect human rights. He talked about security with careful language similar to that of Uribe. Making use of his successful business background (Luna and Mardones 2010), Piñera's television advertisement on crime showed him leading a businesslike roundtable of his aides and declaring, "We will combat drug trafficking with all the force in the world, with a firm and intelligent hand" (Piñera 2009). These careful words attempted to counteract doubts about human rights, such as Frei's focusing on Piñera's sympathies with the Pinochet dictatorship (Canales and García 2010; *La Nación* 2010). By using this careful language rather than slogans such as the "hard hand urgently needed" that Pérez used in Guatemala (Krause 2009), Piñera positioned himself as a new, modern face of public security.

Also, Piñera had a robust issue base involving a broad mix of issues. He complemented his heavy focus on security with a strong emphasis on job creation and a promise to maintain outgoing president Michelle Bachelet's commitment to social programs (Luna and Mardones 2010). His "75 Commitments to Chile" platform placed his proposals for jobs in front of his proposals for security. Consequently, voters

perceived him as competent not just on security, but also on these topics. On education and health, Chileans' second and third biggest concerns in 2010, 34% of Chileans surveyed trusted Piñera more than Frei. On security and jobs, Piñera was seen as better by 44% and by 42% of voters, respectively, compared with only 20% who saw Frei as better on these issues (Centro de Estudios Públicos 2009). Piñera's perceived capability to handle education and health was narrower than for other topics, with 34% each trusting Piñera the most and over twenty percent each trusting Frei the most. Yet on security he was trusted over Frei by 44% to 20%, and on jobs he was favored 42% to 20% (CEP 2009). Piñera therefore not only owned the issue of security but also avoided ceding to Frei the issue of jobs.

Furthermore, Piñera strongly used enforcement messages. Piñera's proposals for an increased police force meant that he had a clear enforcement message. On the other hand, Frei did not focus on security, instead campaigning on education, social programs, and largely continuing incumbent president Michelle Bachelet's policies (see *Cooperativa* 2009; *Tercera* 2009).

As a result, Piñera took the clear lead on messages of careful enforcement, and support for him on security and in general was strong. In a poll where Piñera led Frei 44% to 37%, his lead among voters most concerned with crime widened substantially, leading 49% to Frei's 30% (Centro de Estudios Públicos 2009); in another poll where Piñera led Frei 46% to 32% overall, his lead among those most concerned with crime widened further, leading 55% to 26% (LAPOP 2010).

These brief comparative analyses corroborate the main findings of this study, and suggest that its arguments are more broadly applicable. Throughout Latin America, human rights constrain the prospects for the successful use of security. These constraints can be seen across the region, in diverse contexts within Latin America. In the end, these dynamics apply not only to the contexts of Colombian presidential campaigns, but rather to the region more widely.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

This study's results have important theoretical implications. Starting from the most direct to the most wide-ranging, these implications are discussed in the following sections. First is a direct implication of the findings of this study: a critique of the sociological school of voting. Second is a finding of reduced assurance of issue ownership. Despite the advantage that rightist candidates usually have on security, portions of this study have uncovered ways in which ownership by rightists is no longer so secure. Third is a demonstration of the influence of changes in political culture, affirming that certain aspects of political culture can change somewhat quickly and thus produce relatively quick shifts in political dynamics. As an added implication, this work also improves the understanding of the recent rise of leftist presidents in Latin America, a topic that has received notable interest in the study of politics in the region.

The Sociological School of Voting

First, the most direct of these implications is that this study represents a critique of the sociological school of voting (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1994). In this school of voting, society can be split into groups based on identities that affect their interests, which shape their preferences on new matters that arise in their economy or society, for example, whether to build a particular bridge, levy a new tax, investigate a particular scandal, or crack down on crime and violence. Politicians are seen as picking up on these matters, and then voters choose the candidates who represent the societal group on their side of the divide.

If the sociological school's perspective were applied to the issue of public security, the result would be the presumed ease of success that existing research on security has found. The sociological school would predict that the topic would emerge as an issue when groups in society become concerned dramatically about crime and violence. Accordingly, people vote for candidates on that basis, choosing candidates who clamor the most to deal with these problems.

In contrast, by stressing particular conditions for success, this project shows that concerns about crime and violence do not lead automatically to the politicization of these issues. These findings suggest that the sociological school's perspective has particular limitations, in particular by assuming that when issues arise, no considerations can interfere with them. In fact, this study shows that interests can come into direct conflict: in this case, security problems are undercut by human rights considerations.

Consequently, the basis for candidates' discussion or for voters' electoral choices becomes less straightforward.

The findings of this project also expose some limitations of other schools of voting behavior, namely the "rationalist" and "psychological" schools. These schools of voting do not make direct predictions about the ease of success on security, but nevertheless the findings of this study demonstrate some important limitations of these approaches. The rationalist school, which is the framework employed in spatial voting, predicts voting based on comparisons of candidates' proposals with voters' issue preferences (Downs 1957; Key 1966). Yet this school cannot explain why security-concerned voters would avoid voting for candidates who make elections centrally about security, especially when such candidates' security policies are in line with their preferences.

The psychological school predicts voting based on attitudes toward given political parties and other political movements. In this view, psychological attachment to the labels affiliated with such groupings, namely party identification, affects voters' choices of candidate (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Bartels 2000). This perspective would attempt to explain away a lack of vote support on security by claiming that security concerns were mostly among voters who identified with parties other than that of the most security-focused candidate. Yet this project shows the limitations of this view: concerns about security cut across these partisan lines fairly squarely in Colombia, meaning that security arose as an issue and was made into the basis for voters' choices, even where security concerns cut across partisan lines.

Rather than a wide-open world where candidates respond to the matters in which society is interested, as the sociological school of issue emergence portrays, voters' human rights values and beliefs about security forces can constrain what politicians can promise in their campaigns. These obstacles therefore show how the complexities of public opinion constrain electoral politics. These findings suggest a modification of the sociological school of voting to recognize that social cleavages depend not only on core interests, but also voters' values and beliefs. In the balance between values and immediate interests, values often play a critical role.

In this sense, constructivist frameworks in political science provide some useful insight. Certainly, not everything is socially constructed: some level of crime, however low, would seem to be a precondition for a security focus. Yet the focus of this study is to show that it is often difficult for security to be a viable campaign issue, and the explanation for such a state of affairs is rooted in values and norms. In this case, actors' interests are certainly constructed differently by changes in intersubjective beliefs (see Finnemore and Sikkink 2001): voters' and politicians' increasing commitment to human rights values makes them behave in ways that embody human rights as an end in itself. Support for the protection of basic liberties therefore occurs, even though it may not be guaranteed to improve their well-being directly (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Voters' desires for basic protections keeps them from allowing just any potential solution to security. Voters increasingly pay attention to these considerations, even if they feel that they personally will not be harmed by any arbitrary use of authority. Meanwhile, candidates increasingly recognize that voters care about such protections.

Issue Ownership

This study not only has direct implications for the various schools of research on vote choice, it also has direct implications for research on issue ownership. Since this study has so closely examined an issue that voters often deeply associate with rightist candidates in particular, rather than candidates across the ideological spectrum, there are important theoretical implications of this body of research.

The results of this study suggest limits to rightists' dominance over issues of security by showing how such ownership may be leased more easily. The examination of content-related conditions in chapter 5 confirms a broader point about present knowledge of how issues are leased: advantage over an issue can be tilted away from its traditional owners by using a different type of message. This findings of this study suggest that enforcement messages, not punishment, may be useful in seizing the advantage on the issue of security, or at least in diminishing others' ownership of the issue. The way in which issues are framed affects voters' perceptions of the issue and the support given to various candidates on that issue (Chong 1996). This study's finding of successful campaigning through messages of enforcement differs from current work on framing in terms of prevention (see Holian 2004).

This study also shows further ways in which candidates can "lease" away ownership of the issue of security. The campaign conditions from chapter 4 show that rightists often campaign in ways that reduce voters' trust in them to handle the issue: being too narrow on security can actually backfire in getting voters to trust them on security. Also, having a background that does not sit well with voters' concerns on

human rights may result in a decrease in success on the issue rather than an increase, thereby defying traditional expectations of the sources of issue ownership. Ownership often comes from long-standing support from constituencies that are related to the issue (Petrocik 1996), such that candidates and parties supported by the military are seen by existing research as more trusted on the issue. This project shows that support from the military does not always help candidates gain ownership over the issue of security. Although military backgrounds burnish candidates' perceived ability to handle security threats, these backgrounds, including vociferous support from military constituencies such as the support for Bedoya under the call that he "will always be our general," heighten fears about human rights and drive away support.

All in all, when candidates had unfavorable backgrounds or campaign approaches, their success on security was limited. Some caution is needed in drawing implications from these findings, since rightist candidates still were more trusted than their leftist competitors on the issue, for all the campaigns studied. Nevertheless, even though ownership of security was not taken away completely from rightist candidates, these conditions did reduce rightist candidates' lead on how well trusted they were to handle the issue.

For Latin American countries, the implications arising from these findings may be particularly useful. Since the constituencies that support different political parties give voters clues as to whom to trust on any given issue (Petrocik 1996), in many Latin American parties where party systems are not institutionalized and parties rise and fall more frequently, rightist ownership of security may be even less secure. More broadly,

this study suggests the possibility that other issues, whether owned by the right or the left, may also not be as securely in the hands of either rightists or leftists, thereby suggesting much need for further innovation in the body of research on issue ownership.

Change Through Political Culture

This study underscores the importance of relatively quick change in political culture, involving the construction and spread of norms of behavior and the resulting changes in how politicians and voters conceive of what is acceptable in their societies. Cultural factors are certainly an adequate explanation of only certain kinds of political phenomena. Yet as this study makes clear, rapid changes in culture can have important political effects that become visible over a compressed period of time. This change in values has shifted some of the campaigning and policies that are politically possible in contemporary politics. This study therefore provides a clear example of how changes in political values strongly affect patterns of politics, and is an example of such change having political effects outside of the set of advanced industrial democracies.

The heart of the argument invokes a broad change in political values in recent decades. Voters' shift toward intolerance of repression and political actors' acceptance of human rights rhetoric in public discourse demonstrate notable cultural change. When existing political science perspectives on political culture argue that it is not very useful as a primary explanatory factor (see Elkins and Simeon 1979), often they are characterizing such culture as something relatively static and unchanging within the polities that are being examined. Furthermore, studies that invoke political culture often

attribute cross-regional differences in culture to long-standing belief systems that have been stable for hundreds of years or longer (see Putnam 1993; Inglehart and Carballo 1997). Research that focuses principally on cross-regional variation, and which bases any explanations on such long-standing differences in political culture, is often unable to provide a convincing explanation if outcomes then later change.

This study, instead, demonstrates the value of culture-based research in political science that places explanatory power on modern changes in political culture, and that focuses on a single region. Such changes within a region over time, not cross-regional variation, should be highlighted as a key focus of social science research involving political culture. Although many aspects of culture are relatively stable, this study emphasizes that some aspects of culture can undergo faster changes. In fact, certain elements of culture do change relatively quickly (Eckstein 1988). For example, in the United States in a span of 50 years, voters' attitudes about topics such as racial equality and gender equality have changed dramatically (see Schuman 1997; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Consequently, this study affirms the existence of relatively quick changes in political culture, and shows that such shifts can be very influential in altering certain political dynamics.

Left and Right in Latin America

As an added implication, this study has important impacts on current research on the electoral prospects of the left and right in Latin American politics. Certain findings

from this study may have much to say to contribute to this area of research, especially on the prospects of future election for the left and right.

Throughout the 2000s, much of the research on Latin American electoral politics came to focus on the dramatic series of leftist presidents being elected in many countries of the region. The body of research on it grew voluminously to match the striking rapidity of the trend, producing research documenting newly elected leftist leaders' ideological orientations (Petkoff 2005; Castañeda 2006); governing styles (Valenzuela and Dammert 2006; Conaghan 2008; Cameron 2009); policies (Lozano 2005; Tussie and Heidrich 2008; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010); and in particular, the causes of this new electoral trend and the prospects for its maintenance.

According to the line of research on the reasons for this trend, the rise of leftist presidents in the region has been driven by longstanding inequality amidst deep poverty (Panizza 2005; Cleary 2006; Seligson 2007), alongside reaction against market-oriented economic policies (Baker and Greene 2011). The pacted democratic transitions of the 1980s are now several decades past; after the demise of leftist authoritarian regimes in eastern Europe, formerly radical leftist Latin American parties became pro-democratic, allowing leftists to win election by taking on socioeconomic problems (Cleary 2006). Consequently, according to this line of work, socioeconomic issues have become dominant in the region and few topics can challenge these issues (Cleary 2006; Arnold and Samuels 2008): seemingly, not even public security.

This study provides rich insight into many interesting aspects of this recent trend. It helps to explain why in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many Latin American

presidential elections did not feature security as a major campaign topic, and why candidates were largely not elected on security even though crime and violence were rampant throughout the region. During that time period, security threats were frequently more diffuse, with the exception of several cases with long-standing political violence. Other organized security threats, such as threats from gangs or drug traffickers, were not yet as severe. The prevailing body of research on security, which suggests frequent success, cannot explain this pattern.

These findings also explain why, since the late 2000s, the trend of rightists being elected in Latin America on public security has seemed to accelerate somewhat. Human rights violations have often been dealt with as a matter of the past: new generations of voters, who were not witness to the intense repression of the 1960s and 1970s authoritarian regimes, have been entering the electorate. More recent spates of repression and human rights abuses in the region have sometimes been cleaned up. Also, in certain countries, crime and violence have increasingly been perpetrated by potently organized threats. Even more, the candidates who campaign on security have increasingly been civilians rather than former military or authoritarian figures: modern faces with firm hands rather than hard hands. This pattern is something that the current research on the wave of electing leftist presidents cannot explain.

Furthermore, despite showing how security is not an easy topic, the findings also show the limits of economic issues in Latin America. Existing research on the rise of the left purports that socioeconomic issues are naturally dominant in the region and can now be used by leftists to dominate presidential elections (Cleary 2006; Arnold and Samuels

2008). Yet this characterization carries a key implication about public security as an issue. Rather than resulting from unfavorable conditions for using security, low use of public security is merely due to socioeconomic issues' dominance, according to such views. Instead, this project suggests strongly that socioeconomic issues do not enjoy a naturally dominant status in the region. Rather, the low use of security by many campaigns during the 1990s and 2000s has been due to unfavorable conditions for using security, and not the dominance of economic issues. Socioeconomic issues, as a result, may not have the complete dominance that has been described as characterizing politics in the region.

FUTURE RESEARCH

The future research questions raised by the results of this study are important. The first line of research is to assess the applicability of the study in the full range of contexts within Latin America, thereby ensuring the generalizability of the theoretical framework. The second is to examine the dynamics of public security campaigning among not just rightist candidates, but also leftist candidates in the region, thereby opening a relatively untapped area of research.

Expanding the cases examined to test the theoretical framework in the full range of cases in the region would be a very useful future research endeavor. Several seeming outliers seem to be explained well by the framework of this study: El Salvador often sees ready success on security, while on the opposite extreme, Venezuela has seen little use of

the issue despite surging crime rates over 2000s, especially in major cities. More research on these countries in particular would help to determine the applicability of this study's framework to those contexts. In addition, there are still other cases, such as Mexico, where the complexity of security problems makes it even more useful to determine whether considerations of human rights complicate the use of security.

El Salvador seems to fit with the framework of this study because it is an example of the spread of human rights in Latin America not being fully uniform. Human rights are relatively less widespread in El Salvador: clear majorities, for example, affirm that the protection of human rights only helps criminals (IUDOP 1995), and politicians have blocked international and domestic calls for reform of the police (Cruz 2006). Furthermore, even to the extent that human rights values have spread in El Salvador somewhat, the majority of news coverage about youth violence is specifically about youth gangs, and politicians and news media have focused on these gangs to argue that organized youth violence is a major threat to security (Peetz 2008). This study's framework makes sense of dynamics in El Salvador by characterizing campaigning on security in El Salvador as relatively easier, with candidates invoking security and winning much more easily, including through promises of "mano dura." There is room for variation in human rights values across the diverse countries of Latin America, and even these values aside, it is still notable that repression and human rights violations continue to occur in many parts of the region.

As for Venezuela, this case may also be seen as a variation on the central findings of this study. There has been high crime in Venezuela in recent years, but little

campaigning on it. As a way of partially explaining this situation, it must be noted that security threats have mostly been unorganized, including high levels of robberies and murders in the capital Caracas. Political actors are not pushing back against security campaigners on the basis of any past repression, yet there still is a tension on something similar to human rights: namely democracy.

In Venezuela, opposition politicians have campaigned on issues of democracy, or more precisely, an end to aspects of arbitrary rule. This focus on freedom from the arbitrary exercise of power makes their discourse less compatible with a concerned attack against crime and violence. The tension between campaigning on security and promising an end to unchecked authority makes campaigning on security difficult. Discourse on security would conflict with the opposition's focus on issues of democratic rule, similar to the way in which security conflicts with the protection of human rights and other basic liberties. This suggests that the central argument of this study holds: considerations of basic liberties impinge on the success of security.

Still, there are also cases of security problems within Latin America that deserve even more attention to see how the interplay between human rights and security problems turns out, particularly Mexico. Security problems in Mexico stemming from drug violence posed gradually increasing problems in the mid-2000s and then exploded in the late 2000s in intensity. In geographic scope, such violence also includes many states of northern and central Mexico, making the country an important case to consider. The organized nature of the actors responsible for massive violence among themselves, against security forces, and against ordinary people would suggest that the problem

should readily become an effective issue. Yet success may depend on what candidates propose to do about security, as well as whether candidates cultivate an image of attending to security in a careful way that protects innocent individuals. For Mexico, successful use may be also made even more challenging by the fact that the current security effort against drug traffickers in Mexico is already a form of enforcement, despite being applied to a different threat than in Colombia and done in a different way.

The existing work in this study also points to a need for further research on how leftists campaign on security. Much of the existing research has already examined what rightist candidates do when they attempt to campaign on security, and this study has also added to the understanding of rightist candidates' campaign strategies and efforts in making use of the issue. Chapter 5 focused on careful enforcement messages, which were used not only by rightist candidates, but also eventually by their leftist competitors. It involved an understanding of not just how rightist candidates talked about the issue, but also what their competitors aimed to say about it. This study has examined what some of these leftist competitors did on security, but more systematic examination of leftist candidates' use of security issues would be fruitful. Given that it is not a traditional strong suit of the left in Latin America and has gotten much less attention in social science research, research on when leftists refer to the issue, and when they do not, is much needed. Furthermore, it would be important to examine more deeply what leftists propose on security when they do talk about it, and what campaigning and vote dynamics occur when leftists, instead of rightists, are the candidates in any given election who campaign most vociferously on the issue.

Change is afoot in Latin America. The region continues to face threats to both human rights and to public security, yet voters now increasingly demand protection of both security and basic liberties. Fueled by a gradual but steady change in political values, the politics of public security are now characterized by a break from the past: a contrast with previous decades, rather than continuity. As the values and ideas of voters continue to change, especially those related to basic protections from the arbitrary use of authority, the quest for public security will continue to develop in ways that are ever more interesting, complex, and dramatic. In a changing Latin America, previously held patterns of politics often no longer hold.

References

Interviews Cited

Araujo, Gonzalo. 2009. Director of Pensamiento Siglo XXI, a think tank affiliated with the Partido Conservador. Bogotá, Colombia. December 11, 2009.

Bayona, José Arnulfo. 2009. National committee member of the Carlos Gaviria 2006 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. September 9, 2009.

Bedoya, Harold. 2009. Former commander of the Colombian armed forces, and 1998 and 2002 presidential candidate. Telephone interview. December 22, 2009.

Benítez Gaitán, Eduardo. 2009. Representative of the Juan Manuel Santos 2010 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. October 23, 2009.

Bergman, Jay. 2009. Director of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Andean division. Bogotá, Colombia. December 9, 2009.

Bustamante, Jorge. 2009. Director of the Instituto Pensamiento Liberal, the think tank of the Partido Liberal. Bogotá, Colombia. September 9, 2009.

Echeverri Correa, Fabio. 2009a. Campaign chief for the Álvaro Uribe 2002 and 2006 campaigns. Bogotá, Colombia. September 23, 2009.

Echeverri Correa, Fabio. 2009b. Campaign chief for the Álvaro Uribe 2002 and 2006 campaigns. Bogotá, Colombia. October 19, 2009.

Elejalde, Ramón. 2010. Former congressman and regional director for the Horacio Serpa 2002 and 2006 campaigns. Medellín, Colombia. January 26, 2010.

Fierro, Carolina. 2009. Policy coordinator for the Rafael Pardo 2010 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. August 31, 2009.

Gómez, Hernando. 2009. Regional coordinator for the Carlos Gaviria 2006 campaign in Bogotá. Bogotá, Colombia. September 14, 2009.

Gómez, Luis Fernando. 2010. Manager at Unidad Liberal, the Partido Liberal unified campaign headquarters in Medellín. Medellín, Colombia. January 26, 2010.

Rangel, Alfredo. 2009. Director of the think tank Fundación Seguridad y Democracia. Bogotá, Colombia. October 15, 2009.

Sánchez Ángel, Ricardo. 2009. Consultant to the Carlos Gaviria 2006 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. October 23, 2009.

Tirado, Álvaro. 2010. Historian and 1980s Partido Liberal Medellín figure. Bogotá, Colombia. March 10, 2010.

Urrutia, Carolina. 2010. Representative of the Sergio Fajardo 2010 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. March 4, 2010.

Vargas, Mauricio. 2009. Former editorial chief of *Cambio* and *Semana*. Bogotá, Colombia. December 15, 2009.

Villamizar, Andrés. 2010. Representative of the Germán Vargas Lleras 2010 campaign. Bogotá, Colombia. February 23, 2010.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Abellán, Pedro. 2011. "Elecciones en Guatemala y Nicaragua: de sufragios entre pobreza, desvergüenzas y amenazas." *Más poder local* 8: 24-25.

Agüero, Felipe. 1998. "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America." *Mershon International Studies Review* 42: 383-404.

Ahnen, Ronald E. 2007. "The Politics of Police Violence in Democratic Brazil." *Latin American Politics and Society* 49(1): 141-164.

Aguilera Peralta, Gabriel. 2008. "Enfrentar la violencia criminal con 'mano dura'." *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* 2: 124-140.

Ahmad, Nabeela, Victoria Hubickey, and Francis McNamara. 2011. "Trust in the National Police." AmericasBarometer Insights. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University.

Aigneren, Miguel. 1998. "Propaganda y elecciones." Centro de Estudios de Opinión, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas. Medellín, Colombia: Universidad de Antioquia.

Altman, David. 2006. "From Fukuoka to Santiago: Institutionalization of Political Science in Latin America." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 39(1): 196-203.

Angell, Alan, Maria D'Alva Kinzo, and Diego Urbaneja. 1996. "Electioneering in Latin America" in *Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles*, Roderic Ai Camp, editor. Oxford, England: Scholarly Resources.

Angus Reid. 2005. "Crime Has Mexicans Contemplating Death Penalty." Angus Reid Public Opinion. August 9, 2005.

Angus Reid. 2006. "El Salvador Split on How to Deal with Crime." Angus Reid Public Opinion. October 22, 2006.

Angus Reid. 2006. "Mexico Divided Over Capital Punishment." Angus Reid Public Opinion. November 4, 2006.

Angus Reid. 2009. "Mexicans Want U.S. Assistance for Drug War." Angus Reid Global Monitor. April 5, 2009.

Anozie, Valentine, Juhie Shinn, Katy Skarlatos, and Julio Urzua. 2004. "Reducing Incentives for Corruption in the Mexico City Police Force." International Workshop in Public Affairs, Paper 869. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin.

Appleyard, Melissa M. 2001. "Colombia: Is There a Light at the End of the Tunnel? (B)." Charlottesville, Virginia: Darden Business Publishing.

Arbeláez, Maria Angelica, Juan José Echavarría, and Alejandro Gaviria. 2002. "Colombian long run growth and the crisis of the 1990s." Global Development Network and Inter-American Development Bank.

Arce, Moisés. 2003. "Political Violence and Presidential Approval in Peru." *Journal of Politics* 65: 572-583.

Arnold, Jason and David Samuels. 2008. "Public Opinion and Latin America's Left Turn." Conference on Latin America's Left Turn: Causes and Implications, April 2008, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Arriagada, Irma and Lorena Godoy. 2000. "Prevention or repression? The false dilemma of citizen security." *CEPAL Review* 70: 112-136.

Asociación Grupo Ceiba. 2011. "Encuesta sobre relación, trato y actuación de las y los Policías." Encuesta Sobre Policías. www.pazurbana.org.

Avilés, William. 2006. "Paramilitarism and Colombia's Low-Intensity Democracy." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38: 379-408.

Azpuru, Dinorah. 2005. "The general elections in Guatemala, November-December 2003." *Electoral Studies* 24: 143-149.

Azpuru, Dinorah. 2010. "The Salience of Ideology: Fifteen Years of Presidential Elections in El Salvador." *Latin American Politics and Society* 52(2): 103-138.

Bagley, Bruce Michael. 2001. "El tráfico de drogas y la política de los Estados Unidos en Colombia." *Iconos* 10: 87-98.

Bailey, John and Lucía Dammert, editors. 2006. *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas*. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Baker, Andy and Kenneth F. Greene. 2011. "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free-Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies." *World Politics* 63(1): 43-77.

Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 35-50.

Basombrío Iglesias, Carlos. 2006. "Civilian Oversight of Security in Peru: The Testimony of a Participant" in *Toward a Society Under Law*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, editors. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Beckett, Katherine. 1994. "Setting the Public Agenda: 'Street Crime' and Drug Use in American Politics." *Social Problems* 41(3): 425-447.

Beckett, Katherine. 1997. *Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Beckett, Katherine and Theodore Sasson. 2004. *The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America*. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

Beitel, June S. 2010. "Colombia: Issues for Congress." Document RL32250. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Benson, Peter, Edward F. Fischer, and Kedron Thomas. 2008. "Resocializing Suffering: Neoliberalism, Accusation, and the Sociopolitical Context of Guatemala's New Violence." *Latin American Perspectives* 35(5): 38-58.

Berelson, Bernard, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Bergquist, Charles, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzálo Sánchez G. 2001. *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace*. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources.

Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2011. "Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?" *American Political Science Review* 105(3): 552-566.

Bitencourt, Tim. 2007. "Crime and Violence: Challenges to Democracy in Brazil" in *Citizenship in Latin America*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, editors. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Blacklock, Cathy and Laura Macdonald. 1998. "Human Rights and Citizenship in Guatemala and Mexico: From 'Strategic' to 'New' Universalism?" *Social Politics* 5(2): 132-157.

Borge y Asociados. 2007. "Guatemala - Encuestas Nacionales contratados por El Periódico 1-2-3-4 años de Gobierno."

Borge y Asociados. 2009. "Guatemala - Encuestas Nacionales contratados por El Periódico Enero 2009."

Borón, Atilio A. 2000. "Ruling without a Party: Argentine Dominant Classes in the Twentieth Century" in *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, Kevin J. Middlebrook, editor. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Botero, Felipe and Laura Wills Otero, editors. 2009. *Juntos pero no revueltos?: partidos, candidatos y campañas en las elecciones legislativas de 2006 en Colombia*. Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.

Boudon, Lawrence. 1996. "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 28: 279-297.

Boudon, Lawrence. 2000. "Party System Deinstitutionalization in Comparative Perspective: The 1997-98 Colombian Elections in Historical Perspective." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42(3): 33-57.

Brinks, Daniel M. 2008. *The Judicial Response to Police Killings in Latin America*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Brockett, Charles D. 1991. "The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peace Mobilization in Central America." *Comparative Politics* 23(3): 253-274.

Brown, Stephen E. 1981. "Crime, Police, and Deterrence: A Simultaneous Model." *Criminal Justice Review* 6: 1-7.

Budge, Ian and Dennis J. Farlie. 1983. *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies*. London, England: Allen and Unwin.

Burke, Roland. 2010. *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Caldeira, Teresa P. R. 2000. *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Calvo Ospina, Hernando. 2008. *Colombia, laboratorio de embrujos: democracia y terrorismo de Estado*. Madrid, Spain: Foca.

Cameron, Maxwell A. 2009. "Latin America's Left Turns: beyond good and bad." *Third World Quarterly* 30(2): 331-348.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Cao, Liqun. 2002. "Curbing Police Brutality: What Works? A Reanalysis of Citizen Complaints at the Organizational Level, Final Report." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice.

Carmines, Edward G. and James A Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Carvalho, Sandra and Andressa Caldas. 2002. "Crime and Human Rights in Brazil." Seminar on Crime: Managing Public Order in Countries in Transition. New York, October 2002.

Cavallaro, James L. and Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou. 2005. "Public Enemy Number Two?: Rising Crime and Human Rights Advocacy in Transitional Societies." *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18: 139-165.

Castañeda, Jorge G. 2006. "Latin America's Left Turn." *Foreign Affairs* (March/April): 28-43.

Centro de Estudios Públicos. 2009. "Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública No. 32 - Tercera Serie, Octubre 2009." Encuesta 61. Santiago, Chile.

Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona (CIDOB). 2008. "Álvaro Colom Caballeros." Centro de Documentación, Biografías Líderes Políticos.

Centro Nacional de Consultoría. 2002. "Voz y Voto 2." January 2002.

Cepeda, Fernando. 1996. "Antioquia: ¿un modelo a la fujimori para Colombia?" *Estrategia*, November 15, 1996, 29-31.

Chernick, Marc W. 1988. "Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 30(4): 53-88.

Chevigny, Paul. 2003. "The populism of fear: Politics of crime in the Americas." *Punishment and Society* 5(1): 77-96.

Chinchilla, Laura. 2010. *Plan de Gobierno Laura Chinchilla 2010-2014*. San José, Costa Rica.

Chong, Dennis. 1996. "Creating Common Frames of References on Political Issues" in *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*, Diana Mutz, Richard Brody, and Paul Sniderman, editors. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Cleary, Matthew R. 2006. "Explaining the Left's Resurgence." *Journal of Democracy* 17(4): 35-49.

Cohen, Mark A., Roland T. Rust, and Sara Steen. 2006. "Prevention, Crime Control or Cash? Public Preferences Towards Criminal Justice Spending Priorities." *Justice Quarterly* 23(3): 317-335.

Collins, Cath. 2010. "Opinión pública y los derechos humanos en Chile" in *Chile 2009: Percepciones y Actitudes Sociales*. Santiago, Chile: Universidad Diego Portales.

Conaghan, Catherine M. 2008. "Correa's Plebiscitary Presidency." *Journal of Democracy* 19(2): 46-60.

Costa, Arthur. 2002. "Crime and Elections in Brazil." *Hemisphere Focus* 10(10).

Crawford, Adam. 2009. "Situating crime control policies in comparative perspective: policy travels, transfer and translation" in *Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective*, Adam Crawford, editor. Uffculme, England: Willan.

Cruz, José Miguel. 2006. "Violence, Citizen Insecurity, and Elite Maneuvering in El Salvador" in *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas*, John Bailey and Lucía Dammert, editors. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Cruz, José Miguel. 2008. "The Impact of Violent Crime on the Political Culture of Latin America: The Special Case of Central America" in *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-2007*, Mitchell A. Seligson, editor. Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press.

Cullen, Francis T., Bonnie S. Fisher, and Brandon K. Applegate. 2000. "Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections." *Crime and Justice* 27: 1-79.

Cullen, Francis T., Gregory A. Clark, and John F. Wozniak. 1985. "Explaining the Get Tough Movement: Can the Public be Blamed?" *Federal Probation* 49: 16-24.

Cullen, Francis T., John B. Cullen, and John F. Wozniak. 1988. "Is Rehabilitation Dead? The Myth of the Punitive Public." *Journal of Criminal Justice* 16: 303-317.

Dammert, Lucía. 2007. *Perspectivas y dilemas de la seguridad ciudadana en América Latina*. Quito, Ecuador: FLACSO Ecuador.

Dammert, Lucía and Felipe Salazar. 2009. *¿Duros con el delito?: Populismo e Inseguridad en América Latina*. Santiago, Chile: FLACSO.

Damore, David F. 2004. "The Dynamics of Issue Ownership in Presidential Campaigns." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3): 391-397.

Davey, Joseph. 1999. *The Politics of Prison Expansion*. New York: Praeger.

De la Torre, Verónica and Alberto Martín Álvarez. 2011. "Violencia, Estado de derecho y políticas punitivas en América Central." *Perfiles Latinoamericanos* 37: 33-50.

Dettmer, Jamie. 1998. "Is Colombia's hope a hawk or a dove?" *Insight on the News*. January 12, 1998.

Di Tella, Rafael, Sebastian Galiani, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2010. "Crime Distribution and Victim Behavior during a Crime Wave" in *The Economics of Crime: Lessons For & From Latin America*, Rafael Di Tella, Sebastian Edwards, and Ernesto Schargrodsky, editors. Chicago, Illinois: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Dugas, John C. 2003. "The Emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia? The Case of Alvaro Uribe." *Third World Quarterly* 24(6); 1117-1136.

Duncan, Gustavo. 2006. *Los señores de la guerra: de paramilitares, mafiosos y autodefensas en Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Planeta.

Duzán, María Jimena. 2004. *Así Gobierna Uribe*. Bogotá, Colombia: Planeta Colombiana.

Echandía Castilla, Camilo. 2006. *Dos décadas de escalamiento del conflicto armado en Colombia (1986-2006)*. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad Externado de Colombia.

Eckstein, Harry. 1988. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change." *American Political Science Review* 82(3): 789-804.

Ejército de Colombia. 2009. "General Padilla desestima alianza Farc-ELN y dice que falsos positivos son cosa del pasado." December 17.

Ellner, Steve. 2009. *Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict, and the Chávez Phenomenon*. New York: Lynne Rienner.

Elkins, David J. and Richard E. B. Simeon. 1979. "A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics* 11(2): 127-145.

Erikson, Daniel P. 2005. "Mexico's Uneasy Choice: The 2006 Presidential Election." *World Policy Journal* 22(4): 15-24.

Escobar, María-Luisa, Ursula Giedion, Antonio Giuffrida, and Amanda L. Glassman. 2009. "Colombia: After a Decade of Health System Reform" in *From Few to Many: Ten Years of Health Insurance Expansion in Colombia*, Amanda L. Glassman, María-Luisa Escobar, Antonio Giuffrida, and Ursula Giedion, editors. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

Estévez, Ariadna. 2008. "A Latin American Sociopolitical Conception of Human Rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 7: 245-261.

Estrada, Felipe. 2004. "The Transformation of the Politics of Crime in High Crime Societies." *European Journal of Criminology* 1(4): 419-443.

Estrada, Fernando. 2009. "Encrucijadas de la Acción Humanitaria en Colombia." Conference on "Retos y propuestas sobre acción sin daño y construcción de paz en Colombia." Bogotá, Colombia: September 2009.

Farrell, David M. and Paul Webb. 2000. "Political Parties as Campaign Organizations" in *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, editors. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Fernandez, Kenneth E. and Michelle Kuenzi. 2006. "Crime and Support for Democracy: Revisiting Modernization Theory." Working Paper 64. AfroBarometer.

Ferraro, Kenneth F. 1995. *Fear of Crime: Interpreting Victimization Risk*. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52(4): 887-917.

Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4: 391-416.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Flamm, Michael W. 2005. *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Florez Romero, Enrique. 2009. "La Experiencia de Bogotá: Desde la Reforma Policial Hasta el Plan Integral de Seguridad." Conference on "La Seguridad Ciudadana como Problema de Estado." Miranda, Venezuela.

Franklin, James C. 2008. "Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America." *International Studies Quarterly* 52: 187-211.

Frühling, Hugo. 1992. "Political Culture and Gross Human Rights Violations in Latin America" in *Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, editor. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Frühling, Hugo. 2009. "Recent Police Reform in Latin America" in Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America, Niels A. Uildriks, editor. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington.

Fuentes, Claudio A. 2005. *Contesting the Iron Fist: Advocacy Networks and Police Violence in Democratic Argentina and Chile*. New York: Routledge.

Fuentes S., Claudio. 2004. "La inevitable 'mano dura': sociedad civil y violencia policial en Argentina y Chile." *Revista de ciencia política* (Santiago) 24(2): 3-28.

Fukumi, Sayaka. 2008. *Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US policy Responses*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Gallup. 2000. Gallup International Millennium Survey. Gallup-International.com.

Gallup Colombia. 2010. "La Gran Encuesta de Los Medios." Medellín, Colombia. March, April, and May 2010.

García, Miguel and Gary Hoskin. 2003. "Political Participation and War in Colombia: An Analysis of the 2002 Elections." Working Paper 38. London, England: Crisis States Programme.

Gargarella, Roberto. 2008. *De la injusticia penal a la justicia social*. Bogotá, Colombia: Siglo del Hombre.

Garland, David. 2001. *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Garzón, Juan Carlos. 2008. *Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Gaviria, Alejandro and Carmen Pagés. 1999. "Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin America." Working Paper 408. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

Gaviria, Alejandro and Carmen Pagés. 2002. "Patterns of crime victimization in Latin American cities." *Journal of Development Economics* 67(1): 181-203.

Geddes, Barbara. 1994. "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom." *Journal of Democracy* 5(4): 104-118.

Gibson, Edward L. 1996. *Class and Conservative Politics*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Godoy, Angelina Snodgrass. 2005. "La Muchacha Respondona: Reflections on the Razor's Edge Between Crime and Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly* 27(2): 597-624.

Godoy, Angelina Snodgrass. 2006. *Popular Injustice: Violence, Community, and Law in Latin America*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. "The second image reversed: the international sources of domestic politics." *International Organization* 32(4): 881-912.

Granada, Soledad, Jorge A. Restrepo, and Andrés R. Vargas. 2009. "El agotamiento de la política de seguridad: evolución y transformaciones recientes en el conflicto armado colombiano" in *Guerra y violencias en Colombia*, Jorge A. Restrepo and David Aponte, editors. Bogotá, Colombia: Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.

Guáqueta, Alexandra. 2009. "The way back in: reintegrating illegal armed groups in Colombia then and now" in *Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict: Politics, violence, and transition*, Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko, editors. New York: Routledge.

Ha, Sang-Sub. 2007. "Contemporary Social Movements in Latin America and Its Political Sociology." *Asian Journal of Latin American Studies* 20(2): 135-173.

Hagan, Frank E. 2006. "'Organized Crime' and 'organized crime': Indeterminate Problems of Definition." *Trends in Organized Crime* 9(4): 127-137.

Hall, Anthony. 2006. "From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation under Lula." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 38: 689-709.

Hamai, Koichi and Thomas Ellis. 2006. "Crime and criminal justice in modern Japan." *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 34: 157-178.

Hawkins, Darren G. 2002. *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile*. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.

Heinemann, Alessandra and Dorte Verner. 2006. "Crime and Violence in Development: A Literature Review of Latin America and the Caribbean." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4041.

Hibbs, Douglas A. 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." *Public Choice* 104: 149-180.

Hinton, Mercedes S. 2006. *The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in Argentina and Brazil*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Holbrook, Thomas M. 1994. "Campaigns, National Conditions, and U.S. Presidential Elections." *American Journal of Political Science* 38(4): 973-998.

Holian, David B. 2004. "He's Stealing My Issues! Clinton's Crime Rhetoric and the Dynamics of Issue Ownership." *Political Behavior* 26(2): 95-124.

Holland, Alisha C. 2010. "Right on Crime? The Spatial Politics of Crime in El Salvador." American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2010.

Holmes, Jennifer S. and Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres. 2003. "Sources of Fujimori's Popularity: Neoliberal Reform or Ending Terrorism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 14(4): 93-112.

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. "Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis." *Latin American Politics and Society* 48(3): 157-184.

Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2008. *Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia*. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Hoskin, Gary. 1998. "Elecciones presidenciales, 1998" in *Elecciones y democracia en Colombia 1997-1998*, Andrés Dávila and Ana María Bejarano, editors. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes.

Hoskin, Gary and Gabriel Murillo. 1999. "Can Colombia Cope?" *Journal of Democracy* 10(1): 36-50.

Hoskin, Gary and Gabriel Murillo. 2001. "Colombia's Perpetual Quest for Peace." *Journal of Democracy* 12(2): 32-45.

Hoskin, Gary, Rodolfo Masías Núñez and Miguel García Sánchez. 2011. "La decisión de voto en las elecciones presidenciales de 2002" in *Partidos y elecciones en Colombia*, Felipe Botero, editor. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes.

Hughes, Emma and Nigel Parsons. 2001. "The 1999-2000 presidential elections in Chile." *Electoral Studies* 20: 641-657.

Human Rights Watch. 1993. "State of War: Political Violence and Counterinsurgency in Colombia." New York: Human Rights Watch.

Hume, Mo. 2007. "Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs." *Development in Practice* 17(6): 739-751.

Hunter, Wendy and Timothy J. Power. 2005. "Lula's Brazil at midterm." *Journal of Democracy* 16(3): 127-139.

Inglehart, Ronald and Marita Carballo. 1997. "Does Latin America Exist?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30(1): 34-47.

Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. 2003. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Instituto de Ciencia Política. 2011. "Tasa de Homicidios en Colombia 2002-2010." Observatorio de Política & Estrategia en América Latina. Bogotá, Colombia. February 18, 2011.

Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública. 1995. "Encuesta sobre derechos humanos y los retos del nuevo procurador." San Salvador, El Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas.

Interlatin. 2002. "Planes de Gobierno - Harold Bedoya." www.colombia.com/especiales/elecciones_2002/planes/bedoya

International Council on Human Rights Policy. 2003. *Crime, Public Order and Human Rights*. Vernier, Switzerland: Atar Roto.

Ipsos Napoleón Franco. 2010. "La Gran Encuesta 2010 Medición 9." #10-019198-01.

Ipsos Public Affairs Brazil. 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007. São Paulo, Brazil.

Isacson, Adam and Jorge Rojas. 2002. "'Firm Hand, Large Heart'." *Human Rights Dialogue* 2(8). Carnegie Council.

Ito, Koichiro. 1995. "Research on the Fear of Crime: Perceptions and Realities of Crime in Japan" in *Crime Prevention in the Urban Community*, Koichi Miyazawa and Setsuo Miyazawa, editors. Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Jaramillo, Juan C., Roberto Steiner, and Natalia Salazar. 1999. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia." Working Document R-366. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank.

Jasper, Miranda Louise and Colleen W. Cook. 2008. "Guatemala: 2007 Elections and Issues for Congress." Document RS22727. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Jimeno, Myriam. 2001. "Violence and Social Life in Colombia." *Critique of Anthropology* 21: 221-246.

Johnson, Gregg B. and Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer. 2009. "Economic Accountability in Central America." *Journal of Politics in Latin America*.

Jones, Edward E. 1979. "The Rocky Road from Acts to Dispositions." *American Psychologist* 34(2): 107-117.

Just, Marion R. 1996. *Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates, and the Media in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Justice Research and Statistics Association. 2000. *Crime and Justice Atlas 2000*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Kaniss, Phyllis. 1991. *Making Local News*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.

Karl, Terry Lynn. 1995. "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America." *Journal of Democracy* 6(3): 72-86.

Kavanaugh, Jennifer E. 2011. "The Dynamics of Protracted Terror Campaigns: Domestic Politics, Terrorist Violence, and Counterterror Responses." Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Keating, Michael. 2010. *The Government of Scotland: Public Policy Making After Devolution*. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.

Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Kessler, Daniel and Steven D. Levitt. 1998. "Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation." Working Paper 6484. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Key, V. O. 1966. *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press.

Kincaid, A. Douglas and Eduardo A. Gamarra. 1996. "Disorderly Democracy: Redefining Public Security in Latin America" in *Latin America in the World-Economy*, Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz and William C. Smith, editors. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Kliksberg, Bernardo. 2008. "¿Cómo enfrentar la inseguridad en América Latina?: La falacia de la mano dura." *Nueva Sociedad* 215: 4-16.

Kline, Harvey F. 2009. *Showing Teeth to the Dragons: State-Building by Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez, 2002-2006*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.

Knoester, Mark. 1998. "War in Colombia." *Social Justice* 25(2): 85-109.

Koo, Jeong-Woo and Francisco O. Ramirez. 2009. "National Incorporation of Global Human Rights: Worldwide Expansion of National Human Rights Institutions, 1966-2004." *Social Forces* 87(3): 1321-1353.

Krause, Krystin. 2009. "Iron Fist Politics in Latin America: Politicians, Public Opinion, and Crime Control." Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 2009.

Lagos, Marta. 1997. "Latin America's Smiling Mask." *Journal of Democracy* 8(3): 125-138.

Lagos, Marta. 2008. "Latin America's Diversity of Views." *Journal of Democracy* 19(1): 111-125.

Lambert, Peter. 2000. "A decade of electoral democracy: continuity, change and crisis in Paraguay." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 19: 378-396.

Landman, Todd. 2004. "Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy." *Human Rights Quarterly* 26(4): 906-931.

Latin American Public Opinion Project. 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010. AmericasBarometer. Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. www.lapopsurveys.org.

Latinobarómetro. 1996, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2010. Santiago, Chile. www.latinobarometro.org.

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2002. "The 1999 General Elections in Guatemala." *Electoral Studies* 21(1): 107-114.

Lewis, Paul H. 2005. *Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America*. Oxford, England: Rowman and Littlefield.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1990. *Economics and Elections*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S. and Martin Paldam. 2000. "Economic voting: an introduction." *Electoral Studies* 19: 113-121.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction" in *The West European Party System*, Peter Mair, editor. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Livingstone, Grace. 2003. *Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy, and War*. London, England: Latin America Bureau.

Llorente, María Victoria. 2006. "Demilitarization in a War Zone" in Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas, John Bailey and Lucía Dammert, editors. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Univeristy of Pittsburgh Press.

Loo Pinzón, Kemy. 2009. "Martinelli dará a conocer su plan de seguridad." *Prensa*. Panama City, Panama. March 24, 2009.

Lopes, José Amilton. 2008. "Partidos políticos brasileiros: o renomear PFL - Democratas." Thesis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil.

Loveman, Mara. 1998. "High-Risk Collective Action: Defending Human Rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina." *American Journal of Sociology* 104(2): 477-525.

Lozano, Wilfredo. 2005. "La izquierda latinoamericana en el poder: Interrogantes sobre un proceso en marcha." *Nueva Sociedad* 197: 129-145.

Luna, Juan Pablo and Rodrigo Mardones. 2010. "Chile: Are the Parties Over?" *Journal of Democracy* 21(3): 107-121.

Lutz, Ellen L. and Kathryn Sikkink. 2000. "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America." *International Organization* 54(3): 633-659.

Maldonado, Arturo. 2010. "Insecurities Intensify Support for Those Who Seek to Remove Government by Force." Insights 48. AmericasBarometer.

Marcos, Dolores. 2005. "Liderazgos autoritarios en el noroeste argentino: el caso Bussi en Tucumán." *Reflexión Política* 7(13): 42-58.

Marion, Nancy E. 1997. "Symbolic Policies in Clinton's Crime Control Agenda." *Buffalo Criminal Law Review* 1(1): 67-108.

Marion, Nancy E. and Rick Farmer. 2003. "Crime Control in the 2000 Presidential Election: A Symbolic Issue." *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 27(2): 129-144.

Martínez Torres, Juan Pablo. 2002. "The Evolution of Conflict Resolution Strategies in Colombia's Peace Process." Proceedings of Southwestern Journal of International Studies, Appalachian State University, Boone, North Carolina.

Mason, Ann. 2003. "Colombia's Democratic Security Agenda: Public Order in the Security Tripod." *Security Dialogue* 34: 391-409.

Mayer, Nonna and Vincent Tiberj. 2004. "Do Issues Matter? Law and Order in the 2002 French Presidential Election" in *The French Voter: Before and After the 2002 Elections*, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, editor. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

McAra, Lesley. 2008. "Crime, Criminology and Criminal Justice in Scotland." *European Journal of Criminology* 5: 481-504.

McDermott, Monika L. 2005. "Candidate Occupations and Voter Information Shortcuts." *Journal of Politics* 67(1): 201-219.

Medhurst, Martin J. 2000. "Text and Context in the 1952 Presidential Campaign: Eisenhower's 'I Shall Go to Korea' Speech." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 30(3): 464-484.

Medina, Carlos and Jorge Andrés Tamayo. 2009. "An Assessment of How Urban Crime and Victimization Affect Life Satisfaction." Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la República.

Meguid, Bonnie E. 2005. "Competition Among Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success." *American Political Science Review* 99: 347-359.

Mesquita Neto, Paulo. 1999. "Violência policial no Brasil: abordagens teóricas e practicas" in *Cidadania, Justiça e Violência*, Dulce Chaves Pandolfi, José Murilo de Carvalho, Leandro Piquet Carneiro, and Mario Grynszpan, editors. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Middlebrook, Kevin J., editor. 2000. *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Miller, Lisa A. 2008. *The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Miller, Warren and Norman Schofield. 2003. "Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States." *American Political Science Review* 97(2): 245-260.

Miranda, Lucia. 2011. "What Do People on the Right Think? Citizen and Elite Values and Opinions in Latin America." Bulletin 4. United Nations Development Programme and Instituto de Iberoamérica, Universidad de Salamanca.

Moller, Rolf. 2006. *Transporte urbano y desarrollo sostenible en América Latina: el ejemplo de Santiago de Cali, Colombia*. Cali, Colombia: Universidad del Valle.

Montaño Virreira, Sonia and Mariana Sanz Ardaya. 2009. "Movimientos sociales de mujeres. El femenismo" in *Movimientos socioculturales en América Latina*, Fernando Calderón, editor. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Siglo Veintiuno.

Moraes, Reginaldo. 2005. "Notas sobre o imbróglio do governo Lula, 2005." *Lua Nova* 65: 179-202.

Moser, Caroline, Ailsa Winton, and Annalise Moser. 2005. "Violence, Fear, and Insecurity among the Urban Poor in Latin America" in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, Marianne Fay, editor. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Murillo, Maria Victoria, Virginia Oliveros, and Milan Vaishnav. 2008. "Voting for the Left or Governing on the Left?" Conference on Latin America's Left Turn: Causes and Implications. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Nellis, Ashley. 2009. "Fear of Terrorism" in *Terrorism in America*, Kevin Borgeson and Robin Valeri, editors. Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett.

Nieto Bernal, Julio. 1998. *La banda presidencial: La campaña del 98*. Bogotá, Colombia: Norma.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley, California: Institute for International Studies.

Pachón, Mónica. 2009. "Colombia 2008: éxitos, peligros y desaciertos de la política de seguridad democrática de la administración Uribe." *Revista de ciencia política* 29(2): 327-353.

Palau, Marielle. 2006. "El lado militar de la ofensiva neoliberal en Paraguay." *Observatorio Social de América Latina* 7(20): 339-350.

Panizza, Francisco. 1995. "Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America." *Political Studies* 43: 168-188.

Panizza, Francisco. 2005. "Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in Latin America." *Political Studies* 53: 716-734.

Peetz, Peter. 2008. "Discourses on Violence in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua: Youth, Crime, and the Responses of the State." Working Paper 80. Hamburg, Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

Pérez, Orlando J. 2009. "Crime and Support for Coups in Latin America." Insights Series 32. AmericasBarometer.

Pérez Toro, William Fredy, Alba Lucía Vanegas Yepes, and Carlos Mario Álvarez Martínez. 1997. *Estado de derecho y sistema penal*. Medellín, Colombia: Biblioteca Jurídica Diké.

Peruzzotti, Eduardo. 2002. "Towards a New Politics: Citizenship and Rights in Contemporary Argentina." *Citizenship Studies* 6(1): 77-93.

Petkoff, Teodoro. 2005. "Las dos izquierdas." *Nueva Sociedad* 197: 114-128.

Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study." *American Journal of Political Science* 40: 825-850.

Petrocik, John R., William L. Benoit, and Glenn J. Hansen. 2003. "Issue Ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952-2000." *Political Science Quarterly* 118(4): 599-626.

Petras, James. 1999. *The Left Strikes Back: Class Conflict in Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.

Petras, James and Henry Veltmeyer. 2009. *What's Left in Latin America?: Regime Change in New Times*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Piñera, Sebastián. 2009. "Derrotar a la Delincuencia: Franja 19 de noviembre Sebastián Piñera." November 2009.

Pion-Berlin, David and Craig Arceneaux. 1998. "Tipping the Civil-Military Balance: Institutions and Human Rights Policy in Democratic Argentina and Chile." *Comparative Political Studies* 31(5): 633-661.

Pion-Berlin, David and Harold Trinkunas. 2011. "Latin America's Growing Security Gap." *Journal of Democracy* 22(1): 39-53.

Plasser, Fritz and Gunda Plasser. 2002. *Global Political Campaigning*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.

Posada-Carbó, Eduardo. 2006. "Colombia Hews to the Path of Change." *Journal of Democracy* 17(4): 80-94.

Putnam, Ronald D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Qi Fengtian. 2004. "Gelunbiya heping jincheng de xianzhuang jiqi qianjing" [Status and prospects for the Colombian peace process]. *Ladingmeizhou yanjiu* [Journal of Latin American Studies] 11(1): 13-16.

Ramírez Gallegos, Franklin. 2006. "Mucho más de dos izquierdas." *Nueva Sociedad* 205: 30-44.

Ray, Julie. 2010. "Colombia Eclipses Mexico in Murders Close to Home." Gallup. May 5, 2010.

Reiner, Robert. 2007. *Law and Order: An Honest Citizen's Guide to Crime and Control*. Cambridge, England: Polity.

Reynolds, Natalie, Leam A. Craig, and Douglas P. Boer. 2009. "Public attitudes toward offending, offenders and reintegration" in *Public Opinion and Criminal Justice*, Jane Wood and Theresa Gannon, editors. Uffculme, England: Willan.

Richani, Nazih. 2005. "Third Parties, War Systems' Inertia, and Conflict Termination: The Doomed Peace Process in Colombia, 1998-2002." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 25(2): 75-103.

Riker, William. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Roberts, Julian V., Loretta J. Stalans, David Indermaur, and Mike Hough. 2003. *Penal Populism and Public Opinion*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Roberts, Julian V. and Ross Hastings. 2007. "Public Opinion and Crime Prevention: A Review of International Findings." *IPC Review* 1: 193-218.

Romer, Daniel, Kathleen Hall Jamieson, and Sean Aday. 2006. "Television News and the Cultivation of the Fear of Crime." *Journal of Communication* 53(1): 88-104.

Roniger, Luis. 1997. "Paths of Citizenship and the Legacy of Human Rights Violations: The Cases of Redemocratized Argentina and Uruguay." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 10(3): 270-309.

Roniger, Luis and Mario Sznajder. 1999. *The Legacy of Human Rights Violations in the Southern Cone*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rozema, Ralph. 2008. "Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks in Medellín, Colombia." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 40: 423-452.

Ruy, Carolina. 2008. "Justiça, segurança e paz nas cidades: Entrevista com Benedito Mariano." *Princípios* 97: 65-68.

Sabino, Carlos. 2007. "Elecciones presidenciales en Guatemala." Análisis #119. Madrid, Spain: Real Instituto Elcano.

Santos Presidente. 2010. "Buen gobierno para la Prosperidad democrática: 109 iniciativas para lograrla." Bogotá, Colombia.

Schamis, Hector E. 2006. "Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions." *Journal of Democracy* 17(4): 20-34.

Scheingold, Stuart A. 1984. *The Politics of Law and Order: Street Crime and Public Policy*. New York: Longman.

Scheingold, Stuart A. 1991. *The Politics of Street Crime: Criminal Process and Cultural Obsession*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press.

Scheingold, Stuart A. 1995. "The politics of street crime and criminal justice" in *Crime, Communities, and Public Policy*, Lawrence B. Joseph, editor. Champaign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Schemo, Diana Jean. 1997. "In Colombia, Support Grows for a Candidate With a Hard Line." *New York Times*. New York. November 2, 1997.

Schuman, Howard. 1997. *Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Seelke, Clare Ribando. 2009. "Gangs in Central America." Document RL34112. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Seligson, Amber Lara. 2002. *When democracies elect dictators: motivations for and impact of the election of former authoritarians in Argentina and Bolivia*. Dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 2007. "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America." *Journal of Democracy* 18(3): 81-95.

Sellers, Patrick J. 1998. "Strategy and Background in Congressional Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 92(1): 159-171.

Serafino, Nina M. 2002. "Colombia: The Uribe Administration and Congressional Concerns." Document RS21242. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Shepsle, Kenneth. 2003. "Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become Winners): William Riker's Heresthetic." *Perspectives on Politics* 1: 7-22.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. "Human rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America." *International Organization* 47(3): 411-441.

Sikkink, Kathryn. 2004. *Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Smith, Jackie, Ron Pagnucco, and George A. Lopez. 1998. "Globalizing Human Rights: The World of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s." *Human Rights Quarterly* 20(2): 379-412.

Smith, Jason Matthew. 2010. "Does Crime Pay? Issue Ownership, Political Opportunity, and the Populist Right in Western Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 43(11): 1471-1498.

Smulovitz, Catalina. 2006. "Citizen Participation and Public Security in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: Lessons from an Initial Experience" in *Toward a Society Under Law*, Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenburg, editors. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sonnleitner, Willibald. 2009. "Dos décadas de elecciones en Guatemala: en las fronteras de la democratización." *Estudios Sociológicos* 27: 509-549.

Spelman, William. 1994. *Criminal Incapacitation*. New York: Plenum.

Spelman, William. 2005. "Jobs or Jails? The Crime Drop in Texas." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 24(1): 133-165.

Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America*. Cambridge, England: Canbrdge University Press.

Sundquist, James. 1983. *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of the Parties in the United States*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings.

Tate, Winifred. 2007. *Counting the Dead: The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in Colombia*. Berkeley, California: University of California Press.

Taylor, Steven L. 2009. *Voting Amid Violence: Electoral Democracy in Colombia*. Lebanon, New Hampshire: Northeastern University Press.

Tedesco, John C. 2001. "Issue and Strategy Agenda-Setting in the 2000 Presidential Primaries." *American Behavioral Scientist* 44: 2048-2067.

Teixeira, Cindy. 2011. Head archivist, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Electronic communication. June 20, 2011.

Télam. 2011. "Construyendo caminos y escuelas luchamos contra la delincuencia." Canal Audiovisual de la Agencia Télam.

Tickner, Arlene and Rodrigo Pardo. 2003. "Estados Unidos, Colombia y sus vecinos: Los desafíos externos de la 'seguridad democrática'." *Foreign Affairs en Español* 3(4): 102-114.

Tonry, Michael and David P. Farrington, editors. 1995. *Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention*. Chicago, Illinois: Univerisity of Chicago Press.

Tulchin, Joseph S., H. Hugo Frühling, and Heather Golding, editors. 2003. *Crime and Violence in Latin America: Citizen Security, Democracy, and the State*. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Tussie, Diana and Pablo Heidrich. 2008. "A Tale of Ecumenism and Diversity: Economic and Trade Policies of the Latin American New Left" in *Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left*, Jorge G. Castañeda and Marco A. Morales, editors. London, England: Routledge.

Tyler, Tom R. and Renee Weber. 1982. "Support for the death penalty: Instrumental response to crime, or symbolic attitude?" *Law and Society Review* 17(1): 21-45.

Ulloa, Fernando Cepeda and Eduardo Posada-Carbó. 1999. "The Colombian presidential elections of 1998." *Electoral Studies* 18: 411-450.

Ulloa, Fernando C. and Eduardo P. Carbó. 2003. "The congressional and presidential elections in Colombia, 2002." *Electoral Studies* 22: 765-807.

Ungar, Mark. 2002. *Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Ungar, Mark. 2006. "Police Reform in Argentina: Public Security versus Human Rights" in Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, Security, and Human Rights in Latin America, Niels A. Uildriks, editor. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington.

Ungar, Mark. 2011. *Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press.

United Nations. 2007. *Human Development Report*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 2006. "Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia." Bogotá, Colombia.

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. 2007. "Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean." Report 37820.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2009. "International homicide, rate per 100,000 population: 2004, unless otherwise specified." International Homicide Statistics, UNODC.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2011. *2011 Global Study on Homicide*. Vienna, Austria.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2011. "Intentional homicide, count and rate per 100,000 population" and "Theft at the national level, number of police-recorded offences." www.unodc.org.

Uribe Velez, Álvaro. 2002. "Manifiesto Democrático - 100 Puntos Álvaro Uribe Vélez." Bogtotá, Colombia.

Valenzuela, Arturo and Lucía Dammert. 2006. "Problems of Success in Chile." *Journal of Democracy* 17(4): 65-79.

Vavreck, Lynn. 2009. *The Message Matters: The Economy and Presidential Campaigns*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Vermeer, Jan P. 2002. *The View From The States: National Politics in Local Newspaper Editorials*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Villaveces, Andrés. 2001. "Comparative Statistical Note on Homicide Rates in Colombia" in *Violence in Colombia 1990-2000*, Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez G., editors. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources.

Weis, Kurt and Michael E. Milakovich. 1974. "Political Misuses of Crime Rates." *Crime and Punishment* 11(5): 27-33.

Welna, Christopher and Gustavon Gallón Giraldo, editors. 2007. *Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights in Colombia*. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Weyland, Kurt. 2000. "A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support for President Fujimori." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(3): 481-502.

Weyland, Kurt. 2003. "Political Repercussions of Crime and Violence in Latin America." Conference on Culture and Peace: Violence, Politics, and Representation in the Americas. Austin, Texas.

Weyland, Kurt, Raúl L. Madrid, and Wendy Hunter, editors. 2010. *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Wiarda, Howard. 2003. *The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Tradition*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Wilpert, Gregory. 2007. *Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chávez Government*. London, England: Verso.

Wilson, James Q. 1975. *Thinking About Crime*. New York: Basic.

Wolfram. 2011. *Wolfram Alpha*. Publicly available economic data online.

World Bank. 1998. *Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank. 2002. *Cities on the Move: a World Bank Urban Transport Strategy Review*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank. 2011. "Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge." Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

World Values Survey. 2005. www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

Yang, Karen J. 2006. *Media Coverage of Establishment and Non-Establishment Candidates in Argentina's 2003 Presidential Election*. Dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

Yashar, Deborah. 1999. "Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America." *World Politics* 52(1): 76-104.

NEWS SOURCES

Arrazola, Carlos. 2007. "Otto Fernando Pérez: Un militar retirado de derecha." Guatemala City: *Nuestro Diario*. November 4, 2007.

Aznárez, Juan Jesús. 1997. "Bánzer, favorito en los comicios de hoy en Bolivia." *El País*. Madrid, Spain. June 1, 1997.

Barrionuevo, Alexei. 2010. "After Operations, Rio's Forces Greeted by Wariness." *New York Times*. December 9, 2010.

Canales, P. and P. García. 2010. "Frei remarca vínculos de la Alianza con gobierno de Pinochet." *La Tercera*. Santiago, Chile. January 12, 2010.

Caracol. 1998. "General Bedoya: llegar a la paz ganando la guerra." Bogotá, Colombia. May 29, 1998.

Caracol. 1999. "Mayoría de colombianos cree que puede haber un golpe militar." Bogotá, Colombia. April 29, 1999.

Caracol. 2010. "La legalidad democrática, primera propuesta conjunta de Mockus y Fajardo." Bogotá, Colombia. April 5, 2010.

Casas-Zamora, Kevin. 2012. "La delincuencia en Venezuela." *La Nación* (Costa Rica). San José, Costa Rica. February 19, 2012.

Cooperativa. 2009. "Eduardo Frei presentó su programa de Gobierno centrado en la equidad social." Santiago, Chile. September 7, 2009.

Enriquez, Sam and Alex Renderos. 2005. "In Gang-Plagued Honduras, the Softer Stance Takes the Presidency." *Los Angeles Times*. Los Angeles, California. November 29, 2005.

El Espectador. 2009. "Colombia permitirá que Estados Unidos use bases aéreas colombianos." Bogotá, Colombia: February 27, 2009.

El Espectador. 2010. "Nueva encuesta refleja que Santos baja y Mockus sube." Bogotá, Colombia. April 16, 2010.

El Espectador. 2010. "Mockus de llegar a la Presidencia buscaría la legalidad democrática." Bogotá, Colombia. April 19, 2010.

El Espectador. 2010. "Santos asegura que apoya cadena perpetua para violadores de niños." Bogotá, Colombia. April 24, 2010.

El Espectador. 2010. "Homicidios aumentaron en Colombia un 16% en 2009." Bogotá, Colombia. May 4, 2010.

El Espectador. 2010. "Empate técnico entre Santos y Mockus en nueva encuesta." Bogotá, Colombia. May 13, 2010.

El Espectador. 2010. "Juan Manuel Santos: No nos inventamos los falsos positivos, los acabamos." Bogotá, Colombia: May 28, 2010.

El País. 2009. "Colombia promete 'generosidad' para los guerrilleros de las FARC que dejen las armas." Madrid, Spain. February 6, 2009.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Samper adelanta a Pastrana." Bogotá, Colombia. February 20, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Capitalismo social propone Samper." Bogotá, Colombia. March 3, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Intelectuales respaldan candidatura de Samper." Bogotá, Colombia. May 22, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Llegará a su fin el conflicto armado en Colombia." Bogotá, Colombia. May 25, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "El miedo y la inseguridad." Bogotá, Colombia. May 25, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Por fin el debate usted decide." Bogotá, Colombia. May 25, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Rehenes en un bus por cuatro horas." Bogotá, Colombia. May 26, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Samper, una mano a la inseguridad." Bogotá, Colombia. May 27, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1994. "Samper lanza plan de seguridad ciudadana." Bogotá, Colombia. June 1, 1994.

El Tiempo. 1997. "Yo seguiré siendo el general para ustedes." Bogotá, Colombia. July 26, 1997.

El Tiempo. 1997. "Del arte de la guerra al arte de la política." Bogotá, Colombia. August 10, 1997.

El Tiempo. 1997. "Encuestas sobre presidenciales a quién creerle." Bogotá, Colombia. December 20, 1997.

El Tiempo. 1997. "A Serrano le suena la vicepresidencia." Bogotá, Colombia. December 12, 1997.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Campaña de 'todos contra todos'." Bogotá, Colombia. February 19, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Por qué no un general?" Bogotá, Colombia. February 21, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Recuperación de la justicia, prioridad de mi gobierno." Bogotá, Colombia. February 25, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "La prioridad es la paz." Bogotá, Colombia. February 27, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Por qué suben y por qué bajan." Bogotá, Colombia. April 5, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Bedoya debe concretarse: expertos." Bogotá, Colombia. April 14, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Propuestas imprecisas: expertos." Bogotá, Colombia. April 14, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "General Harold Bedoya Pizarro." Bogotá, Colombia. April 22, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Y los 'vices' ¿en qué andan?" Bogotá, Colombia. April 24, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Mediación externa para el conflicto." Bogotá, Colombia. May 7, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Campañas aconsejan ajuste inmediato." Bogotá, Colombia. May 15, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Harold Bedoya cuestiona a las ONG y a E.U." Bogotá, Colombia. May 21, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Paz para Colombia, Bedoya." Bogotá, Colombia. May 22, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Bedoya, optimista fotonoticia." Bogotá, Colombia. May 27, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "La malicia da para todo." Bogotá, Colombia. May 29, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "Bedoya, con la mira en eventual fraude." Bogotá, Colombia. May 30, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1998. "El fenómeno Bedoya cayó en picada." Bogotá, Colombia. June 2, 1998.

El Tiempo. 1999. "Opinómetro." Bogotá, Colombia. April 29, 1999.

El Tiempo. 2001. "Uribe Vélez va en ascenso." Bogotá, Colombia. August 25, 2001.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Tiene gasolina Uribe." Bogotá, Colombia. January 31, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Pizano, el vice de Uribe." Bogotá, Colombia. February 22, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Guerra y la paz." Bogotá, Colombia. March 20, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Listos, primeros vices." Bogotá, Colombia. March 21, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Apoyo a los periodistas." Bogotá, Colombia. March 23, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "No a respaldo de paras." Bogotá, Colombia. March 23, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Gobierno revivió el Upac." Bogotá, Colombia. April 1, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Uribe pedirá a Europa ayuda antiterrorista." Bogotá, Colombia. April 2, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Vices, en cacería de votos." Bogotá, Colombia. May 13, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Candidatos hablan de la justicia." Bogotá, Colombia. May 14, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2002. "Candidatos rechazan otro despeje." Bogotá, Colombia. May 20, 2002.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Seguridad democrática." Bogotá, Colombia. February 22, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Por qué Angelino." Bogotá, Colombia. March 14, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Mockus tendría el 41,5% de intención de voto en segunda vuelta y Santos el 29%, según Datexco." Bogotá, Colombia. April 30, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Los retos de la seguridad urbana, según el Partido de 'la U' y el Partido Verde." Bogotá, Colombia. May 12, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Lucha contra el delito en ciudades, los candidatos presidenciales opinan." Bogotá, Colombia. May 12, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Desplazamiento forzado: las posturas de Mockus y de Santos sobre el tema." Bogotá, Colombia. May 17, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Candidatos presidenciales cerraron campañas." Bogotá, Colombia. May 23, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Desplazamiento, el primer tema." Bogotá, Colombia. May 26, 2010.

El Tiempo. 2010. "Mockus y Santos hablaron con 'El País' de España." Bogotá, Colombia. May 27, 2010.

El Universo. 2002. "Ecuador cierra campaña por presidencia." Guayaquil, Ecuador. October 17, 2002.

Elías, José. 2011. "Vuelven los militares, pero no el Ejército." *El País*. Madrid, Spain. September 9, 2011.

Folha. 2002. "Leia frases de José Serra em sabatina da Folha de S.Paulo." São Paulo, Brazil. August 16, 2002.

Folha. 2002. "PT pretende ampliar indenização a vítimas da repressão sob militares." São Paulo, Brazil. September 13, 2002.

Folha. 2002. "Anistia Internacional se reúne com presidenciáveis." São Paulo, Brazil. September 19, 2002.

Font, Juan Luis and Claudia Méndez Arriaza. 2007. "El general del puño Otto Pérez Molina Presidenciable por el Partido Patriota." *El Periódico* (Guatemala). May 27, 2007.

Frayssinet, Fabiana. 2009. "Mixed Reviews for 'Community Policing' in Slums." *IPS Noticias*. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. May 22, 2009.

Globo. 2002. "Mobilização contra a violência." Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. January 19, 2002.

Globo. 2002. "Festa na política." Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. June 11, 2002.

Globo. 2002. "A campanha e os candidatos." Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. September 19, 2002.

Globo. 2002. "O dia de campanha dos principais candidatos à Presidência." Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. September 21, 2002.

Glüsing, Jens. 2007. "Child Soldiers in the Drug Wars." *Spiegel*. Hamburg, Germany. March 2, 2007.

Jiménez, Sergio Javier. 2006. "Promete Calderón cadena perpetua para quien secuestre niños." *El Universal*. Mexico City, Mexico. April 30, 2006.

La Nación (Chile). 2009. "Piñera critica a Frei y al gobierno en materia de delincuencia." Santiago, Chile. November 29, 2009.

La Nación (Chile). 2010. "Frei y Piñera: Confrontacional debate a 6 días del balotaje." Santiago, Chile. January 12, 2010.

Landauro, Inti and Darcy Crowe. 2010. "Colombia's Santos Reorients Campaign." *Wall Street Journal*. New York, New York. May 1, 2010.

Latin American Regional Report. 2002. "Mayor's murder puts focus on crime." February 2002.

Latin American Weekly Report. 2002. "Bogotá discusses truce with ELN, as US prepares to lift curbs on military aid." March 19, 2002.

Latin American Weekly Report. 2002. "Serpa warns that the paramilitaries may impose Colombia's next president." March 26, 2002.

Margotta, Carlos. 2010. "Piñera no cree en los derechos humanos." *La Nación* (Chile). Santiago, Chile. January 13, 2010.

Muñoz, Carmen. 2002. "Álvaro Uribe, candidato colombiano: «Ningún Gobierno puede apoyar a terroristas que actúan contra pueblos democráticos»." *ABC*. Madrid, Spain. April 14, 2002.

Nueva Provincia. 2007. "Roberto Lavagna reiteró propuesta sobre seguridad." *La Nueva Provincia*. Bahía Blanca, Argentina. October 23, 2007.

Núñez, Rogelio. 2011. "Otto Pérez Molina, mucho más que sólo 'mano dura'." *Infolatam* (Santiago). September 12, 2011.

Ortiz Cuenca, Julio Enrique. 2010. "Santos y la prosperidad democrática." *La Nación* (Colombia). Neiva, Colombia. April 26, 2010.

Prensa Libre. 2011. "Pérez Molina encabeza la preferencia." Guatemala City, Guatemala. November 3, 2011.

Primera Hora. 2009. "Lacalle advirtió sobre riesgo institucional por falta de seguridad pública." San José, Uruguay. May 8, 2009.

RCN. 2010. "Se incrementaron los homicidios en Medellín y Cali." Bogotá, Colombia. April 1, 2010.

Reuters. 2007. "Leftist pulls ahead in Guatemala election poll." October 29, 2007.

Roig-Franzia, Manuel. 2007. "Colom Wins Presidency in Guatemalan Runoff." *Washington Post*. November 5, 2007.

Ronderos, María Teresa. 1998. "Harold Bedoya de la guerra a la política." *El Tiempo*. Bogotá, Colombia. May 10, 1998.

Semana. 1994. "Más Clinton que Bush." Bogotá, Colombia. March 7, 1994.

Semana. 1998. "Bedoya al ataque." Bogotá, Colombia. March 23, 1998.

Semana. 2002. "De malas Pizano." Bogotá, Colombia. March 18, 2002.

Semana. 2010. "Candidatos asumen fallo como recta final de campaña." Bogotá, Colombia. February 26, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "Bandas criminales son comandadas por mandos medios de antiguos 'paras': ONU." Bogotá, Colombia. March 11, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "Así fue el 'Gran Debate'." Bogotá, Colombia. March 24, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "El timonazo." Bogotá, Colombia. May 8, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "También caerás." Bogotá, Colombia. May 15, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "Primer cara a cara entre Mockus y Santos." Bogotá, Colombia. June 3, 2010.

Semana. 2010. "En Citytv: duro contrapunteo entre los candidatos a la Presidencia." Bogotá, Colombia. June 10, 2010.

Schemo, Diana Jean. 1997. "In Colombia, Suport Grows for a Candidate With a Hard Line." *New York Times*. New York, New York. November 2, 1997.

Seijo, Lorena and Francisco González Arrecis. 2007. "Propuestas de candidatos antes inseguridad." *Prensa Libre* (Guatemala). Guatemala City, Guatemala. August 20, 2007.

Silva, Alessandro. 2000. "Crime cresce menos com PM comunitária." *Folha*. São Paulo, Brazil. October 29, 2000.

Sociedad Uruguaya. 2009. "Encuesta sobre 'aptitudes' de candidatos ubica a los de la izquierda mejor que nadie, salvo en combatir la delincuencia." Montevideo, Uruguay. April 28, 2009.

Teledoce. 2009. "Lacalle propone mano dura contra delincuencia." Montevideo, Uruguay. October 23, 2009.

Tercera. 2009. "Frei lanza campaña de segunda vuelta: 'Soy el heredero histórico de los presidentes de la Concertación.'" Santiago, Chile. December 16, 2009.

Universal (Colombia). 2010. "Se cayó referendo de cadena perpetua para los violadores." Cartagena, Colombia. May 26, 2010.

Velázquez-Gaztelu, J. P. 2002. "Entrevista: Francisco Santos: 'Lo que Colombia necesita es restaurar la autoridad y la ley'." *El País*. Madrid, Spain. March 21, 2002.

Vieira, Constanza. 2009. "Uribe acuerda 'acceso' estadounidense a bases militares." *IPS Noticias*. July 17, 2009.

Vita

Randy Sunwin Uang attended public schools in Cupertino, California, and received a B.A. in Spanish and mathematics from Cornell University in 2005.

Email address: uang@utexas.edu

This dissertation was typed by the author.